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Abstract 
This multi-layered narrative inquiry focuses on the struggles of six counsellors to uphold 
ethical standards of practice, despite external pressures to the contrary. It is situated 
firmly within postmodern and constructivist traditions where both personal and social 
dimensions of the experiences are included; local and marginalised voices are privileged; 
and divisions between art, therapy and research are disrupted. 
The narratives were powerfully and evocatively told and, in the (re)presentation, I have 
endeavoured to maintain this evocative expression. This provides a compelling and unique 
insight into the disturbing nature of such pressure, which was considerable and 
unpleasant. It included bullying and intimidation, accompanied by efforts to malign the 
identity of the person. This is considered in relation to victim blaming discourses and 
impact on identity. 
The counsellors tended to hold values of relationship and responsibility to the individual, 
yet they felt unsupported and profoundly isolated throughout the critical period. This was 
compounded by the bullying as well as feelings of being personally culpable and shamed. 
The counselling profession is thus challenged to provide safe arenas for such experiences 
to be considered. 
In the retelling, their accounts became more complex (including narratives that counter 
those of resistance) and relational (including concern for the position of the powerful 
other). Links were made to early childhood experiences which the contributors felt to 
have been particularly constitutive of their ethical identity. Identity seems to have been 
further reconstituted through the telling and retelling of the narratives as well as through 
the impact of the critical incidents themselves. 
Creative reflexive and autoethnographic practices similarly allowed the re-storying and 
reconstitution of researcher identity, and again invoked key constitutive experiences from 
early lived experience, some of which were profoundly personal. Assumed neutrality of 
researchers is thus comprehensively challenged, and the value of creative approaches to 
reflexive inquiry affirmed. 
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Writing this introduction is both the beginning of an end and the end of a beginning: It 
marks the beginning of the end of a great adventure where I have found new ways of 
thinking, of hearing, of being. And it marks the end of the beginning of my life as a 
researcher. In some ways it has been very difficult to write up this study, and yet in some 
ways it has written itself, and indeed has also written (or re-written) me. 
It is hard to find a clear way to describe my process of carrying out this research project as 
my learning from it has not been incremental or straightforward and I am aware that my 
understanding of it is still incomplete, in process. I am beginning to accept that it will 
inevitably always be so. At the beginning of this venture I had expected that I would find 
something out, find answers to key research questions, reveal hitherto unknown or at 
least unacknowledged aspects of life. I thought that I would now be 'writing it up'. But I 
discovered the work of Laurel Richardson (e. g. 1990,1992,1997,2000) amongst others 
and was shown that there was more to writing than that. Writing became a way of 
inquiring, a way of knowing, a way of being. And that leaves me with the predicament that 
as long as I write I keep learning and discovering. The writing continues to open 
possibilities and new directions. The adventure, once begun, is difficult to stop. But stop it 
must and so the writing has to change. Reluctantly it has to find a way of closing itself 
down. 
I am also increasingly aware as I look back through my memories, and my narrations of 
those memories, that what I recollect and what I tell is likewise not there to be recalled 
clearly by myself nor straightforwardly revealed to others. As I turn my attention to the 
beginnings and the events that I have lived through so far I sift, I select, I remember some 
things and fail to remember others. I also realise that I am struggling to access and disclose 
a version of my'self that no longer exists (e. g. Drewery and Winslade 1997). More than 
that, I am trying to do this whilst also describing the period of my life that brought about 
those changes, that fundamentally re-constituted that self and in the telling I will be 
further re-constituted (Wortteam, 2000; Anderson, 1997; White and Epston, 1990). 
From the beginning I understood that I was strongly connected to this field of inquiry. I 
knew that I was interested in studying counsellors' experiences of being pressured to 
practice in a way that they felt to be unethical as I had undergone similar experiences, and 
I knew from colleagues that my experiences were not unusual. At the time of applying for 
the ESRC studentship that has funded this study I had found myself in a familiar situation 
of working in an organisation whose values clashed with my own. I was also in a position 
of powerlessness with regard to the hierarchical structure of that organisation, such that I 
was clearly expected to override my personal and professional principles without 
question. I was expected to adopt the values of my superiors, I was expected to obey. I 
tried to argue from my position as a well-qualified and experienced counsellor but 
counselling was accorded little status or respect in that institution and in fact, counselling, 
counsellors and clients were commonly ridiculed. And this was not the first time that I had 
experienced such attitudes and not the first time that I was expected to conduct myself 
professionally in a way that I believed to be unethical. 
So I knew that I had experiences that had motivated me to explore this area and to try to 
find answers to some quite personal questions, but at the outset I had no idea how far this 
would go. I prepared myself for a heuristic and somewhat reflexive approach as I knew 
that there was likely to be overlap between my experiences and those of contributors in 
professional terms. What surprised me, though, was the extent to which the sense of 
engagement, new understanding and transformation that I was undergoing was 
profoundly personal. Much of my life history was revealed to me from perspectives that 
were previously inaccessible. I wasn't recovering memories per se but I was certainly 
finding new meanings for my memories, I was vividly re-experiencing them, and some of 
them were profoundly painful, even traumatic. These are the main focus of Chapter Seven. 
The accompanying intellectual and philosophical challenges were also somewhat 
alarming. Soon after embarking on this period of study I began to develop a sense of being 
almost overwhelmed by the situation that I had put myself into. I was clearly at an exciting 
point in my professional life; I had gained a place at a prestigious university to study 
something that really interested me. However, it was also very daunting: I had left secure 
employment as a professional practitioner and the success of my future career would now 
depend on what I was able to make of the opportunity that I had been given. Clearly then, I 
was keen that my research would be well regarded and seen to be of an acceptable 
standard. But I was also keen that it would do me justice in more personal ways. That it 
would not betray the ethics, standards and values that I had developed and defended 
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throughout my life, and particularly through my years of experience as a counsellor, 
counselling supervisor and counselling educator. But as I have already mentioned, the self 
that held these values was in a process of transformation. I was trying to remain true and 
constant to a self that was itself remaining neither true nor constant. 
Carr (1995) affirms that values are vital in influencing choices in research and he is critical 
of attempts to use research strategies infused by one set of values in order to study 
practices that are infused by another. So I worked hard to identify my values, to pin them 
down and relate them to my research choices and practices. But, throughout this period of 
study the self that I had known, and the values that I had used to navigate my life by began 
to mutate and my insecurities grew. 
A particular difficulty for me was that throughout my adult life I have held a strong 
personal value of honesty and authenticity. I also valued creativity and freedom of 
expression but saw this as distinct from the honesty and sincerity that I so prized. I did not 
consider how uncomfortably authenticity and creativity might sit alongside each other. I 
had certainly not comprehended the extent to which our reality might itself be created by 
us and between us, and that we may not simply reveal a pre-existing self but rather 
continually construct (and co-construct in relation with others) an ever-shifting complex 
of selfhood. In my world the concept of authenticity as a real and attainable personal 
attribute had never really been questioned until this time, despite some considerable 
exposure to 'new paradigm' thinking. Indeed the striving for such authenticity was carried 
as a core duty. Likewise the idea of an essential 'self with integrity had been pretty much 
taken for granted. So these challenges hit me with full force and I really struggled to 
maintain, or rather, to regain some equilibrium. I was of course caught between the two 
worldviews of realism and poststructuralism, trying to force a realist / essentialist 
framework to co-exist with poststructuralist perspectives. I have to say that, to some 
extent, this apparent contradiction remains unresolved. It has settled into being a core 
paradox (see Leitch, 2003) that I am gradually getting used to living with. 
When I started out on this undertaking I strongly identified as a person-centred counsellor 
with values that were based on humanistic philosophy. For me, at that time, this seemed to 
represent a moral standpoint regarding all interpersonal relations. The positioning of such 
humanistic approaches to practice, as standing for a fundamental respect for the rights of 
each individual as well as recognition of their personal integrity, seemed straightforward. I 
was however, also aware that counselling is not well served by adherence to entrenched 
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camps, which can have a divisive effect within the profession. I was particularly keen that 
ethics-related research should have relevance for all practitioners irrespective of their 
theoretical allegiance. As such, I aimed to put aside my personal preferences and to 
transcend such differences. I wanted to recognise and welcome the diversity of 
approaches as well as rigorous efforts to integrate them. 
The importance of this increased when it became clear that the counsellors who 
volunteered to take part in this research came from diverse backgrounds with disparate 
trainings and theoretical allegiances. I may have been justified in privileging my own 
approach if I were working solely with similar others but this was not the case. Yet I also 
had to work from the skill base that I had and (remembering my value of integrity and 
authenticity) I wanted to 'own up' to the inevitability that my person-centred 'way of 
being' (Rogers, 1980) would infuse my research conversations. 
In Cooper and Rowan (1999: 2) 1 found an assertion that I felt to be in harmony with my 
situation. They argue that finding "a way of embracing contemporary critical thinking 
without losing the human being in the process" is a major challenge for present day 
psychologists, psychotherapists and counsellors. In this research I attempt to meet this 
challenge by engaging mindfully with postmodern and poststructuralist perspectives 
(which recognise that individual experience cannot be reduced to simple truths but is 
multi-layered and constructed within a social and cultural context) whilst holding fast to 
humanistic ways of connecting and responding to others. These included empathic 
witnessing and engaging with relational depth. In this way I felt more able to step outside 
of pre-existing structuralist approaches and the debates or rivalries between them, and 
also to avoid the adoption of interpretive or analytic frames that might feel differentially 
inclusive or exclusive to the counsellors taking part 
It was not an easy solution though. The rigorous questioning of authentic truth requires a 
degree of scepticism with regard to the self-reports of those taking part that I was 
unwilling to accept. And I found such scepticism to be an effective privileging of the 
researcher's position, something I was very keen to avoid, or at least minimise. These 
themes of problematizing truth, and discomfort with the privileging of the researcher are 
played out throughout the thesis. 
I had additional concerns with the way in which poststructuralism privileges language as a 
constitutive force and, within psychology in particular, it allies itself with psychodynamic 
thinking. To some extent I wanted to avoid both of these inclinations. 
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Some of the "limits of language" are clearly delineated by Leitch (2003: 60-62) and the 
poststructuralist focus on this is also problematic for me as embodied experience and pre- 
linguistic awareness have long been significant in both my personal and professional life. 
Somewhat incongruously then, I include only written representations in this study. The 
focus is on the storying of experience rather than other forms of telling or discovering 
such as visual art, music or dance. This is essentially for practical and pragmatic reasons 
and I am aware that much is lost in this decision, but also that there have been substantial 
gains, for instance in the space that it has afforded for rich and evocative tellings and 
retellings of the narratives. Writing and telling are, however, acknowledged as embodied 
processes. 
I wished to avoid psychodynamic analysis as this represents one of the main'schools' 
within the counselling and psychotherapy community and was the preferred theoretical 
framework of some of the counsellors involved in the research whist being explicitly 
rejected by others. In addition, one of the narratives in the study describes the imposition 
of a psychodynamic frame as a bullying experience (Chapter Five). 
My response to these dilemmas was to make a working distinction between 
poststructuralism and postmodernism and to embrace a more postmodern bricolage of 
creative narrative perspectives. This has allowed a degree of artistry and artfulness in 
approach that, to some extent, compensates for the lack of non-text based representations 
of experience. It also includes much of value from poststructuralist perspectives, including 
a focus on meaning-making (Bruner, 1986; 1990), knowledge and power (Foucault, e. g. 
1980), feminist respect for different voices (Gilligan, 1982) and deconstruction of taken- 
for-granted assumptions (Derrida, 1978; 1981). Throughout I am seeking to honour 
human experience and to identify'thick descriptions' (Geertz, 1973; 1983) as multi- 
faceted and multi-storied (Speedy, 2001). It is not constrained by the need to identify'core 
stories' or'answers' or to support a particular view or model. Emerging, as well as 
dominant narratives are valued, including those of the reflexive researcher. 
From these struggles, two particular threads can be identified throughout the thesis. One 
(as must already be apparent in this introduction) is the thoroughly reflexive stance used 
to explore my motivation and position regarding research into ethical coercion (the 
rationale and procedures for this are further debated and described in Chapters Two, Four 
and Six). The second thread is the commitment to (re)present the narratives that I have 
collected in ways that maintain and emphasise the evocative ways in which they were told. 
These stories are told in Chapter Five, with additional excerpts layered into Chapters Six, 
Seven and Eight. I also attempt to bring these two themes together and have found some 
resolution within the complex interaction between them by experimenting with creative / 
therapeutic forms of writing and especially by producing somewhat fictionalised accounts 
of my own lived experience (Chapter Seven). In doing this I have blurred some divisions 
between research, therapy and creative writing that may previously have been taken-for- 
granted and, in this way old boundaries such as between art and science, or therapy and 
research are challenged (see for example Clough, 2002; Ellis, 1995; Etherington, 2000; 
Leitch, 2003). 
It was clear from the outset that the people who volunteered to contribute to this project 
would not be referred to as subjects. My first degree had straddled positivist psychology 
and what were then seen as radical perspectives. The groundbreaking book, 'Changing the 
Subject' (Henriques et al, 1984) had been very influential in my developing academic 
identity. Increasingly at that time such people were known as 'co-researchers' but that has 
always felt phoney to me. A student of mine (Cummings, 2005) chose to use the term 
'informant' to describe the person who shared her experiences and stories with him in his 
autoethnographic project. For him and his project this fitted well, for me it has echoes of 
shady police work I wanted the process to be collaborative but the descriptor 
'collaborator' took me to thoughts of those who could not be trusted in times of conflict. As 
I became more aware of the extent of the bullying and subsequent victimising that these 
people had endured the fashionable therapeutic term 'survivor' became a possibility but 
this felt to be an inappropriate imposition and also excluded many contrary aspects of 
their narratives. I began to use the term 'participants' but increasingly felt that they were 
much more than this. My project would not exist without them; I would be lost without 
them. I started to recognise that, in some ways they were my guides, but our relationship 
and associated power dynamics were more complex than this. The terms that fitted best 
were 'fellow travellers' or 'companions' but this seemed pretentious. So I settled on 
'contributors'. I hope that this reflects the active nature of their input and acknowledges 
my inevitable ownership of the project whilst avoiding unnecessarily florid language. 
So what started out as a straightforward project to identify factors that influence 
counsellors' struggles to maintain ethical counselling (when there are external pressures 
to do otherwise) rapidly shifted to an exploration of meaning, meaning-mating, identity 
and relationship. More than that, the relationships that we forged through jointly taking 
part in the research were unexpectedly significant. Amongst other things I was compelled 
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to recognise the complexity of my own experiences as well as those of my contributors 
and they made it clear to me that it may sometimes be difficult to distinguish between 
resistance and capitulation. That ethical / moral identity is constituted through the 
creation and articulation of the narrative, as well as through the impact of the critical 
incident itself, became apparent. 
I had, to some extent, acknowledged that experience of such situations would somehow be 
related to conceptions of self and personal life-story. My core research question, What is 
the quality of the experience of being coerced in a way that was ethically challenging' had 
indeed been supplemented by an additional curiosity, ' how do such experiences relate to 
conceptions of identity and personal life-story? ' 
But still the links made to intense and painful early experiences were unexpected and at 
times shocking. Again I was provoked to turn to my own experiences and found similar 
links to be made. Now I am not claiming here that all such experiences can be explained by 
unresolved issues from childhood, or even that any such experiences can easily be 
explained in this way but personal history appears to be important to those of us involved 
in this study, at least in the sense-making. 
Throughout this thesis I choose to be very careful about how much I disclose in telling the 
stories of my experiences as a counsellor. Unlike my contributors I cannot have the 
protection of anonymity and of course this means that others connected to my stories 
would likewise be exposed if I were to give detailed accounts of incidents or settings. 
Clients may even recognise circumstances connected to their counselling and this would 
be a perverse course of action for a research project related to counselling ethics. So I limit 
myself to only giving sufficient information to enable the reader to understand my 
connection to the field, to have a sense of what motivated me to carry out this research 
where I ask other counsellors, "Has this ever happened to you too? " 
Richardson (2000: 927) points out that "social science writing uses metaphor at every 
level" and that metaphors external to a piece of research prefigure the analysis with a 
'truth value' code that belongs to another domain. Such metaphors appear neutral and 
literal because the values are so entrenched and familiar. Metaphors of construction such 
as framework, foundation, support and building are common in more traditional research 
(see Lakoff and Johnson, 1987) and there has been some feminist resistance to this as 
shown in the increased preference for the metaphor of story. Of course my research write 
up will inevitably be storied. This is narrative research and my own reflexive account of it 
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will thus take an explicitly narrative form. But I also wish to avoid too heavy a reliance on 
metaphors that may be taken-for-granted or become invisible in the writing, so I must 
explicitly look for another and make this decision visible. 
A popular metaphor for accounting for the research process is that of a personal journey 
and I expected to adopt this form when I started out (Bridges, 2006). This has the benefit 
of explicitly including the researcher's reflexive process as well as doing justice to the 
progressive nature of much research. My story, however, does not make so much sense in 
those terms. There would be an awful lot of false starts, hanging around feeling 
disorientated, trying to purchase or borrow better maps, going over the same ground and 
asking, "haven't we been here before? " Now that recognition of going over the same 
ground gets my attention. And a gardening metaphor seems very appropriate for a 
country girl with a background in the personal growth movement. 
I had been given an allotment, a plot of unkempt land, earth, ground. And I had to create 
some order, but not too much -I didn't want a formal garden more suited to times 
constrained by thoughts of correctness and formulaic rules but still discipline was needed. 
The ground would need to be prepared, enriched, fertilised. I expected that, to some 
extent, I would reap what I sowed but I knew that the outcome would not be entirely in my 
hands, there would be cross-fertilisation as well as self-seeding, I didn't want to fill all of 
the gaps. On the contrary I was drawn to possibilities of creating space and movement. 
A garden is not just a place for plants. Gardens can be littered with all manner of objet 
trouve, not to mention resting-places, gateways and various devices for the shelter and 
sustenance of wildlife. I would need all such things in my garden. You see this is no 
ordinary garden. This is a place where I came to try to understand efforts towards 
goodness. The Garden of Eden comes to mind but here we have a mirror image of sorts, a 
place to go after fall from grace rather than before. Or so I hoped. 
And when I discussed this with my supervisor she told me that gardening is an act of faith, 
you plant the seeds and you trust that some will grow. But it is not just seeds that are 
buried in gardens. Many things can be interred there. Perhaps that is partly what I did as I 
embedded my story with those of others? But things can also be dug up; treasures found 
from times past or perhaps just previously hidden unpleasantnesses. Indeed all such 
things were found in my garden. And I think I am left a little wiser, and maybe more 
realistic even while resisting realism. 
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Chapter Two 
Root Theories and Philosophies 
2.1 Stepping into the landscape 
This ground that I have been given has not been neatly prepared for my use. In fact I find 
myself in a place of considerable turmoil. Seemingly incompatible ideas, beliefs and values 
compete for light as well as firm ground. Crises and particularly crises of legitimation 
(Habermas, 1972) surround me, and there are two main aspects of this that are especially 
relevant to my research. Firstly there is a crisis of professionalisation, which is currently 
very acute in the cluster of professions which include counselling, counselling psychology 
and psychotherapy. Secondly there are the crises of legitimation as regards the status of 
academic inquiry. It is the intertwining of these two crises that I will focus on here. 
It is important to recognise that those involved in counselling are not alone. Other 
professional groups affected by these twin crises include teachers, various health care 
staff, social workers and probation officers. The professional is under scrutiny as never 
before since the actions of Beverley Allitt, Harold Shipman, Professor Sir Roy Meadows 
and numerous others have come into the public gaze. Related to this, there is an increased 
need for public accountability and consequent debates about the form that such 
accountability should take. The growth in strength of the evidence-based movement and 
the subsequent setting up of the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) have 
enormous implications for claims of legitimacy with regard to both therapeutic practice 
and research. And in the process both are increasingly politicised. We appear to be 
entering a season where there is effective governmental control of both professionalism 
and associated research; what counts as legitimate evidence and what can be 
countenanced as legitimate practice. There is a fear that anything not cultivated within 
approved conventions will be weeded out. 
Perceived disconnection between research and practice in the various therapy professions 
makes them a soft target for allegations of illegitimacy and even delusion. This is 
exacerbated by an anti-therapy climate prevalent in society in general and the media in 
particular. Participation in therapeutic practice is sometimes seen as self-indulgence in 
clients and exploitation in practitioners. Understandably, such a climate will engender 
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strenuous attempts to demonstrate rigour within the terms of those raising the objections 
in some quarters alongside resistance to the underlying terms of the challengers in other 
quarters. A divided profession results and when large stakes are at risk, relating to finance, 
power and influence, then practices of protectionism, posturing, positioning and privilege 
abound. This appears to be the situation counsellors find themselves in. The forward 
march of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) and its effectiveness in these battles 
appears to be a direct consequence of its relationship to evidence-based practice. There 
have been ensuing calls from other approaches to follow suit but there is a key sticking 
point. Whereas the underpinning philosophical basis of CBT is consistent with a 'scientist 
/ practitioner' model of practice this has not been the case for the majority of counselling 
schools. As Speedy (2001: 18) observes, counsellors fear that "a 'research climate' may 
change the way we work", and Johns (1998: 10) portrayed attempts to bridge academia 
and counselling as feeling like being, "trapped in two shotgun marriages" with neither 
being consistently productive. This analogy of a dysfunctional marriage is developed by 
counselling psychologists Lane and Corrie (2006: 15). 
"One of the central difficulties in attempting to marry science and practice 
within a single model of practice... Is that scientists and practitioners have 
fundamentally different priorities. Whilst the scientist is arguably concerned 
with knowledge that is rigorous, objective and generalisable, the practitioner is 
more concerned with knowledge that is subjective, holistic and applicable to 
the individual" 
However, times are changing and so Lane and Corrie go on to recognise that there is now 
shifting ground and that more complex formulations of both science and practice are 
emerging. Research in counselling and psychotherapy is influenced by forces, trends and 
traditions in the social sciences in general whilst also having its own unique issues and 
influences, and the emerging formulations referred to by Lane and Corrie likewise 
combine such influences. As stated above, however, we remain in conditions of crisis and 
are caught amidst competing tensions. In the context of increasingly widespread evidence- 
based assumptions, defence of any innovation in methods is habitually demanded. 
My focus is on the context of counselling rather than on the practice of counselling itself. I 
do not have to justify choice of therapeutic intervention, however I am part of a 
professional community that is encumbered by these issues and it would be remiss of me 
to try to side-step them here. Both the contributors and the potential audience of this 
work are likewise subject to these debates. I do, therefore, have to account for my choice 
of research intervention and also attempt to make some of my own processes and 
decisions regarding the positioning and direction of this research visible. 
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That this research would be a narrative inquiry of sorts was already prescribed for me. 
The opportunity to apply for the studentship was advertised as such. But the type of 
narrative inquiry, or the particular 'take' on narrative inquiry was open to me. Narrative 
approaches encompass a wide range of disparate perspectives and I had to find my own 
position and coherence within this range. I will therefore start here by locating this piece 
of research within the broad traditions of social science as well as considering issues more 
peculiar to the therapy professions and to narrative inquiry. 
2.2 Cutting back: Acknowledging the positivist legacy 
Most research in most disciplines, including the social sciences, has been influenced by the 
'modernist project', which grew out of the Enlightenment of the 17th century. The spirit of 
this project was to break through the oppressive legacy of religious dogma and feudal 
authority of that time, and in this it radically transformed the European world and the 
lives of many for the better. This modernist project and its goal of orderly progress 
towards controlling the natural and social worlds through the rational evaluation of 
empirical evidence was especially affirmed by Comte, who advised the establishment of 
scientific laws through objective and methodical observation (Bassey, 1996; Crotty, 1998; 
Delanty, 1997; Smith, 1998; Usher, 1996). This repudiation of religion and superstition, 
and the proposed ascendance of science within a systematic law-seeking framework, 
however, relied on a shared belief in a reality (realism) which pre-exists independently of 
any awareness of it (objectivism) and can be accurately represented through knowledge 
founded within disciplines (foundationalism). Thus it is associated with positivism, which 
has proved to be a resilient philosophy from its early roots in Comte and 17th century 
empiricism to vigorous 20th and early 21st century debates regarding whether to embrace 
or disclaim it. It remains the dominant means of making sense of the world and largely 
determines the status of knowledge. 
The immense success of positivist science is particularly evidenced through the 
achievements of engineering and medicine and I and countless others put our lives in the 
hands of some positivist enterprise daily. It is thus clearly a tempting position for many to 
occupy, including me. As I have described in the introduction, I had concerns that my 
research should be taken seriously and positivist approaches bring authority and powerful 
claims of truth-finding and rigour. My research describes positions of powerlessness 
experienced by myself and by other counsellors so it was indeed tempting to adopt a more 
powerful position here. Despite this evident success though, there have been dissenting 
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voices throughout the modernist period and these have gathered pace in a batch of post- 
positivist perspectives. 
2.3 Identifying the bedrock Some basic concerns 
The question that continues to drive these arguments is whether sociology, psychology etc 
can or should be regarded as sciences. For my part this is of little consequence, science is 
not my aspiration. These arguments now have a tiredness about them yet still they raise 
fierce passions. Surely there must be something more to this than inclusion in an academic 
coterie, even if it is a rather elite one? Digging deeper reveals basic concerns about the 
extent to which the produce from the various positions can be claimed to be truthful or 
whether such claims are essentially unpalatable. Integrity and identity are thus both at 
risk, and defensive practices begin to make sense. 
The proliferation of social science research since the mid-1970s seems to have brought 
diversity of view rather than consolidation and coherence (see Halfpenny, 2000) and, as 
West (2004: 17) points out, antagonism between these positions "served therapy badly 
and continues to be problematic". McLennan (1997: 168) likewise identifies "the 
debilitating rhetoric of opposition" in social science research. In view of this I am keen 
that this research is not positioned against anything, except certainty and division. It is 
clearly not positivist but neither is it anti-positivist. I admire and value much of what 
positivism stands for and what it has achieved. 
However, much positivist science takes inspirational aspects of the world and subjects 
them to diminishing, oppressive procedures. Mysteries are not explained but explained 
away. Theories of others (subjects, cultures, animals, ancestors) are expressed with 
certainty and insufficient tentativeness or humility. Tolerance of uncertainty, diversity, 
and multiplicity Is needed and positivism has demonstrated incapacity for this. 
Recognition of such problems in positivism's history does not necessarily undermine its 
concern for neutrality or truth. The value of 'uncoerced' thought and debate is undeniable 
and the appeal to experience that was accessible by all has been a great liberator. I believe 
that positivism today still shares these values. My concerns have been with its lack of 
caution and its excessive certainty. These have now been modified and, as a result, 
positivism is much more palatable. Although science in practice has been shown to be 
oppressive, this has not been its aim. Indeed, many researchers have used positivist 
methods to make a case for much needed social improvements, arguing that social reforms 
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require grounded knowledge. Certainly it is hard to influence policy-makers without firm 
evidence and positivist formats seem most appealing in this context. As such I am grateful 
that such work is being carried out. 
These policy makers are not my main concern, however. I am more troubled that most 
counselling practitioners are disconnected from research or academic inquiry, that they 
are not more aroused by debates regarding the truth claims that determine their ways of 
working, that they often believe research to be 'ivory tower' and 'not for the likes of us'. 
Too often the courses they attend are seen as training rather than education. They close 
down avenues to alternative ways of thinking rather than opening them up. In this way 
they engender loyalties that add to the divisions referred to above. And I must admit that, 
over the last two decades, I too have played a part in this. In considering such 
disconnection between research and practice, educational researcher Kennedy (1997) 
makes points that are also pertinent for counselling research. She argues that research 
needs to be more authoritative, relevant and accessible. There are, of course, tensions 
between authority and accessibility but I have identified authority and associated 
certainty as problematic, and so accessibility takes precedence. Like Etherington (e. g. 
2004a, 2005) 1 want to engage practitioners. My aim is to provide research that will be 
relevant, interesting and challenging for a wide range of counsellors and therapists, not 
just those few who are research-active. 
A key figure in British counselling research, McLeod (2001: 118) argues that: 
"Philosophical and conceptual issues ... have more force in the academy than they do in the counselling room. Counselling and psychotherapy are forms of 
practical action, and not modes of theoretical reflection. For therapy 
practitioners, what is important In a piece of research is its pragmatic value - 
Does it say something that might make a difference? " 
I am not so sure. My experience is that most person-centred counsellors can give a 
reasonable account of humanistic / phenomenological philosophy, those from the 
psychodynamic schools are often familiar with ideas that can be identified as hermeneutic, 
and so on. It seems to me that what they lack is openness or exposure to alternative 
positions. Although I recognise that practical relevance or pragmatic value is also 
necessary, again it does not seem to be sufficient. Given the opportunity, counsellors like 
ideas too. 
Divisions between positivism and alternative movements are very obvious but it soon 
becomes clear that there are divisions within as well as between the major stances of 
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opposition or resistance, and so social science appears to have become a thoroughly 
fragmented discipline. From within this array of perspectives there is much that is 
invaluable in influencing or even inspiring my research choices and though nothing 
matches my requirements comprehensively I need to identify the main influences on my 
thinking, even if they are only partial, and show how my values have shaped my decisions 
(Carr, 1995). The following tour through this terrain is shamefully though necessarily 
brief. 
Z4 Taking cuttings: Thinking through and with alternative positions 
In counselling research the division that is most often made is between quantitative and 
qualitative analysis. There seems to be a recent resurgence in quantitative counselling 
research that is clearly related to the attractions of being able to make evidence-based 
claims (see above). Quantitative approaches are now associated with positivism and as 
such tend to be the target for much post-positivist critique, but actually they have an 
independent history (Halfpenny, 2000). The developing confidence within the quantitative 
interest group seems to have led to a greater focus on answering 'insider' criticism 
regarding technical concerns such as levels of confidence in'significant' results, confusion 
of significance with relational strength, practices of disregarding non-significant results, 
ignoring potential sources of error and inappropriate use of statistics for non-random 
samples (again Halfpenny, 2000). Rebuttals are thus predictably 'reformist', and fail to 
address more radical concerns. 
The radicalist agenda is taken up in Marxist standpoint epistemology where the focus 
moves to the dynamics of power (particularly economic or material power), and it is 
claimed that experiences of oppression and struggle provide unique and valuable 
understanding, as well as a realist / structuralist belief in actual underlying mechanisms of 
oppression. My research is very much about conditions of oppression. Surely I ought to be 
embracing this position, but I find myself uneasy. The power and robustness of standpoint 
theory is appealing but I would be unable to choose which point to stand in. Which aspect 
of my contributors' identity would I privilege; gender, class, sexuality, ethnicity, religion? 
They are all in there. And for me it is so often the multiplicity and the interaction between 
these various elements that is particularly powerful. Personally speaking, I would not have 
had to leave school before my fifteenth birthday if I had been only female, or only working 
class, or only from a fundamentalist evangelical family. It was this interaction between 
gender, class and religion that so affected my life chances at that time. And dynamics like 
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this are always shifting and re-forming kaleidoscopically. We are all caught in webs of 
complexity. I would not know which to privilege in my own life. I could not begin to select 
a standpoint from which to view the lives of all my contributors. I needed an approach that 
enabled me to move, and reposition myself amongst the shifting, multiple complexity of 
human experience. 
In critical theory it is again the values of emancipation and empowerment that seem to 
predominate (Habermas, 1972; Horkheimer 1982: 244). Like standpoint theory it seeks to 
change the world by unmasking the causes and symptoms of powerlessness and 
oppression as well as promoting praxis (i. e. informed and committed action). And from 
this position it makes the powerful argument that, as a human activity, science should be 
subject to critique, especially with regard to the motivations and interests of its adherents 
some of which (those relating to technical control and reductionism for instance) were 
seen as oppressive. Value-freedom itself becomes recognised as a value operating behind a 
specious facade of neutrality. However it differs from more conventional Marxist analyses 
in its inclusion of the psychological, such as the unconscious, and the softening of the 
exclusive focus on economic factors (Billig, 1982). The standpoint position is shifted to 
include a'dual perspective' (Habermas 1996; Bohman, 1991) which includes participants' 
internal as well as critics' external views. In this way they claim to embrace both 
explanation and understanding. This inclusion of the participant 'voice' interests me - 
though I want to take this further than the adoption of a position of duality between 
participant and critic. And I am also wary of claims of producing either explanation or 
understanding and so would fail Horkheimer's (1993) test of the adequacy of a critical 
theory, i. e. that it must be explanatory, practical, and normative. 
Rigorous critique of positivism has come from those taking a hermeneutic approach which 
values meaning and interpretation based on cultural and historical understanding (see 
McLeod, 2003). This focus on meaning and meaning-making alongside particular cultural 
conditions is popular in counselling research and is particularly relevant to this current 
project. I hoped to get some understanding of the sense that counsellors make of their 
experiences of ethical challenges and of their own responses to these difficulties within 
the culture of UK counselling provision. 
I was less comfortable with a focus on interpretation that privileged the perspective of the 
researcher. This has been something that I have strongly resisted in my counselling 
practice and I knew that some of my contributors were liable to feel likewise. I would have 
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been very naYve to believe that there would be no interpretation, but for myself I wanted 
to resist or at least limit this. I also needed to remember that I would be working with 
peers, fellow counsellors who would have their own ideas. Thus any attempts to separate 
subject and object seemed inappropriate and even phoney. Such separation is also 
disputed in some hermeneutic research leading to the concept of the 'double hermeneutic' 
where both researcher and researched are recognised as interpreters. Research is thus 
seen as the 'interpretation of interpretations' and the process of knowledge-formation 
becomes appealingly iterative (Bassey, 1996; Delanty, 1997; Usher, 1996). But I was also 
troubled by the ambition to provide "reliable and practical knowledge" (McLeod, 2003: 
22), to reach a position of meaning which is (if only briefly) free from contradictions 
(Kvale, 1996), to attain clarity from a text that was previously "confused, incomplete, 
cloudy, seemingly contradictory [or] unclear" (Taylor, 1971: 3). 
The hermeneutic practice of open dialogue unconstrained by structural and ideological 
inequalities and subsequent 'fusing of horizons' and'ideal speech situations' was an 
attractive ideal for me, due in part to its resonance with many models of therapeutic 
practice, but there are inevitably questions about whether it is achievable, or indeed 
whether accomplishing consensus is desirable. I wanted to avoid misleading claims of 
coherence or clarity, where undue confidence is expressed in interpretations that are too 
readily assumed to reflect truth. There would also be practical impediments for me in 
taldng this approach in that it requires "publicly accessible data" (McLeod, 2003: 22) and 
there were ethical limits to how publicly accessible my raw data could be as it contained 
sensitive, and in some cases, identifiable material. 
The focus on subjective experience found in phenomenological epistemology drew my 
interest from the outset. Again, an attraction of this approach was its resemblance to 
therapeutic practices with which I was familiar along with its focus on experience and 
language and its inclusion of emotion, action and relationship. This was within my comfort 
zone. More importantly it matched my preference for the'insider view'. And though my 
'ways of being' (Rogers, 1980) with the contributors would inevitably be influenced by 
this, I was drawn away from an over-reliance on phenomenological thinking principally by 
concerns with its 'truth-seeking' ambitions, faith in the concept of 'bracketing off and 
associated positioning within realism and the enlightenment project. 
Ontological realism is maintained (though in a less naive way than previous realist 
accounts) in the approaches to science variously referred to as critical realism (e. g. Benton 
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and Craib, 2001), scientific realism (Halfpenny, 2000) or unrepresentative realism 
(Chalmers, 1999) in that they view phenomena as being generated by underlying, stable, 
enduring structures (Willig, 1999: 45). This position thus accepts naturalism but rejects 
dependence on empiricism proposing that some aspects of reality are beyond sensory 
awareness but still constitute underlying causal powers or generative mechanisms. In 
natural science, black holes and the inner mantle of the earth come to mind as being 
inherently unobservable, whilst in psychology we have thought, emotion and the 
unconscious. In each, only their manifestations are considered amenable to empirical 
research and so researching them is theory-dependent. We are thus returning to 
interpretation, though here with a focus on identifying causal relationships that are 
deemed to reflect reality. Such realism is somewhat comforting. We think we know where 
we are with realism. And claims of effective prediction give a further level of perceived 
control. It is thus again linked to evidence-based research, even in qualitative formats. 
Underlying themes and patterns are sought for and used to justify firm conclusions as well 
as generalisation and extrapolation. It avoids the real messiness of contradiction, 
uniqueness and irrationality and feels like playing safe. It dilutes much of the critical 
challenges to positivism. This is essentially mainstream research and, for me, reflects 
patriarchal thinking. It would be akin to leasing a parcel of land on the squire's estate and 
to always be at the risk of having it taken back from me when it is needed for more 
important purposes. But rejecting realism en masse may lead to excessive relativism and 
not do justice to the experiences of my contributors. For me then, a core concern is about 
the extent to which I take a realist view. 
2.5 Winds of change: The postmodern disruption 
We are now in a period of climate change. That which thrived within the older order may 
no longer be safeguarded or comfortable. The postmodern age is upon us; an era 
characterised by an ability and propensity to critically reflect on the preceding modernist 
period (McLeod, 1997: 3) and to dispute and distrust much of what that period stood for. 
Loss of faith in the grand narratives of progress (Lyotard, 1979; 1984) has resulted from 
continued war, environmental demise and lack of historical coherence or direction. The 
modernist promise has not been kept. 
In this climate, claims of legitimation by appeal to universal standards are rejected and 
there is a concomitant decline in absolutes. In particular the notion of a determined and 
knowable world is challenged and so consensus about how to do scientific research is 
17 
undermined. Many post-positivist criticisms of science are reiterated. It is no longer 
believed to provide truth. Philosophy of science has not shown it as authoritative, nor 
demarcated it from other belief systems. It becomes recognised as socio-culturally 
situated, as a mere construct within that situatedness, and as simply another social 
practice, albeit a powerful one. Rather than providing progressive emancipation it has 
been used for social control and oppression. Postmodernist sensibilities, on the other 
hand, are concerned with obligations to consider the implications of research including 
power in the research process (Usher, 1996). But old concerns about empowerment and 
disempowerment are now extended to include scepticism regarding all truth claims, not 
merely those of science (Lyotard, 1984). Knowledge itself is shown as being only relative 
to discourses and so is always partial and perspectival. Binary concepts prevalent within 
positivist and modernist mindsets are seen to lead to particular, divisive ways of 
constituting phenomena. Within the fields of academic inquiry these include researcher 
and researched, objectivity and subjectivity, fact and fiction. Furthermore, within these 
binaries, one pole is always privileged, and so powerful hierarchies are formed, which 
become seen as 'natural' and so possess normative power (Acker eta!, 1991). This process 
is of course suppressed and concealed through elite and inaccessible practices, 
particularly of traditional science and so they are able to become a source of mystification 
and oppression (Usher, 1996). 
There is indeed rich and fertile ground here and, for me, these ways of seeing open 
exciting possibilities for each stage of the research process including how I relate to 
contributors, how I work with the information given by them and how I present (or 
(re)present) this information. The valuing of local knowledge; inclusion of previously 
excluded voices; recognition that suppression of values is impossible; awareness of how 
they permeate the research and the consequent embracing of reflexivity are all 
constituents that I want to bring into my creation. There is also an appealing depth of 
irrationalism in postmodernism, and therefore an out-and-out disruption of established 
ways of making meaning (Butler, 2002). 
But having taken a postmodern position within the multitude of research perspectives 
available, it appears that this is not the end of my quandaries. There is inevitably further 
debate and fragmentation here. And there have been calls for researchers and writers to 
be clear about how they are positioning themselves within the related territories of 
postmodernism, poststructuralism, social constructionism and constructivism where 
there remains much confusion and dispute. Again then, there were hard choices to be 
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made and I knew that confronting these would take me into some areas and issues that are 
more particular and detailed, yet at the same time fuzzier as they have grown from and 
into each other, so overlapping, blurring and troubling what once may have been seen as 
distinct or clear. 
Both postmodernism and poststructuralism seem to question the ideological and aesthetic 
preferences for unity, consonance and eventual clarity within modernist ideology (Michael 
Payne, 2000: 128) and thus far I am ideologically allied with both. Related to this, a 
distinction is commonly made between postmodernism's more inclusive cultural critique 
of modernism and poststructuralism's greater focus on issues of method and epistemology 
(see for instance Rosenau, 1992: 3). In this, the break that postmodernism has made from 
modernism may be considered to be more radical whereas poststructuralism is 
sometimes considered essentially modernist in its values whilst still questioning 
modernist ways of providing meaning and value and establishing truth (again Payne, 
2000: 127). Derrida's call for deconstruction (1976) as a systematic way of dealing with 
these issues is associated by some (e. g. Payne, 2000; Benton and Craib, 2001) with post- 
structuralism rather than postmodernism, and by others as a method which 
poststructuralism has given to postmodernism (Delanty, 1977). For me it feels rather too 
confident an approach within the context of postmodern loss of certainty regarding what 
is known, ways of knowing and associated reflexivity. 
Like postmodernism and poststructuralism the terms constructionism and constructivism 
are often used interchangeably but here key differences seem to be more readily 
identified. These seem to group around a further cluster of binary divisions regarding the 
extent to which notions of individual selfhood or more social conceptions of personhood 
should be privileged. Simply, the constructionist stance tends to be more associated with 
relational networks than with individuals, and the focus is on the collective generation and 
transmission of meaning. The term constructivism Is recommended for where there is an 
epistemological focus on individual 'meaning-making' and where personal agency and co- 
construction are emphasised (Crotty, 1998; McNamee and Gergen, 1992; Schwandt, 1994). 
This seems good practice and as I walk the pathways within and between constructionism 
and constructivism I shall use these descriptors to name my positioning accordingly. 
Payne (2000) identifies two types of people who fail to distinguish poststructuralism from 
postmodernism. Firstly, he says, there are those who reject all questioning of the 
'modernist aesthetic', and secondly there are the 'radical postmodernists' who simply 
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"enjoy chaos" (page 128). Given this (somewhat ironically modernist) duality to choose 
from I would clearly have to opt for the latter but actually I don't enjoy chaos, in fact I find 
it deeply unsettling (see Chapter One above), I did however feel an obligation to make the 
most of the opportunities I was being offered, to step out from the comfort of familiar, 
habitual ways of making sense and into the new domains of making meaning. 
Many who have been placed by others within these related movements and thus labelled 
have resisted the designation (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2000). And as they have shunned 
the constraints of crude definition so will 1, though when utilising material from secondary 
sources it seems best to maintain the terms used in the original. In any case, Shawver 
(2001) points out that there is no agreed definition, "no common thread" in how the term 
postmodern is used. She further builds on Wittgenstein's resistance to what he saw as 
unworkably rigid definitions and sharp boundaries, and consequent preference for the 
looser idea of a family resemblance. According to Alvesson and Sköldberg (2000) it is "not 
possible to establish any relationship between the two" (page 149) and "all efforts to 
divide up the intellectual world in PS and PM [sic] will be of limited value" (page 150). 
However, as will become clearer as this thesis unfolds, I believe that I have greater 
legitimacy in claiming my work as postmodern and influenced by poststructuralist 
thinking and as such I have opted for a working distinction along these lines (see chapter 
one above). I do not aim for systematic deconstruction but rather seek to 'trouble' taken 
for granted assumptions and practices, and I have a preference for a multiple and shifting 
focus. As Lather (1991) argues, postmodern research must not become an alternative 
research tradition but rather must remain reflexively critical in its practices of 'sense- 
making'and sense-talking'. 
For Stam (2001: 294), "the frequent conflation of postmodernism with social 
constructionism adds to the confusion, since the former is even more ambiguous a label". 
As he points out, neither postmodernism nor social constructionism are "single 
movements", which may have united enthusiasts, but nor are they "single targets" which 
may have made life easier for their critics. Nevertheless, their critics are many and 
criticisms tend to focus on one or more area of perceived excess which reflect the 
differential preferences for individual or social emphasis outlined above. These include 
claims of 1) excessive weight given to cultural determinism as opposed to human agency; 
2) excessive focus on the constitutive powers of language (a social practice) at the expense 
of (inner) pre-linguistic or embodied experience; and 3) scepticism regarding individual 
testimony and its relationship to questions of truth, so leading to excessive relativism. 
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Interestingly, Payne's identification of the "two types of people" (op cit) raises awareness 
of a further differentiation within postmodernism. If there are radical postmodernists then 
there must also those who are less radical. He is not alone in this view, notably Benhabib 
(1992,1995) has identified strong and weak versions of postmodernism. There must 
therefore be an infinite multiplicity of routes through this landscape. The important 
matter seems to be for me to offer some explication of how I have attempted to navigate 
through the three potential'excesses' listed above and to include some reasonable 
rationale or justification of this. This cannot be fully explicated in advance though as this 
research is a process and, as I have already made clear, I want it to be responsive, heuristic 
and iterative (Douglas and Moustakas, 1985; Moustakas, 1967,1990; Etherington, 2004b; 
West, 2001). In this way the opening of spaces and enabling of movement is more likely to 
continue. I also want the storying of the work to reflect this process. And in postmodern 
form I will accomplish this by collapsing the boundaries which have traditionally 
separated epistemology, ontology and methodology (Bekerman and Tatar, 2005; Denzin 
and Lincoln, 1998; Guba and Lincoln, 1994). 
2.6 Calling a spade a spade: The language problem 
Language has long been recognised as problematic, at least since naive realist ideas 
regarding correspondence between truth and language were rejected by post-positivist 
thinkers. These early ideas owed much to the work of Wittgenstein who argued that when 
we try to pin language down, even words we are very familiar with, the meaning 
disappears. Wittgenstein entertainingly referred to this as "language going on holiday" 
(1963: 37). There are many potential meanings for words, he argued, a whole "family of 
possibilities" (Wittgenstein, 1963: 67). Building on these ideas Derrida (1978) focuses on 
the relationship between words (signifiers), arguing that they only have meaning in 
relation to other signifiers, that the relationships between them are always in flux, that 
such relationships are arbitrary and that ultimate meanings are therefore always deferred. 
That is, we never arrive at ultimate truth. Shared meanings are thus considered to be 
relative to the group or context and not universal or value-free. And even here systematic 
misunderstandings (or'differends', see Lyotard, 1988) are pervasive. As Lewis (2003) 
summarises, "there is no objective standard against which to measure our truth claims 
(where objectivity is given to mean 'unconstructed', or separate from our signifying 
practices) ... [no] recourse to an unconceptualized reality as an'external' justification for 
our truth claims. " (Lewis, 2003: 126-127). 
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This change of perspective has been described as an "ontological twist" (Kerby, 1991: 2) 
whereby language has shifted from being seen as a neutral medium and a means to 
describe a pre-existing reality to a force which has the power to constitute reality. This can 
in fact be seen as the root of the constructionist process. But this turn to language is 
sometimes vigorously condemned, in fact Cromby and Nightingale (1999: 1) have edited a 
book specifically for this purpose, declaring that, "The theme of this book is that it is time 
for social constructionist psychologists to loosen its almost excusive focus on language and 
discourse, and begin to include other vital issues. " What these 'other vital issues' are 
argued to be depends again on the position of the challenger. To claim that language is 
constitutive denies realism and so offends those with an adherence to structuralism and 
materialism. To claim that it is exclusively constructive offends those whose values or 
experiences point to other potentially constitutive forces. 
Like Cromby and Nightingale (1999: 1), 1 know that "language does things", I have no 
doubt that language has constitutive powers but I am concerned by implications that it is 
exclusively constitutive. Cromby and Nightingale (1999) identify embodiment, materiality 
and power as three of the vital factors that are not sufficiently included in constructionist 
discourses. Leitch (2003: 60) too points to the "limits of language" and builds on Frosh's 
(2002: 134) misgivings about postmodern interpretations, where the privileging of 
language can seem excessive and can seem to suggest, in Leitch's terms, "that nothing 
meaningful can exist outside words" and all meaning is reduced to "that which can be 
narrated". 
I am also uneasy about what seems to be a totalising of this thesis. For one thing, this 
emphasis on language has always felt urban to me, a city concern for those whose 
everyday lives are filled with the incessant buzzing of conversation. I have felt that it does 
not take sufficient account of silence. Of course country people spend much of their time 
engaged in language and meaning-making through language, but they also spend much 
time without this, with quietness, and without being bombarded by human made signs. 
There seems to be so much more to our experiencing than the languaging of it. What of 
meditation for instance? And are silence, stillness and retreat also constitutive? 
Leitch (2003: 61) argues that the role of the mental image is underplayed. Images, she 
contends, might reasonably also be considered as `chains of signifiers' "that are constantly 
in play" (see Saussure, 1972) where image leads to image to image but never arrives at 
that which it denotes. For her "the rudimentary language of unconscious is image not 
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words". Baudrillard (1988,1994) also embraces the image as primary and sees society as 
ultimately constructed by images. Distinctions between object and representation appear 
to break down in the same way as with other signifiers, including words. 
For others embodiment is paramount, notably Gendlin (e. g. 1978; 1996) has devoted his 
professional life to asserting this. Tridgell (2004) powerfully alleges that the way in which 
embodiment is ignored is one of the 'lies and silences' of biography. There has, apparently, 
been some recognition of embodiment in postmodern discourses since Foucault (see 
McLaren, 2002) who clearly states that subjectivity is embodied as well as manifest 
through practices, though such accounts are sparse and seem buried amongst the 
proliferation of work on language. 
It seems that I find myself in the embarrassing position of expressing profound 
unhappiness with the exclusive focus on language whilst also having to acknowledge my 
exclusive focus on language. My concern deepens when Frosh (2002) shows how at some 
point discourse inevitably fails and language becomes characterised, not by its'expressive 
capacity' but rather by its insufficiency. Furthermore it is such inexpressible experience 
that can be particularly powerful and painful; in short, I realised that these were the very 
kinds of experience that may arise in conversations with my contributors. I too have often 
found myself frustrated by the inadequacy of language and have witnessed that same 
frustration in others. The phrase, 'words can't describe' says so much of the magnitude 
and quality of our experiencing that is not accessible to language. And yet this very 
frustration needs language to express itself. The phrase, 'words can't describe' is in itself 
deeply evocative and in fact these words do describe much of the quality of the experience. 
Likewise the concept of the 'ineffable' is beautifully poignant but it is the naming, the 
uttering of the sound 'ineffable' that makes this possible, that evokes the experience and 
perhaps also creates it. 
Now there is an interesting paradox and as I search for company in this struggle I find 
Cixous (1993), and further the paradox as she too uses beautiful language to relate the 
inadequacy of language. And here I come to recognise the embodied nature of language 
itself. 
As regards realism, some disquiet seems to cluster around the notion that, "reality 
ultimately disappears in the system of signs" (Delanty, 1998: 100). Along these lines 
(Sayer 1998: 2) asserts that postmodernism loses critical potential when it over- 
emphasises scepticism about distinctions between "appearance and substance, words and 
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deeds, apparent and actual", and when it refuses to consider treating the first term in each 
pair as less important than the second. 
There are, however, disputed definitions of 'reality' which adds to the confusion. Shawver 
(2001: 235) identifies a 'differend' in the use of the term 'reality'. In everyday use, she tells 
us, reality is given to mean "the quality or state of being actual or true", whereas in 
philosophical use it means "that which has necessary existence and not contingent 
existence". She further acknowledges that there are many other possible definitions of 
reality. It seems that, at this level, concerns regarding realism and truth claims are not 
disputing the actuality of whether something did or did not happen for instance, but are 
sceptical of the possibility of providing truths or explanations for that occurrence. Harre 
clarifies that, in his version, social constructionism "affirms the reality of the discursive 
domain without falling into the fallacy of supposing that because many aspects of our lives 
are our own constructions, all must be. " (Harre, 2002: 611). 
It seems then that postmodernism is not always equated with radical anti-realism (again 
see Shawver, 2001). Lyotard, for instance, simply defines it as 'incredulity towards 
metanarratives' (1984). In this version we become postmodern in order to cope with this 
incredulity and thus I am able to place myself firmly within the postmodern camp, to 
welcome the refusal of authorities as a source of legitimisation. 
There are, of course, many who want to make truth claims and who are then unhappy with 
postmodern resistance to this. Such discontent is usually expressed through accusations of 
relativism. Social theorist, Sayer (1998) argues that cultural studies has lost its critical 
edge through relativism but for me it is absolutist positions, particularly those embedded 
in a particular standpoint or in ethnocentric values that have no critical edge. These 
arguments clearly have significant relevance for our ethical understanding and theorising 
and as such will be developed more rigorously in Chapter Three. 
Further objections arise when arguments for the constitutive power of language and 
culture are extended to include the notion of personhood. I began my research by 
assuming agency and this issue was one that shook the ground beneath me. I thought that 
I would be, in effect, asking practitioners how were they agentic in resisting pressure for 
unethical practice. As it turned out, my understanding of these issues was not only 
troubled by my increased immersion in constructionist / constructivist literature but also 
by the conversations that I was having with the practitioners themselves. I was being told 
from all directions that'it's not that straightforward'. 
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Like Crossley (2000) 1 came to recognise that both postmodernism and poststructuralist 
practices such as discourse analysis were invaluable in showing how personal experience 
is constituted through language and cultural narratives but worried that in doing so they 
relinquished the more personal, 'lived' nature of these experiences. Delanty (1997: 108) 
stridently argues that, "agency cannot be reduced to culture". And Sayer (1998) too is 
uneasy that postmodernism has in some ways become a turn from vulgar materialism to 
vulgar culturalism, where all social life is reduced to text or text-like objects and where 
their signifying qualities are all that matters. Crossley's (2000,2003) concern is that the 
focus on deconstruction and signifying practices is depersonalising, producing accounts 
that are void of emotion or embodiment. And Benhabib (1992,1995) likewise raises the 
danger of the subject becoming displaced in 'chains of signification', effectively just 
'another position in language', whereby concepts of intentionality, accountability, self- 
reflexivity, and autonomy also disappear. But Benhabib sees these dangers as only 
associated with strong versions of postmodernism. Weaker versions, she suggests, 
recognise the subject as situated or contextualised in various social, linguistic and 
discursive practices. I prefer to think of resilient and inclusive versions of postmodernism 
rather than weak ones. 
As far as Niemeyer (1998) is concerned, the constructivist rejection of a static self allows 
us to be understood as agents in the construction of reality. Speedy (2001) relates this to 
existential understandings of self as process rather than essence, borrowing the term, "a 
centre of narrative gravity" from Dennett (1991). She also argues (2001: 28) that there is 
an explicit emphasis on agency within constructivism, adding that this provides strong 
links with humanistic values, specifically stating that: 
"It must be wholly possible to acknowledge and experience the potential or 
'agency' of human beings as they search for meaning in their lives and at the 
same time accept the socio-culturally and linguistically determined constraints 
or conditions of worth (within an existentialist/humanist paradigm) and 
contexts and discourses (within a constructivist paradigm) of that agency". 
This brings to mind the case made by Henriques et al (1984,2002) that subject positions 
are made available through discourses and are taken up differentially and agentically by 
persons. Again in Butler (1995: 135), agency is to be found in the possibilities of 
resignification opened up by discourses and in this sense discourse can be seen as the 
"horizon of agency". 
Wetherell (2005) acknowledges that in constructionist psychology we have not worked at 
the personal level enough and has made moves to do this herself through what she calls a 
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'practice-based' approach. This approach shifts the unit of analysis from the individual to 
the in-between (Wetherell, 2006), again refusing the binary of individual agency or 
cultural determination and offering a welcome relational model. In this the person is 
preserved as a site where the flow of meaning-making becomes organised. 
For Shawver (op cit) a key value in social constructionism is the recognition that we all 
construct our'forms of life' (see Wittgenstein, 1958; 1969) through the deliberate co- 
construction of social structures and processes, again this implies that it is neither 
individual nor socially determined but relational. We might also assume that if deliberate 
then surely it is political. These are also key concerns for Butler (e. g. 1997) who maintains 
that such social construction is not the same as determination and as such does not 
preclude agency. She does, however, identify a cultural and political predicament in that, 
for her, agency can only be articulated in opposition to the forces of subordination from 
which we were constituted. This focus on resistance is taken up by narrative therapists 
White and Epston (e. g. 1990). And McLeod (1997) explains that, while he finds the 
Foucauldian analysis associated with their work compelling, he finds it incomplete in that 
it still seems to assume that we are each influenced by a single monolithic culture. 
McLeod's view is that we are often pulled between different cultural systems. This reflects 
the argument of Henriques et al (1984,2002) above. Of course what we choose to resist 
will depend on our values and our identity, and particularly our ethical identity, of which 
more later. 
The empty, de-personalised image of the person in constructionism, as described by 
Crossley above, is often assumed to indicate a moral vacuum (see for example Lewis, 
2003). As such these concerns, along with their rebuttals, are particularly pertinent, as 
well as potentially problematic for this project. And so this trail must be continued 
throughout the thesis. The main groundwork for this will be established in the next 
chapter where I take up the notions of agency from this section and move on to include 
postmodern perspectives on ethics, ethical identity, reflexivity and responsibility. 
As the focus of my research includes experiences of coercion, I clearly need to remain open 
to narratives of power, but if I limited myself to either imagery or embodiment or power 
in setting out on this research I would be limiting myself to one version of truth, another 
metanarrative and would not be open to any fresh perspective, including that which my 
contributors might bring. My allegiance to an iterative, unfolding process remains 
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somewhat intact. I am committed to a narrative framework however, and will inevitably 
engage with contributors through language. 
2.7 Mixed borders: Interdisciplinarity and postfoundationalism 
Of course there have always been interdisciplinary difficulties and'turf wars' in academia 
and some of these have been keenly expressed as anti-psychology sentiments by social 
theorists who have (often with good cause) associated psychology with crass positivism 
and excessive individualism (see for instance Kölb, 2002). These arguments again come to 
the fore in the various positionings around the concept of agency. Much psychology, 
including the often favoured humanistic paradigm, has been accused of over-emphasising 
human agency in relation to the concept of self and is clearly inadequate in accounting for 
the way in which narratives are embedded in social and political power relations (see 
Crossley, 2000). And these disputes are not simply between psychology and other social 
sciences. Sayer (1999: 3), for instance, turns his challenge to radical social constructionism 
in sociology. He argues that many sociologists "treat agents as a tabula rasa awaiting social 
constructionism", thus avoiding the interface with psychology. He refers to the tendency to 
focus exclusively on social co-ordinates as sociological reductionism and his scepticism 
about interdisciplinary rivalry in radical social constructionism is evident in the following: 
"When sociologists say science has to be understood as a social construction, 
does this appeal because it's a better explanation of science, or because it 
advances sociological imperialism - others don't realise it's a social 
construction, but sociologists know it and they understand that better than 
anyone. " 
Concerns have also been expressed that some versions of postmodern cultural studies 
seem to have "a distinctly anti-sociological flavour" because of their positioning as 
"militantly'anti-essentialist' and 'anti-reductionist'" where "the very notion of structures" 
is questioned (see McLennan, 2002: 639). But of course this is just one (contested) version 
of sociology. 
On the one hand these arguments seem to recommend some interdisciplinary awareness, 
however, the defensive positioning can also be seen to exacerbate hostilities and pay little 
heed to the more interesting borderlands. Narrative inquiry clearly crosses discipline 
boundaries (Riessman, 2002a) and it is in such border regions that those from both sides 
have stepped out of the comfort of easy belonging into the edges of their familiar territory 
where there is the risk of boundary disputes but also the promise of new viewpoints and 
new understandings. I am optimistic that this post-foundational blurring will open up 
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exciting possibilities for psychology where its margins meet those of sociology, cultural 
studies and literary criticism, for instance. My early academic grounding was in 
psychology and the vast majority of my professional experience has been working with 
individuals as a counsellor. As such my own focus remains in the subjective and inter- 
subjective aspects of these. Though, as will become evident as this study unfolds, I will 
happily cultivate anything of value that spreads or grows in from neighbouring plots. 
2.8 Hybrid or pure genus: Embracing bricolage 
Calls for plurality do not only extend to interdisciplinary or postfoundational preferences 
but also include some blurring of methodological demarcations. 
Postmodernism is inherently multiple and shifting. It is 'in principle' fragmented and this 
can be seen as one of its strengths. Increasingly researchers influenced by postmodernism 
are embracing improvisation and the creation of techniques for data collection and 
analysis that has come to be known as bricolage. Denzin and Lincoln (1994) refer to this as 
the negotiation of a personal route through the methodological terrain. In taking up this 
'personal' aspect of bricolage McLeod (2001: 127) writes that, "The bricoleur is someone 
who both fully understands and 'owns' his or her perspective on research. " These 
positions seemed to offer values and an identity that appealed to me but did not actually 
describe where I was. My work was becoming very personal but it was not just that it 
related to me or was owned by me, it was changing me. It still is changing me. I am 
experiencing, questioning, and reviewing my personhood as never before. I am 
discovering that the very essence of personhood is mutable, fluid, in process; so much so 
that I can no longer get away with talking about the very essence of personhood. And I 
don't know if I will ever'fully' understand my perspective on this research (or anything 
else, come to that). So I needed a way of engaging with the research that not just allows for 
this but thrives on it. I did not need rigid structures. I yearned for flexibility, dynamism, 
movement, opening spaces, room for growth in unexpected directions. I wanted my 
research to be rich, multi-textual, challenging and enjoyable to read as well as to write. 
And I wanted it to do justice to the stories of my contributors, which are in themselves 
rich, multi-textual, challenging and enjoyable. 
Richardson (1992) provides a non-structuralist solution. She advocates 'drawing freely' 
from literary, artistic and scientific genres and including different 'takes' to produce a sort 
of postmodern triangulation. For her a crystal metaphor is appropriate to represent this as 
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we can assume no fixed point to triangulate on but instead need to include multi- 
dimensionalities, various transmutations and angles of approach. This inclusion of science 
alongside artful approaches troubles simple divisions between modernism and 
postmodernism and is consistent with the ambition of extending and supplementing 
previous forms of inquiry rather than attempting to overthrow them (see above). 
Denzin and Lincoln (2000: 6) seemed to offer further support for this richness of approach 
in their identification of the manifold abilities required of the methodological bricoleur. 
These included sldlls of interviewing, reflection and introspection as well as the capacity of 
the interpretive bricoleurto recognize research as an interactive process, fashioned in part 
by "personal history, biography, gender, social class, race and ethnicity" of the researcher 
as well as of the contributors. 
I am inspired by post-structuralist approaches to texts, where the primacy of the author is 
'destabilized' or 'decentred'. Perhaps there is a danger that in adopting the kind of 
bricolage that privileges the craft of the researcher then their authorial voice becomes 
central once more. What I wanted to do in this research was to own my inevitably 
powerful influence and ownership whilst also trying to subvert or destabilise this. I 
wanted to dissipate the source(s) of authority to include readers and particularly 
contributors. In this there would be no aspiration of consistency. 
Of course there is some potential opposition and criticism of this. Some commentators 
(e. g. Carr, 1995; Hammersley, 1999) have expressed a disquiet that appears to mirror that 
relating to eclecticism in counselling practice. They have serious concerns about such 
mixing of traditions and seem to seek unity or integrity between methods, values and the 
practices being studied, the underlying sentiments here being essentially structuralist. In 
my research there is already disunity within the practices that I am studying. Humanist, 
psychodynamic, transpersonal and integrative approaches are all represented and so no 
single approach could be congruent with all of the contributors. This encouraged me to 
find ways to embrace and mirror that diversity. 
Hammersley (1999: 578) then uses Neurath's (1973) 'research as boat' metaphor to 
develop his critique of methodological bricolage. He cautions us that: "mixing critical, 
feminist and postmodern ideas may be bricolage, but it is not good shipbuilding. " He 
becomes more alarmist in his prophecy that, "faced with the danger of sinking, bricolage 
does not offer us any hope of survival... " But I was not entering the seas of Neurath's and 




Crotty (1998), more convincingly, criticises the promotion of the researcher-as-bricoleur 
movement as being based on a mistranslation of the original Levi-Strauss term. He argues 
that Levi-Strauss used the term bricolage to illustrate his recommendation that 
researchers focus on the objects of research and dialogue with them, not in a way that is 
straitjacketed by conventional meanings but in a radical spirit of openness to new or 
richer meaning. Again this was a principle that I was happy to be guided by and I saw no 
contradiction with the more creative, inclusive approaches to methodology implied by the 
definitions of bricolage listed above. In short I embraced both 'bricolages' but rejected the 
pressure to produce a coherent new whole in favour of remaining open to an emergent, 
constantly reforming construction informed by heuristic / reflexive as well as relational / 
discursive practices. 
2.9 Preparing to survey the ethical landscape 
In this chapter and in Chapter One above, I have taken considerable space to explore and 
explain how I am positioning myself in relation to the diverse array of ideas and 
philosophies that are likely to inform this research. But now I need to turn my attention to 
potential ways in which I and the other contributors to this research have been positioned, 
and indeed constituted, by living through and with the implementation of such ideas as 
they relate to the domain of ethics in counselling. In the next chapter I thus begin to 
consider the positioning of therapy practitioners within the shifting ethical discourses of 
the last two or more decades. I have not intended this to be a personal critique of the field 
but have rather set out to provide a reasonably extensive and comprehensive overview of 
the major issues and potential influences on counselling ethics and on those aspiring to be 




The Changing Ethical Climate 
3.1 The urge for order 
In the world of counselling and psychotherapy it is very difficult to think of the word 
'ethical' without following it with the word 'dilemma', as 'ulterior' and'motive' seem also 
to have become inseparable (try thinking of another word that can follow ulterior in 
general parlance). But what does this indicate? For me there seems to be a common and 
long-standing recognition that, in counselling at least, ethical decisions are not always 
straightforward, that there are more likely to be predicaments, or quandaries than 
certainties. And yet until very recently this complexity and uncertainty was barely 
acknowledged in the codes of ethics and practice of the main professional bodies. These 
were, of course, situated and produced within modernity, known for its preoccupation 
with reason and rationality (Foucault, 1967); evidence and visibility (Leppert 2004: 19); 
and the rise of bureaucracy (Bauman, 1994). And these values and characteristics were 
understandably reflected in the form that the codes took. As Bauman, (1993) explains, 
modern ethics is founded on the conviction that a non-aporetic, or non-contradictory, code 
is possible. 
The kinds of codes of practice that we are talking about here originally emerged in the 
medical profession and tended to be expressed in terms of physicians' duties towards 
their patients. They appear to have been developed as a response to excessive 
individualism and occasional self-interest made possible within the preceding system, 
which had been characterised by the swearing of individual oaths. This was supported by 
a particular regard for personal honour at that time. In short it seems that the good name 
and protectionist practices of the professional were sometimes prioritised over the needs 
of the patient. A change was needed and consequently, around the turn from the 
eighteenth to the nineteenth century, humanitarian campaigner Thomas Percival was 
invited to draw up the earliest versions of a code of practice (see Bond, 2005 for a more 
detailed coverage of this). 
This was the end of the enlightenment period and the very early days of modernity. These 
were turbulent times. Across the English Channel the French revolution was in progress, 
31 
closely followed by the Napoleonic wars; the American wars of independence were taking 
place and making early threats to the British Empire; and after the 1798 Irish Rebellion 
the 1801 Act of Union was imposed. And these were related to battles of ideas and 
ideology. Thomas Paine's'Rights of Man' was published in 1791-2; Mary Wollstonecraft's 
'A Vindication of the Rights of Woman' in 1792; and the Romantic Poets of the English 
Lake District were turning to nature for solutions to human ills. The reformist groups of 
the 1790s, pressure groups for parliamentary reform, the women's movement and 
challengers to the use of child labour were all active. The abolition of the transatlantic 
slave trade was on the political and public agenda, coming into force in 1807. In short, 
issues of ethics, morality and humanitarianism were very much in the spirit of the time. 
In terms of ethical philosophy Kant's deontological theories were making an impact and 
challenging the prevailing emphasis on an ethic of virtue which had rested on Aristotle's 
rather elitist view of 'better people' having an inherent propensity to live a virtuous life 
(Blackburn, 2001). Deontology derives from the Greek'deontos' or moral duty, and for 
Kant the main concern was to ensure that "the voice of duty [was] heard, even when one's 
inclinations may be to act immorally" (Skiotis, 2005: 6). We can see here how this thinking 
would have been brought to bear in Percival's drafting of physician's duties, especially 
where their previous behaviour had demonstrated a lack of concern for vulnerable 
patients. And perhaps we can also imagine how insisting that professionals should be 
under external guidance (or even control) may have been seen as questioning their 
capacity or commitment to live a life of virtue and it is in this way that honour would have 
been at stake. 
To support his mapping of moral duties Kant searched for fundamental moral principles 
that could be universally applied and in this there is an implicit and sometimes explicit 
absolutism. In the context of modernist propensities for social control through law-making 
they are soon translated from principles to rules. And, as Blackburn (2001: 52-53) argues, 
these ideas have a "coercive edge. They take us beyond what we admire, or regret, or 
prefer, or even what we want other people to prefer. They take us to thoughts about what 
is due. They take us to demands. " And they "fit into a moral climate, where things just are 
right and wrong, permissible or punishable" (Blackburn, 2001: 75, original italics). And as 
he earlier explains, "An ethical climate is a different thing from a moralistic one. Indeed, 
one of the marks of an ethical climate may be hostility to moralizing" Blackburn (2001: 3, 
original italics). 
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The deontological position is commonly contrasted with the utilitarian ethics of Hume, 
Bentham and Stuart Mill (e. g. Bond, 2000; Nash, 2002a; Blackburn, 2001) which also took 
hold during the enlightenment and modern eras. The concerns of utilitarianism are less 
with principles and duties and more with "results or purposes" (Nash, 2002a: 113) and 
this is generally expressed or measured in terms of "the greatest good for the greatest 
number". Bond (1999,2000) thus explains the difference between deontology and 
utilitarianism as being a difference in how human beings are viewed; as either means to 
ends or as ends in themselves. For Kant, and those following his ideas, people should be 
treated as ends in themselves, whereas for the utilitarians they may be used for a greater 
good, as a means to an end. Lyotard's take on the enlightenment project (1988) is that, as a 
project, it was forward looking, future orientated and perhaps this inevitably puts the 
focus on ends rather than means. Bauman (1993: 225) vividly conveys the implications of 
this: 
"Suffering was no more a trial of piety; it was now an act, an act with a purpose 
and a function.... Modernity did not declare war on suffering: it only swore 
extinction to a purposeless, functionless suffering. Pain unplanned and 
unsolicited was an abomination, and unforgivable; but if it served a purpose, if 
it was 'a necessary step' towards the future, pain could be - should be - had to 
be - inflicted.... One must cut off a limb to save the body. One should sacrifice a 
thousand lives to save ten thousand. " 
Stainton Rogers et al (1995: 82) apply this type of critique to modernist social psychology 
where there seems to be a mission to teach moral lessons. They identify "painful 
paradoxes" in studies such as the well known obedience experiments of Stanley Milgram 
(1974). As they argue, this research claimed to simply reveal forms of destructive 
obedience whereas the experiments themselves were actually part of a similar ethos, to be 
effective, someone had to be hurt. But this is excused in utilitarian modernity where ends 
justify means. For Stainton Roger and his colleagues this paradox is presented as a 
warning to any of us who might attempt to teach moral lessons through such research and 
I am only too well aware that I would do well to heed their warning as I engage with this 
ethics-related project. Yet this is not straightforward for me. I am one of those people who 
really did learn moral lessons through such social psychology! I was changed by hearing 
the story, and the analysis of the story of Kitty Genovese, a citizen of New York who was 
left unsupported and un-rescued throughout her fatal attack I remember well the decision 
not to act like the witnesses to her killing if ever I found myself in similar circumstances, 
not to become an apathetic bystander (Rosenthal, 1964), to guard against 'diffusion of 
responsibility' (Darley and Latan6,1968; 1993), to endeavour to think and act 
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independently rather than as either a conformist or even an anti-conformist (Willis, 1965). 
And in the main I have kept this as a guiding intention, though, particularly since engaging 
in this research, I have become aware of how simplistic my early understandings were at 
that time, and also note that it was the 'real' experience of a living / dying person that 
spoke most strongly to me, and what stays with me from the related laboratory 
manipulations of Milgram (1974), the Zimbardo team (e. g. Haney eta!, 1973) etc is the 
dreadful effects on the participants. 
The two contrasting positions of deontology and utilitarianism have survived to this day. 
Nash (2002a) views them as mutually contradictory and as reflecting individual 
differences between people. After Frankena (1973) he uses a genetic metaphor to suggest 
that each person might have a dominant deontological gene and a recessive utilitarian 
gene (or vice versa) but nevertheless, for him one must dominate. To illustrate this, he 
quotes from one of his ethics students and in so doing speaks directly to those with an 
interest in counselling (Nash, 2002a: 114): 
"Now I understand why my husband and I have been having particular 
problems lately in disciplining our teenager. My husband's a utilitarian who 
tells our son to look at the consequences of his behaviour; and I'm a 
deontologist who constantly reminds our son that some actions are right or 
wrong regardless of the consequences. My husband's a businessman, and I'm a 
counselor (sic). " 
The role of business in modernist ethics has been forcefully made by Bauman (e. g. 1994: 
5) who claims that, "Modernity came up with two great institutions... to assure the 
prevalence of morality through following rules". One, he says, was bureaucracy and the 
second was business. The bureaucratisation of the therapy professions and services is 
likely to figure prominently in this research. Concern has been expressed (Strawbridge, 
2002; Strawbridge and Woolfe, 2003) that the increasing control, bureaucratization, 
standardization and dehumanization, means that Ritzer's (1993) concept of 
'McDonaldization' is ever more applicable to our work The provision of counselling 
services is also Increasingly commercialised and there are progressively more therapists 
being employed in business. Indeed these business contexts have been recognised as 
shaping the ethical dimensions of psychotherapy (Tjeltveit, 1999: 152). 
3.2 Pruning and training: The crafts of control 
As I have already mentioned, until recently the ethical guidelines of the main professional 
bodies in the UK were expressed to members in terms of (relatively) clear codes of 
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conduct, or rules. For the British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy (BACP) 
the move from a set of codes (which basically listed prohibitions) to a less resolute model 
(which recognised unavoidable complexity) took place in 2001. For the British 
Psychological Society (BPS) this move happened in 2006. There are, of course, numerous 
other organisations concerned with counselling ethics, each with their own set of codes 
and guidelines, but for the purposes of this project I shall restrict my consideration to 
these two organisations. 
The development, adoption and maintenance of the previous unequivocal professional 
rules had been well-intentioned. Visser (1994: 122) reminds us that professionals are 
"oficially placed in a position to do direct, personal damage to a client". And as Percival 
and his peers found, there is sometimes a need to protect vulnerable people from 
unscrupulous and incompetent practitioners and charlatans. However, this imposition of 
external regulations can also work to reduce the personal responsibility of the 
professional or practitioner. The responsibility for differentiating right from wrong is 
entirely in the hands of those in power and all that is required of members is that they 
obey. This is a climate that myself and most of the other contributors to this research have 
found ourselves in. Bond (2005: 12-13) expresses this thus: 
"Rules position the person who is subjected to them in subservient compliance 
to an external authority. The only issue to be addressed is whether something is 
forbidden or mandatory. There may be scope for the exercise of professional 
judgement by creative interpretation of what is stated, or by using the spaces 
left between different rules. However, the predominant position of someone 
subject to rules is compliance, even if this means overriding their own sense of 
right or wrong. " 
Bauman (1994) takes this further. He asserts that, in line with a Hobbesian view of 
humanity, modernity has emphasised the need for control of human desires based on 
rationality and that this brings a concomitant need to eradicate or exclude the emotional. 
In the moral or ethical arena this has led to a focus on rule of law and moral codes. And so 
modern, bureaucratic organisations demand that people not be sidetracked by their own 
beliefs, values or convictions. The organisation does not even desire the affection of its 
members for itself unless that affection be in the form of loyalty to the corporation as 
opposed to loyalty to the goals or mission that the corporation claims to be pursuing. The 
risk of members having an allegiance to the organisational goals is clearly explained here: 
"Were the members' readiness to fulfil their duty grounded in their enthusiasm for the 
declared purposes of their joint activity, if their performance depended on what they 
thought about the organisation's loyalty to its ends, they would, so to speak, watch the 
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hands of the givers of command, and measure the order against their ostensible 
purposes. In the end they might disagree with their reasons and even disobey them. " 
(Bauman, 1994: 7) 
Bauman goes on to identify two ways in which organisations guard against the conscience 
or scruples of its members. Firstly there is 'floating responsibility'. This is the logical result 
of a system which combines the detailed break down of tasks and their allocation amongst 
employees with a comprehensive arrangement of rules and procedures. Each action of 
each member becomes innocuous and impersonal. Secondly there is the positioning of 
most of the activities of the organisation as being exempt from moral evaluation. They are 
presented as morally indifferent, neither good nor bad but simply correct or incorrect. 
As far as the professional organisations responsible for counselling and psychotherapy are 
concerned there is no denial of the moral aspects of their members work, nor of their 
personal responsibility to uphold the ethical standards set. However, the agencies and 
organisations employing counsellors may be a different matter. Many counsellors are 
employed in organisations whose raison d'dtre has no direct relation to counselling, where 
counselling is a secondary rather than a primary concern, where it is perceived as 
supporting or supplementing the core business. As such the counsellors are not usually 
central to the purpose of that organisation and are rarely in positions of power. In 
addition, the culture of counselling may not be compatible with the culture of such 
organisations, e. g. command-driven, top-down, goal-oriented etc. 
So this research raises issues about the locus of authority. Whom or what is seen as 
authoritative? Even if obedience could be assumed there are questions of which powerful 
other will dominate; the employing agency or the professional association? I myself have 
been in the position of having dilemmas of loyalty; having to choose between obedience 
and loyalty to either my employer or to my profession. Though, by now it is clear that such 
binary divisions are rarely so neatly partitioned. Demands by those high in organisational 
hierarchies are often seen as reflecting organisational policy but this is not necessarily the 
case. What is perceived, or presented, as an organisational demand may not be so in 
actuality. It may simply be how a particular high-level employee interprets those demands 
and then presents them to the counsellor. There are also various levels of 'canteen 
culture', some more powerful than others as well as 'backstage and'understage'versions 
(Rugg and McGeorge, 1999) and these may lead to less than overt pressures on the 
counsellor. Moral frameworks are often assumed and therefore 'obscured' (see also 
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Warner, 2001; Reavey and Warner, 2003). And as Blackburn (2001: 1) points out, "the 
workings of the ethical environment can be strangely invisible: ' 
In such circumstances the codes and procedures of the professional bodies may be useful 
therefore; they can and have been used to give the professional organisations protection 
from interference by the state (McLeod, 2003) and to give practitioners protection from 
interference by employers (Bond, 2005). And in this way can be seen to have provided 
some solidarity and support as well as control. As Bond (2005: 7) (who is, incidentally, a 
major contributor to the more recent formulations of the BACP ethical framework) 
acknowledges; the dynamic between practitioners and their professional body is also 
complex. 
Bond goes on to identify an additional problem with ethical requirements that are 
constructed as a detailed set of rules. Using the examples of the Enron collapse in the 
United States and the Nuremburg trials he shows how, in such systems, responsibility is 
devolved to the organisation that sets the rules and so the 'moral agency' of the individual 
is diminished. He further suggests that such formulations provide loop-holes that 
additionally reduce individual accountability, "what is not explicitly forbidden is 
permitted" (Bond, 2005: 10). This concern by one of those tasked to set professional 
guidance clearly contrasts with Bauman's account of the bureaucratic corporation. Here 
the personal responsibility of the individual practitioner is again very much desired, and 
again there is the potential for the practitioner to be caught between these competing 
expectations. 
Systems of power are never simple, nor total and are not usually unidirectional; people do 
resist (e. g. Foucault, 1982). And it is this resistance that, in part, exposes power (Guilfoyle, 
2005). What after all is being resisted? And if there is resistance to that resistance then 
perhaps the original power becomes more apparent. Yet, as Foucault (1995) and White 
(2002) have shown, modernist self-regulation can work to conceal the forces of power. 
They argue that in modernity, the way states controlled their populations changed from 
reliance on use of force to the exercise of disciplinary regimes which increasingly included 
self-regulation, and that these regimes were maintained by "hierarchical surveillance, 
continuous registration, perpetual assessment and classification" (Foucault, 1995: 220). 
This construction and regulation of selves was epitomised in the 'panopticon' prison, 
designed by Jeremy Bentham. In this design guards were able to view prisoners at any 
time and prisoners thus became constantly vigilant and self-regulating. Foucault appeared 
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particularly struck by this and used the panopticon metaphor to illustrate how control is 
maintained in modern society by'technologies of the self. The technologies are governed 
by institutions of society and must be endlessly'tinkered with' to be maintained (Stainton 
Rogers, 2003). 
People then act as if they are under constant scrutiny and, like the inmates in Bentham's 
gaols, become self-regulating. One of the particular ways in which such self-regulation 
occurs is in the take up of identity and relational practices and the adoption of 
'normalising judgements' (Foucault, 1979; 1980) where we judge our own performance 
according to the cultural ideals of personhood. And these ideals are so pervasive that we 
are ever likely to fall short of the mark. As White (2002: 35) points out, "Never before has 
the sense of being a failure to be an adequate person been so freely available to people. 
And never before has it been so willingly and routinely dispensed". He helpfully groups 
such failures into either lapses or omissions but then, interestingly (at least for the 
purposes of this project), adds resistance as a further route to such failure, and in so doing 
effectively makes a stand to disrupt (resist) this system of control. His suggested routes for 
failure / resistance include: abandonment of adequacy; rejection of aspirations of status; 
resistance to classifying people and their lives; interest in relationships that challenge 
culturally legitimated forms; and negating the 'contemporary emblems of normalcy' 
including self-actualisation and authenticity (White, 2002: 45). Thus our failure to achieve 
the prescribed version of selfhood becomes a refusal of both the identity and related 
practices. Where such practices and identities would have been supportive of a regime 
that we experience as unethical or immoral they can be seen as an ethical or moral 
rebellion. 
McLeod (2003) argues that this internalisation of moral control is directly related to the 
need for psychotherapy in modern society. And Howard (2005) maintains that these same 
forms of control can increasingly be identified within the therapeutic professions. Systems 
of control and regulation by professional organisations include compulsory regular and 
frequent participation in the all-embracing network of supervision, the obligation to 
report errant peers, as well as professional conduct or complaints procedures, including 
what members refer to as the 'name and shame pages' of the house journals. 
According to Danchev (2005: 59) "During its development BACP went through a process 
of having increasingly detailed and complex codes of ethics ... allied to a harsh disciplinary 
process which failed to distinguish between poor practice and malpractice". Bond (2005) 
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now acknowledges the need to make such distinctions He clearly differentiates between 
the need to set and seek to maintain a baseline of acceptable practice and the need to 
support practitioners' ethical development over and above this baseline. He refers to this 
latter challenge as "fostering ethical mindfulness" (Bond, 2000: 242 and 2005: 14) and 
recognises the need for professional bodies to "inform and support" practitioners in this 
(Bond, 2006: 78). 
3.3 Variety and variegation: From unitary principles to multiplicity 
The current form of ethical frameworks for counsellors began, as usual, within the field of 
medical ethics. Here early moves to recognise inevitable complexity and the need for a 
range of principles came from Beauchamp and Childress (e. g. 1979,1994) who listed 
autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice as fundamental guiding principles. 
Kitchener (1984) accepted these but added fidelity as an additional requirement in her 
recommendations for counselling psychologists. And this was taken up and again applied 
to medicine by Thompson (1990) who further added self-interest, a principle which 
recognises that self-care and avoidance of unnecessary risk are also in the best interests of 
clients. In adopting these (now six) principles in 2001 BACP crucially acknowledged 
potential clashes between them. And thus the individual practitioner is charged with the 
increased responsibility of appropriately navigating through them according to specific 
circumstances. In this the BACP are implicitly embracing a situated rather than an 
absolutist ethic and the counsellor has moved from a position of obedience to being 
positioned as a reflexive and (mostly) self-governing moral agent, though still the 
principles are prescribed. The focus on the responsible individual is increased in the 
inclusion of a list of 'personal moral qualities' which reflects a current revisiting of virtue 
ethics and thus appears to have a close relationship with the (somewhat transpersonal) 
contemplative ethics (Bond, 2000). These BACP 'virtues' are listed as empathy, sincerity, 
integrity, resilience, respect, humility, competence, fairness, wisdom and courage. For 
Thatcher (2006) the inclusion of these personal qualities contributes to it reading as a 
more aspirational document than that of the BPS. But where the principles listed by the 
BACP appear to focus on the rights of the client, the locus of those listed in the 2006 BPS 
code (i. e. respect, competence, responsibility, integrity) is in the practitioner and in this 
they resemble virtues. Each of these is supported by a statement of values and quite 
detailed standards that members are expected to be able to demonstrate. 
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The deontological and utilitarian positions both display the modernist preference for 
unity, consonance and eventual clarity described in Chapter Two above (Payne, 2000) in 
that they both seek a single unitary moral principle. Yet surely the existence of these two, 
seemingly irreconcilable principles, even from within the same culture, indicates the 
futility of the search. In counselling we have long been criticised for practices rooted in 
western, individualist values and ethnocentric moral certainties (e. g. Sampson, 1988; 
McLeod, 2003; Pederson eta!, 1996) and consequently we are trying to find better ways of 
reaching out to include those who are not like 'us'. For this to be reflected in our ethical 
guidance we must loosen our attachment to the moral and ethical convictions with which 
we have traditionally allied ourselves, consider how such convictions may not be 
independent of situation, local conditions or context but are rather rooted in our'tradition 
of values' (Gergen, 1995). As Warner (2004) reminds us, "Morality is always contingent. 
No standpoint is always correct" 
Absolutist positions, however, provide a confidence that one's own position is the correct 
one and must be fought for and these are generally held and upheld within the dominant 
cultural hegemony. As Blackburn (2001: 24) reminds us "... it is typically only the 
oppressors who are spokespersons for their culture or their ways of doing it". So perhaps, 
there should be some caution with regard to this. Unless we are able to hear the silenced 
and suppressed within each culture (or subculture) we will miss much moral complexity. 
Those battling for justice from less powerful positions also gather on the basis of shared 
convictions. I am reminded of standpoint theory, the related notion of solidarity and my 
(naive) socialist past. But now I ask myself, is such solidarity actually being for yourself, or 
at least for others in your own image, people like you. Does it simply involve reaching out 
to your own kind, standing alongside those who agree with you? Pete Seeger's "Which side 
are you on boy, which side are you on? " plays in my mind's ear. This is one of the protest 
songs that have long sustained me but now I feel uncomfortable. There seems to be a 
certainty that if you are not wholly with us you must be against us. These positions grew 
from and through much needed battles for civil rights and justice. But the positioning of 
the ethic of justice as the highest level of morality (Kohlberg, e. g. 1969,1980) has also 
been questioned and from feminism a more relational ethic of care has been spreading 
(Gilligan, 1982; Gilligan and Attanucci, 1988) where the voice of the other is included and 
moral connectedness rather than separateness is emphasised (Linn and Gilligan, 1990). 
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But as we begin to move from claims of realism and absolutism to a more constructionist 
position a modernist mindset is again likely to impose assumptions of duality; if we are 
not being realist then we are being relativist or at least we are on the 'slippery slope' 
towards relativism or even subjectivism where moral beliefs and attitudes are simply 
based on gut feelings about what is right or wrong (Nash, 2002b: 72). A detailed and 
rigorous critique of the common conflation of relativism and subjectivism is offered by 
Lewis (2003) who recognises the absurdity of this misreading. In a constructionist version 
of relativism, truth and falsity are themselves determined within socio-linguistic practices 
(e. g. Gergen, 1985; Shotter, 1993) and "cease to mean anything when the connections with 
those practices are severed", whilst, in the ("patently incoherent") subjectivist position, 
truth and falsity require "no external justification or credibility" (Lewis, 2003: 227). This 
move from a recognition of the context dependence of moral positions to viewing all 
positions as equally valid and valuable closes down conversation or dialogue as effectively 
as does absolutism (Blackburn, 2001) and in so doing stifles ethical relationships and 
progress. Sayer (1998) seems to fear that relativism also has this effect. Whilst valuing the 
turn to culture, and recognising that absolute foundations to ethical or other judgements 
may not exist, he remains concerned that relativism causes us to lose our critical edge 
through what Connor (1993) refers to as 'ethical disidentification'. His call is for reasoned 
judgement about what is better or worse, but this still seems to be seeking an end position 
of some confidence. Postmodern ethics does not, however, advocate or endorse an 
'anything goes' moral relativism (Van Meijl, 2000) but rather questions how we should go 
about understanding difference (Strathern, 1995). A tolerance of the incommensurable 
(Lyotard, 1984) allows such difference and multiplicity of perspective to be, not only 
accepted, but also celebrated. In Lakoff and Johnson's (1987) take on relativism both 
objectivism and subjectivism are again rejected in order to concentrate on the relationship 
between them. So we once more find ourselves in the borderlands, exploring the 'in- 
between' (Wetherell, 2006). 
3.4 Dismantling boundary markers: Including the relational 
In some respects, concerns about the privileging of the individual in subjectivism seem to 
echo existing disquiet that modern society has been over-emphasising individual freedom 
at the expense of responsibility to and for others, leading to calls for relational and mutual 
responsibility (Taylor, 1997; Edwards, 2005a, 2005b). Counselling has been accused of 
complicity in this regard. As Loewenthal and Snell (2003: 153) put it: 
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"... the client/patient is in danger of becoming a bit player on the therapist's stage, 
with the further danger that as a result of therapy, everyone else becomes a bit player 
on the client/patient's stage". 
Ideas and practices relating to the provision of ethical therapeutic relationships have often 
claimed influence by Buber (1958) who considers the human capacity to objectify the 
other. As we use tools for our own purpose and thus develop an 'I-It' relationship to them, 
so Buber contends that much human relating has similar qualities. People are related to as 
'things' to be used and experienced. An 'I-Thou' attitude, on the other hand, recognises that 
the other has possibilities of their own; there is mutuality, meeting, encounter. 
Buber's I- thou encounter is often likened to the face-to-face relationship described by 
Levinas, whose moral philosophy has been acclaimed as inspiring the development of 
phenomenology as well as postmodernism (Loewenthal and Kunz, 2005). Levinas too 
emphasises the value of dialogue and conceptualises ethics itself as originating in 
relationship rather than in the individual self. There are however substantial differences 
(Atterton, 2004), in particular the proposed mutuality of Buber's 'I-Thou' contrasts with 
the essential asymmetry of Levinas's face-to-face relationship and the former is 
characterised by a capacity for generosity, whereas for Levinas responsibility is primary. 
He (Levinas) proposes a primary ethical orientation towards the other that is, in some 
respects, reminiscent of Kant, but for Levinas this 'infinite obligation' is not inspired by 
duty, or by an'ought' but simply by proximity (Levinas, 1991; see also Levin, 2001). The 
being in the presence of the other is what invokes the awareness of the obligation. "He 
suggests that every face says 'do not do violence to me', 'serve me' and 'do not let me die 
alone"' (cited in Loewenthal and Kunz, 2005: 1). For Bauman (1993: 73) this act of 
confronting the other as a 'face' is an "act of transcendence". Along similar lines Blackburn 
(2001) suggests taking the hurt of the other as our motivation. I imagine a campaign 
slogan, 'not in your backyard'! 
Levinas further attests to an ideal encounter which does not lead to knowing but to 
infinite unknowability of the other (Levinas, 1993). In this thesis to claim knowledge of 
another is to make them in our own image and thus perpetuate a form of violence against 
them. He does not undermine or reject the possibility of knowing but holds that 
knowledge as uncertain (Levinas, 1991; see also Clegg and Slife, 2005). In this he produces 
a potent and refreshing combination of intersubjectivity and uncertainty and thus 
responsibility for our neighbours is conceptualised as'anarchic responsibility' (Levinas, 
1989: 84). The proposed relationship is not one of equity or reciprocity (another contrast 
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with Buber) but rather of obligation to the other, sometimes interpreted as 'subjection' of 
the self to the other, a position which has attracted some criticism (e. g. Alford, 2002) and 
indeed leaves me wondering how this may apply alongside the recently adopted BACP 
ethical principle of self-respect. Disputes between Buber and Levinas have been 
considered as an unfortunate demonstration of their incapacity to live up to their own 
ideal standards (Lipari, 2004). Levinas is also well renowned for his inaccessible language, 
(House, 2005: 99). And again I wonder how the 'responsibility to the other' can be 
manifest in the use of such inaccessible styles of expression. The issue of accessibility is 
soothed by the contribution of writers such as Bauman (see above) who progress and 
cultivate the work of Levinas whilst also presenting his ideas in more comprehensible 
forms. 
Bond (2004a) takes these up ideas and begins to ground them in an accessible and 
practical form in his consideration of an ethic of trust. He describes the gestation of this 
move as being triggered by a conversation with Rabbi Lionel Blue who listed the ethics 
that mattered to him in a therapist as being (in short) trustworthiness, respectfulness of 
him as a person, sufficient compassion to be with him in his pain, and sufficient humility 
that he felt understood and not judged by someone who considered themselves 
invulnerable. Bond (2006: 79) describes the "tipping point" that led him to commit to an 
ethic of trust as happening in response to a traditional provocative challenge by a Maori 
elder who asked what was the most important thing in ethics. Bond apparently heard 
himself responding, 'trust'. What he seems to be relating in these descriptions is that he 
came to grasp the ethical importance of relationship through relationship. He is also 
influenced by the work of O'Neill (e. g. 2002) who suggests that technologies of consent are 
shown to be defective in that they reduce trust, and that the associated over-reliance on 
conceptions of client / patient autonomy are consequently dubious. As Bond (2006: 81) 
summarises, "the solution to mistrust is relational and local". A corollary of accepting this 
position would surely be an increase in the authority or agency expected of the 'local' 
practitioner. 
3.5 Vigorous interweaving growth: Relational responsibility and agency 
If we are merely obeying externally imposed rules we do not have to account for our 
actions, at least not to those making the said rules. But the issue of accountability becomes 
increasingly pertinent in situations where we are either given responsibility to make our 
own ethical decisions or we take that responsibility upon ourselves by resisting or 
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disobeying the given rules. There has clearly been a shift in the expectations of the 
professional bodies concerning the extent to which members are expected or encouraged 
to make their own moral judgements. To my knowledge there is no information available 
on how these changes have been experienced by the membership. We can, however, 
expect that where issues of obedience become knottier then resistance and disobedience 
may also be less than straightforward, and accountability likewise. 
In most early frameworks and published guidance to counsellors (e. g. Bond, 1993; 
Kitchener, 1984) accountability was equated with rationality and rested on the ability to 
articulate clearly reasoned decision-making processes. And this is still very evident in the 
2006 BPS code where prescribed principles are combined with a demand that the 
professional uses reason or rationality alone to apply these. It is specifically made clear to 
them that, "Our capacity to act on rational moral principles bestows on us the dignity of 
free moral agents". It is acknowledged that such rationality cannot by itself provide 
'positive guidance'; this is supplied by the list of principles. There is, however, an 
unambiguous claim that it can provide impartiality; in their words it can, "command 
consistency in action which also means impartiality". Of course this guidance is given to 
the entire, very diverse, membership of the BPS (a tall order) and is not specifically 
tailored for those offering therapeutic services, but there is an assumption here that 
rationality, consistency and impartiality are unquestionably positive characteristics of a 
professional relationship, including a therapeutic one. This is, in short, a framework firmly 
rooted in a modernist, empirical agenda. The agency of the individual psychologist is 
explicitly limited to their capacity to act on the prescribed rational principles. This code is 
also explicitly based on Kant's Categorical Imperative (viz. Act on such maxims as you 
could will to become universal law) which is given as an example of a rational moral 
principle and is re-presented in an unambiguously anti-utilitarian form as "Treat 
humanity in your own person and that of others always as an end and never only as a 
means". This is very reminiscent of Percival's early attempts to make physicians wake up 
to their responsibilities to their patients. 
Actions and decisions may appear more defensible if we are able to present our process as 
coherent and this is often assumed as a basic requirement of counsellors (e. g. Bayne et al, 
1994). It makes sense that in order to be accountable we have to be able to communicate 
to others how we make our judgements and choices. But many ethical decisions appear to 
be made in a manner that can best be described as intuitive (Hare, 1981; Robson et al, 
2000), pre-reflective (Kitchener, 1984) or at least non-rational and arising out of 
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"contradictory impulses" (Van Meijl, 2000: 70). It may be that, where a rational 
justification is required by agencies that this is applied post hoc (Robson et al, 2000; 
Westcott, 1968). And the storying of these decisions and processes also adds a coherence 
that is unlikely to have been experienced in living through the critical event. Perhaps as 
Krumboltz (1983) neatly pronounces, 'it is irrational to distinguish between rational and 
irrational decisions'. 
Such processes of professional accountability always seem to focus on the individual. For 
Stainton Rogers (2003) the major contribution of attribution theory is its illumination of 
our inclination to blame individuals and to reveal typical processes of self-justification. In 
particular, people have been shown to over-emphasise individual factors and under- 
emphasise situational causes in accounting for the actions of others whilst doing the 
reverse when accounting for their own actions (Nisbett and Ross, 1980). On similar lines, 
Gergen (1995) submits that the modern western individualist tradition works to create 
'heroes and villains' and fails to recognise the process as relational. The 'name and shame' 
pages, where the 'villains' of counselling are exposed, again come to mind. As Solomon 
(1991: 99) argues, the locus of justice is neither in the individual nor in the community but 
in the "complex, confluence of interrelated and mutually dependent individuals who move 
in and out of relationships and communities". Along these lines, Gergen joins McNamee to 
call for a shift in focus from personal responsibility to relational responsibility (McNamee 
& Gergen, 1999). 
Working in the areas of teacher education and social inclusion Edwards (2005a) calls for 
the development of relational agency which includes a capacity to work with others; to 
bring the sense-making of others to bear on the issue (in her terms, on the 'object'); and 
drawing on and responding to what they have to offer. In doing this she juxtaposes Hicks' 
(2000) thinking on the moral aspects of 'self-in-relation' with Taylor's expression of a 
need for a stronger connection between individual selves and the common good (Taylor, 
1991) and Shotter's (1993) call for a relational ethics. This model of relational agency is 
reminiscent of the supervision process in counselling, which has its roots in values of non- 
judgmentalism and peer support, though the increasing bureaucratisation, emphasis on 
recognised training and accreditation, and subsequent emerging hierarchies have 
somewhat diminished its peer status. 
Despite the interpersonal nature of the work, counselling is in many ways a solitary 
practice, often described as isolated. Counsellors are frequently employed in private 
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practice (a telling term) or in a variety of agencies developing what is euphemistically 
referred to as a'mixed portfolio'. Edwards (2005a) suggests that as people move between 
different settings in modern society, increasingly without the protection of 'institutional 
shelters' (see Sennett, 1999), they need 'strong forms of agency' in order to find some 
stability. This is consistent with the recognition that denial of agency brings suffering 
(Ricoeur, 1984; Murray, 2003). 
Agency has typically been equated with free will or individuality and, in fact, agency and 
communion have been claimed as two basic and distinct human modalities or orientations 
(Bakan, 1966) and themes in life narratives (McAdams, 1997,1985; McAdams et al, 1996). 
True to my evolving postmodern form, I am unconvinced by the duality. Such individual 
accounts of selfhood and reflexivity are now undermined and displaced by more social and 
relational versions (Harre and Van Langenhove, 1999; Hermans, 1996; Sarbin, 1986; 
Shotter, 1993). The self as responsible moral agent is argued to be constituted in and by 
the social / cultural context in which we are required to account for our actions (Clark and 
Holquist, 1984; Shotter, 1993). Evaluation then is not individual but takes place in'webs of 
interlocution' within a'defining community' (Taylor, 1989: 39) and the self is argued to be 
a'special case' of that evaluation (Lewis, 2003). 
In Chapter Two I expressed discomfort with my focus on language and identified the 
constitutive power of language as raising particular condemnation when applied to 
persons or selves. As predicted at that time, I now find myself needing to return to 
language as constitutive of self, and particularly of the 'moral' self. In constructionist ideas 
of speech as social practice, there is a focus on what we do with language (Austin, 1962), 
or discourse (Potter and Wetherell, 1987), or on "what self-talk achieves rather than what 
self-talk denotes" (Lewis, 2003: 226). Here I am concerned with what such talk achieves as 
regards moral agency, or responsibility. 
Harre and van Langenhove (1999) conceive of agency as arising through the discursive 
capacity to assume complex and multiple perspectives and also to take perspectives on 
these perspectives. Thus agency is found in the emergent meta-perspective. The key for 
Harre (1987) and Lewis (2003: 232) is in the first person psychological predicate. 
Whereas third person predicates are descriptive (examples given by Lewis are, "he hopes 
he will succeed', or'he is angry'), first person predicates work as avowals or commitments 
('I hope I will succeed' or'I am angry'). Second order avowals ('I'm not sure whether I 
should feel sad') allow for reflexive discourses where we express evaluations and attitudes 
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about ourselves and we envisage ourselves as others may see us. This is powerfully 
expressed in Rory McLeod's lyrics, "I hated what I saw; I saw myself with your eyes. " In 
this way, far from personal responsibility being diminished in social constructionism, it is 
actually enhanced as we become increasingly aware of what our speech and actions can 
accomplish. 
Davies and Harre (1990) describe our identity as human beings as characterised by being 
continuous whilst at the same time discontinuous. Though variously positioned in every 
conversation, they remind us that we remain that same person. Our personal history is a 
history of having occupied "multiple positions" and having "engaged in different forms of 
discourse". As such they add that it is "obvious that such a being is not inevitably caught in 
the subject position that the particular narrative and the related discursive practices might 
seem to dictate. " And in this they answer Benhabib's (1992,1995) anxiety that reflexivity 
and accountability will disappear in postmodern linguistic practices (see again Chapter 
Two). Agency requires choice, and choice requires reflexive awareness (Lewis, 2003: 
232). 
In Chapter Two I also came to recognise the relationship between language and 
embodiment, and here again I find that association. In social constructionism, space and 
time become 'source models' for self-talk (Lewis, 2003). Our ability to conceive of 
ourselves and of selfhood requires the notion of embodiment in space and time, that is, the 
self is conceived as inhabiting a position in space and through time. Narrative has been 
argued to be our primary way of organising our experience in time (Ricoeur, 1984; 1991) 
but more recently, Hermans (1996) has extended Bakhtin's (1981,1984,1986) 
polyphonic model of communication to claim the spatial dimension of narrative as being 
equally important. Here interactions are envisaged as 'stretched' across positions and 
'voice' allows 'dynamic interplay between positions'. Having been forced to return to my 
uncomfortable focus on language I am comforted by this further recognition that we are 
embodied beings in relationship, and also by Edwards' (2005a) assertion that there is 
more to relational agency than dialogic reasoning. Whilst recognising a number of 
additional elements (Edwards, 2005b) her focus on mutual responsibility is particularly 





3.6 Cultivating the unruly: Resistance and ethical Identity 
It is thought to be easier to refrain from doing something we feel to be wrong than to do 
something we feel to be right (Linn, 1989: 50), passivity being the path of least resistance 
and the active path requiring more agency perhaps? But when we are expected, or even 
pressured to act in a way we believe to be unethical, or immoral, inaction becomes a 
positive choice, it is the not doing that requires most resistance, most agency. Again here 
we have the intertwining of agency and communion (see again Bakan, 1966; McAdams, 
1997). To act for others requires us to be agentic, to refuse to act against others, likewise. 
One of the strongest forms of moral resistance is conscientious objection to military 
service. In the UK there is no longer conscription, but in Israel it is routine and those who 
object are known as 'refusers', and are subject to public opprobrium, humiliation and 
imprisonment. Linn (1997) has carried out a narrative study with some of these soldiers, 
classified as 'selective refusers'. Where 'absolute refusers' object to taking part in warfare 
per se, the selective refusers object to specific policies or campaigns. Those in Linn's study 
had refused to take part in either the Lebanese war (of 1982-85) or the Intifada (of 1987- 
94). One respondent explains that the army are happy with absolute resisters as they owe 
them no response, whereas selective refusers want to understand. As in the bureaucratic 
organisations described by Bauman (1994) members who "watch the hands" of the 
holders of power are not popular. They had no legal status as selective refusers and were 
all court marshalled. They were given sentences in military prisons and some were 
sentenced more than once for additional drafts. They were condemned by the press and 
the public as "leftists, delinquents and law-breakers and [as] undermining democracy" 
(Linn, 1997: 97). 
There is understandable scepticism in response to such acts of refusal. And calls for clear 
accountability are somewhat reminiscent of the conduct procedures of the professional 
bodies for counselling described above. Walzer (1977) for example, offers a framework for 
determining credibility which includes asking how the decision was reached, how the 
resister honestly confronted their obligations and how seriously they weighed alternative 
actions and consequences. 
This issue of individualism versus relationship is again raised in the consideration of such 
resistance or disobedience. Moral resistance can appear to be individualistic and 
separatist and the individual concerned can be either condemned or acclaimed, reminding 
us of Gergen's 'heroes and villains'. For instance these acts of resistance and dissent are 
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sometimes interpreted as claims of moral maturity or superiority. Such claims are often 
viewed as narratives of moral separateness (e. g. Rawls, 1971; Kohlberg, 1984). Mishler 
(1986) also sees the moral narrative as a claim for a particular personal identity rather 
than indicating cultural values. Fromm (1981: 21) takes a more positive, supportive view, 
arguing that, "In order to disobey one must have the courage to be alone". And 
Frankenstein (1970,1972,1982) likewise equates responsible thinking to thinking that is 
not dependent upon authority or fear of critical judgements but on the ability to see 
beyond the concrete and the immediate. Perhaps again there needs to be some troubling 
of a dualist understanding. Walzer (1988) and Linn (1989) both point to the need to 
understand a paradox between the essential moral connection of resistance and the moral 
separation from the community. For Walzer (1988) this paradox is based on an 
assumption that moral resistance is a way of relating to others. For Linn (1989: 103) it 
"needs to be seen as a moral position from which the resister dares to tell a narrative of 
moral connection. " The telling of the narrative provides, of course, further connection. 
These actions raise Cohen's (2001) distinction between doing evil and failing to oppose 
evil, and bring a further return to the issue of bystanding. Bauman (2003: 138) is clear 
about the "affinity between'doing evil' and 'non-resistance to evil'". He asks, "Would the 
perpetrators - the 'real culprits' - engage in their evil deeds if they could not count on the 
indifference and non-interference of all those around? If they did not know for sure or at 
least had good reasons to believe that the witnesses were not likely to turn into actors? " 
(Bauman, 2003: 140). 
Cohen (2001) describes a dynamic that he refers to as an 'atrocity triangle', where the 
various roles of victim, perpetrator and observer are identified. This is very similar to a 
dynamic well-known in counselling which originates in the Transactional Analysis School 
of practice. This is known as the Karpman, or Drama Triangle (Karpman, 1968) and the 
positions identified are victim, perpetrator and rescuer. In both models there is a dynamic 
shift and the positions change, but there is a very different moral in each. In the Karpman 
version the rescuer intervenes and is then criticised or attacked by the victim. The victim 
thus becomes the perpetrator and the rescuer becomes the victim. It is intervention that is 
considered to constitute problematic 'rescuing' in this model. For Cohen the non- 
intervention, the bystanding, is recognised as the problem. And of course, as the poem 
popularly ascribed to Pastor Niemöller makes all too clear in the poignant account of 
bystanding in Nazi Germany, non-intervention does not protect us from becoming victims. 
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Cohen's interpretation of the triangle reflects what Clarkson (1996) identifies as 
'bystander syndrome' inherent in individualistic counselling approaches where the 
bystander is described as: "a person who does not become actively involved in a situation 
where someone else requires help". Cohen (2001) and Bauman (2003) are united in their 
assertion that both the perpetration of evil and bystanding are made possible through 
denial. In Cohen's account denial can be literal denial (where the facts of the atrocity are 
disputed), interpretive (where the meaning is disputed) or implicatory (where the 
complicity is disputed, the atrocity is claimed to be 'not to do with me'). The way that 
Cohen describes this state of denial is not as a decision made in full awareness. It is a state 
of knowing and yet not knowing (Cohen, 2001) and it is from such a state that Bauman 
(2003) tells us, we have to struggle to transform ourselves from bystanders to actors. 
Hirschman (cited in Bauman, 1994) says that when people are concerned about a situation 
they have two means of influence; voice or exit. Both of these strategies are, in some 
respects, agentic. The difference between these two, as Bauman puts it, is between 
"engagement and disengagement" (1994: 42). Voice is relational. This further call for 
active engagement is also apparent in Tatar and Bekerman's (2002: 382) reminder to 
those of us working in the therapy professions that "we all actively author the 'culture' of 
the context we inhabit". 
Whilst psychologists have typically been associated with supporting the status quo and a 
lack of interest in political action (Prilletensky and Nelson, 2002), this has been contrasted 
with counsellors (e. g. Danchev, 2005). Some of the Counselling Psychologists in Danchev's 
study had, in fact, left the psychology profession because of this absence of a radical 
agenda and only returned when the new Division of Counselling Psychology (DCoP) within 
the BPS offered a place of belonging. In her data she identified an underlying theme of 
"taking the position of the rebel", or "a commitment to shifting the status quo" (2005: 124). 
Likewise Cushman (1995: 281) argues that, "There is ... a morality implicit in the legacy 
and mainstream practices of psychotherapy that offers an alternative to the status quo. " 
Tajfel and Turner's (1979) 'social identity theory' (SIT) claims to describe a simple 
process which is, in some respects, reminiscent of attribution theory (see above), though 
here the focus is group membership and identity rather than individual motivation. In SIT 
the process of delineating consensual social categories leads to a kind of perceptual 
illusion whereby differences between groups are exaggerated and those within groups are 
minimised. As we take up identity positions within these groups we experience 'belonging' 
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and our sense of our own value or esteem becomes linked to that of the groups to which 
we 'belong'. As such, disparagement of a group to which we belong can impact on our 
personal identity and esteem. The given explanations of this process seem mechanistic 
and retain a version of personhood best described as 'social individualism' (Wetherell, 
2006: 66), where "a guiding image is of group membership stacked inside the individual as 
social identities". However, there is something in the accounts that is redolent of the 
current state of the counselling profession. Therapy is increasingly denounced in the 
media and popular culture and there are also somewhat aggressive divisions within the 
various ranks and sections. Moreover, these divisions are often experienced as relating to 
ethical or moral positions. And as Taylor (1989) describes, there seems to be a human 
"craving" to be connected to or in correct relation to "the good". And though this can 
clearly lead to division and divisiveness there is also a clear dialogic or social emphasis. 
Typically counsellors claim ethics as part of their professional identity, again participants 
in Danchev's doctoral research made strong connections between ethics, integrity and 
counselling psychology practice seeing "no separation between the self, ethical beliefs, 
ethical practice, and being a professional" (2005: 120). They particularly valued 
consonance between their beliefs and their ways of working. In my years of working with 
counsellors I too have found this to be a common view, and it has seemed obvious to me 
that people who choose a 'caring profession' that typically requires a considerable number 
of unpaid hours as well as self-financing are likely to be motivated by some concern for 
others. Early in my doctoral studies, I overheard the following conversation and was 
sufficiently shocked to record it verbatim in my notebook: 
Person One: I've got this interview to do counselling training. 
Person Two: I didn't know you were interested in that. 
Person One: Well, I was sitting with my counsellor and we were having a chat 
and I think to myself, 'this is money for old rope. I wouldn't mind a 
bit of that! 
Mind you, I wouldn't want to work with substance abuse, that's a 
dead end job that is. You won't get many successes in that kind of 
work. 
And I wouldn't put up with people being angry with me. I've been 
told I'd have to button it, but I'm not that kind of person. 
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Although this person had not yet been accepted for counsellor training, nor yet been 
exposed to the discourses and debates that typify counsellor training, a more complex 
account of motivations for joining the profession is clearly needed. Constructivist / 
constructionist perspectives again allow a more complex, though messier consideration of 
moral identity and motivation. The focus here is on people as a site of'meaning making', 
where some practices are privileged or become sedimented (Wetherell, 2006). So perhaps 
agency can be seen as the capacity to break out of the habitual, the sedimented, though 
sometimes this seems to be triggered by disruptive circumstances or life events. And it is 
such circumstances (see Becker, 1997) that typically demand a narrative account 
(accountability? ). 
And if, as argued in Chapter Two, agency lies in the capacity to navigate between 
discourses, to differentially take up subject positions (Henriques et al 1984,2002) and act 
on the possibilities of resignification made available through discourses (Butler, 1995) 
then knowledge of alternative discourses, and of alternative routes through them must 
facilitate agency. These are not made available in isolation but through relationship and 
particularly through hearing each others' stories. In this way, Stainton Rogers (2003) 
differentiates between scripts which she sees as simple repertoires to follow and 
narratives which also contain moral and prescriptive elements. 
Narrative inquiry then, clearly allows consideration of ethical challenge and moral identity 
or, for more structuralist / essentialist researchers such as Crossley (2003: 288-289), the 
person's "internal sense of themselves and their morality". This brings me to the 
requirement to describe and account for my adoption of narrative inquiry in this research 
and, in particular to my personal approach to, and route through this work. In the next 
chapter I therefore move to undertake this task, including academic consideration of 
methods, processes and procedures as well as a more experiential account. As this 
research is concerned with ethics it demands that I pay particular attention to the ethics of 
the research process itself, and this awareness will infuse this next chapter. 
52 
Chapter Four 
Preparations for re-planting and grafting 
4.1 Gathering resources 
Until now this thesis has been solely concerned with ideas. And although these ideas have 
been, in the main, grounded in considerations for humanity in general or humans in 
particular, a distance from actual, living people has been maintained. In this chapter, 
however, there is an explicit change of focus as I begin to account for my ways of working 
with the people whose stories are the principal reason for this study. I thus return to the 
ground that I am preparing, bringing with me rich pickings gathered on my journeys. In 
sorting through this crop, and finding suitable locations and ways of transplanting it, my 
primary consideration is that I am soon to invite others in, to bring their own 
contributions, and so I must create a space that is sufficiently safe for them to visit, and 
also sufficiently interesting for them to want to visit. 
In Chapter Two I recounted my decision to create a postmodern bricolage of narrative 
ways of working which embraced postfoundational inclusivity whilst maintaining a focus 
on the subjective and intersubjective, and in which I would be able to remain flexible and 
open to fresh or emerging perspectives, particularly those introduced by the contributors. 
In this decision there was a rejection of certainty and simple truths, including my own 
favoured versions and thus I declared my aim to subvert and destabilise my own position 
and associated power. This consciousness of my power was particularly needed as the 
contributors to this research were likely to have experienced some abuse of power and I 
was thus especially obliged to refrain from behaving in ways that would be experienced as 
a repeat of such abuse. 
And throughout this, I carried with me that particular anxiety, that it would be especially 
odious to use unethical practices to research unethical practices. As such I have taken as 
my inspiration, approaches to research where quality is achieved through collapsing "the 
distinction between quality (rigor) and research ethics" (Lincoln, 1995: 275). I have 
therefore attempted to bring ethical awareness, or mindfulness to bear on each of my 
decisions throughout the course of the research. But, as has become clear in Chapter 
Three, the field of ethics is a contested area. 
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Despite (or perhaps as a result of) my fairly extensive exploration undertaken there, the 
key themes of that chapter can also justifiably be summarised as complexity, contradiction 
and uncertainty. And this applies equally to the ethics of social science research as it does 
to the professional ethics described in that chapter. Each of the foundational chapters 
above has therefore led me to embrace uncertainty in general and to position myself as 
'not-knowing' within the research process, as far as is possible and is honest. 
The other substantive feature of the 'ethics chapter' above is the emergent regard for a 
local and relational or dialogic basis to professional ethics, particularly as it relates to trust 
and trustworthiness (Bond 2004a, 2004b, 2006). And in this too I recognise the parity 
with research ethics, and so I aim to engage with contributors in ways that honour the 
local, the relational and the dialogic. Combining the 'not-knowing' with this relational 
emphasis means that the research process is largely unpredictable as it becomes receptive 
and responsive to what the people at the centre of the research bring to it. 
But I did not come to this PhD naively, at many levels there is indeed some 'knowing'. I 
have long accepted that researchers cannot be assumed to be neutral in the research 
process. And of course, I came to this project with substantial experience in counselling 
ethics, including coercion to practice unethically; and I was very aware that at least part of 
my motivation to undertake research in this area had roots in some of the more difficult of 
these professional experiences. Bochner and Ellis (2003: 508) see this "... deep and 
abiding connection between one's own life history and one's research and writing" more 
positively than I did at that time. My early intention had been to simply make my 'vested 
interest' clear, to practise reflexivity in a bid to both minimise the effects of my own 
history and, where this appeared impossible, to make its influence explicit. Openness to 
new learning was, and still is at the forefront of my ambitions, and in the early days, 
phenomenological 'bracketing off (McLeod, 2001) seemed the best way to do this. But 
slowly I gave in to recognising benefits in maintaining mindful engagement with what I 
had learned in the past, with what brought me here, including my ongoing construction 
and re-construction of that learning. As such, 'personal experience methods' (McLeod, 
2003) were called for and justified. 
In these methods there is systematic use of the self, as in much counselling practice (see 
for example Wosket, 1999) and so this is a fitting approach for a counsellor working with 
counsellors. With regard to research, however, the main intention is "the positioning of the 
researcher in relation to the topic of inquiry" and the attempt to combine "personal 
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journey, testimony and analysis" (McLeod, 2003: 83). Despite McLeod's warning that it is 
difficult to do justice to each of these, such difficulty does not constitute a justification for 
avoidance per se. There may, however, be justification for avoidance of some related 
practices or styles of approach. I do not want to get swept along the well-trodden path of 
producing simple 'confessional tales' for instance (Van Manaan, 1988; Seale, 1999; 
Sparkes, 2002), where I as researcher would assume the focal position and inevitably 
achieve the (seemingly) obligatory happy ending There has been much opprobrium for 
these reflexive practices, some of it warranted. I was wary, for instance, of accusations of 
non-productive 'navel-gazing' or'narcissistic rambling' (see for example, Sanders, 1995; 
Mykhalovskiy, 1997; Sparkes, 2002), or reflexivity as academic privilege (Lynch, 2000). 
But there is a more widespread reticence, or even uncritical scepticism about researcher 
reflexivity in any form. As Charmaz and Mitchell (1997) point out, academic writers have 
been treated as 'Victorian children', to "be seen (in the credits) but not heard (in the text)" 
and those who transgress this principle are often accused of 'self-indulgence'. Amongst 
others Sparkes (2002: 210) creatively and powerfully challenges this view. He asks why 
not "self-knowing, self-respectful, self-sacrificing or self-luminous? " This is what I hoped 
for in taking a reflexive stance but it did not happen easily. 
I wanted to engage actively and critically. I wanted reflexivity to provoke me, as a 
researcher, to take greater responsibility for my actions and to reflect on the impact of my 
research (Warner, 2004). I wanted to recognise that there would be differences that would 
separate me from the contributors, and that this would impact on the process and the 
relationship (Reay, 1996). Along similar lines, Harding (1993) calls for'strong reflexivity', 
which includes the unexamined beliefs of the researcher. But if we are to include our 
'unexamined' beliefs they cannot remain unexamined. In this case reflexivity becomes a 
process of unearthing, of rooting out and looking afresh at our experiences, values and 
motivations and their relationship to our research. For this we need to be willing to 
confront and re-construct these positions, without getting overwhelmed by the "self- 
referential methodological angst" (Bolam et al, 2003: 8) sometimes associated with such 
comprehensive forms of reflexivity, and which Seale (1999) considers to have the 
potential to 'paralyse' the research. 
Making our reflexive practices available for examination as part of our research process 
does inevitably bring us into the spotlight and some researchers embrace this, often for 
reasons of beneficence and fidelity to research participants (e. g. Bond, 2002). For me, and 
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for Wright (2003: 1), "The idea that people do research on themselves rather than each 
other is a comfort" and I support Wolcott's (2005: 198) assertion that it is better to make 
oneself the 'fall guy' rather than the participants. These sentiments are consistent with my 
avowal to behave in ways that avoid abuse of power. Beyond this my preferences were to 
avoid taking the central position, but to take my place (as far as possible) alongside my 
contributors rather than in front of them, again to more fully embrace a relational 
epistemology (Bourdieu and Waquant, 1992). And one of the ways I attempted to do this 
was by inviting contributors to join in the reflexive process. This, I hoped, would begin to 
"close the illusory gap between researcher and researched and between the knower and 
what is known" (Etherington, 2004a: 32). The cluster of my aspirations was thus growing 
to combine the uncertainty and local / relational values with critical reflexivity. 
Among the 'personal experience approaches' commonly used in counselling research, 
heuristic methods (Douglas and Moustakas, 1985; Moustakas, 1967,1990; Etherington, 
2004b; West, 2001) combine a personal connection with the topic and a valuing of 
relationships with contributors as whole persons, as core criteria. Such heurism matched 
my evolving values, but there is realist / humanist focus on 'discovery' in some accounts. 
And I was (by now predictably) less keen to be constrained by prescribed structures or 
even by predicted expectations such as the phases typically identified within more 
formulaic versions of heuristic research. Besides, the final stage of 'creative synthesis' 
(Moustakas, 1990) can be read as an attempt to impose modernist unity, and is also 
reminiscent of the required 'happy ending' of 'confessional tales'. In this regard I preferred 
a postmodern, constructivist heurism and an openness to unpredicted / unpredictable, 
and perhaps even unending iterative cycles of learning. 
4.2 Groundwork Early procedures and processes 
My first significant cycles of learning occurred well before I made any contact with the 
contributors, and grew from my initial encounters and developing relationship with my 
main supervisor, Kim Etherington. One of those early meetings made a lasting impact. In 
this Kim interviewed me about the aspects of my life-history that had brought me to this 
research and also what I hoped for in a supervisor. The session was recorded and 
transcribed, and the latter section, concerning my hopes for supervision, was used as a 
working basis for a contract between us. 
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This proved to be an uncomfortable but immensely valuable first stage for my iterative 
process. At that time I was not aware that Bolam, Gleeson and Murphy (2003) were 
considering how to make reflexive processes more explicit, and specifically drawing 
excessive attention from the writing stages, to engage with reflexive practices before the 
production of the final report. In their research they'turned the tables' by subjecting the 
first author to "the same process of objectivation used to objectivise research participants" 
(2003: 21). In short they too 'interviewed the interviewer'. 
Kim and I did not use the same interview schedules that I would be using, as Bolam et al 
did. At this early stage my approach to interviews was not decided. And as Stanley and 
Billig (2004) contend, there are power differentials and inequalities in the supervisor / 
supervisee relationship as well as conflicting and contrary tensions in the experiences of 
doctoral students, who are dependent on supervisors but are at the same time expected to 
be autonomous. To further'objectivise' me in such a context would have been a dubious 
practice. As it was, I was able to gain a richer understanding of narrative interviews than 
would have been possible in years of sheltering behind the controlling end of the 
microphone. 
During the interview I felt vulnerable and began to wonder what Kim was thinking of me. I 
became reticent, awkwardly measuring my responses against what I imagined her agenda 
might be. Of the many thoughts that passed through my mind, one that impacted most 
strongly was a suspicion that she was assessing how good a student I was. Stanley and 
Billig are clearly onto something! 
The transcript was also illuminating. For one thing, it shows me telling some stories, but 
starting and not managing to tell others, a testimony to the pervasive nature of narrative 
(McLeod, 1997; Mishler, 1986) and also to the impossibility of focussing on all of the 
stories or proto-stories in any conversation. There would inevitably be some selection in 
what I attended to, and in that more power than I had hoped. 
This interviewer power became more evident as I more closely read the transcript of my 
interview experience. My journal says: 
I awt struck by a sense that it seems to represent what the 
interviewer heard, rather than what I said. For instance at 
one point I referred to someone called At but this was 
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keard as Jokn and the nave Jokn appeared in the 
transcript, i: e. wkat the interviewer keard not wkat I said. 
This jars as I read it and I have a sense of alienation from it. 
The question, "wkose transcript is it? " occurs. Otker 
inaccuracies in transcription seem to misrepresent people 
and, even tkougk this was simply a learning exercise and no 
further use will be wade of it, I am still uncomfortable when 
read it. 
From this experience, I could hardly fail to appreciate at least some value in 'member 
checks', the practice of some researchers, including my supervisor, to return transcripts to 
interviewees for checking (as she did here with me). Such inaccuracies can then be 
amended. Later on, when carrying out my own interviews and transcriptions I also came 
to realise that total accuracy is impossible but that the research contributor is much more 
likely to know what they said or meant than an interviewer new to the material. But that 
was a while off yet. First I had to find some contributors. 
These volunteers were accessed through a range of channels, including advertisements 
placed in professional journals, flyers distributed at conferences, posters left on 
noticeboards in counselling agencies and in university training departments, and appeals 
on relevant message boards. The initial wording of these advertisements was brief and 
gave little away, reflecting the 'bracketing off that I initially intended. But after meeting 
with early contributors, I made amendments, giving more information, revealing some of 
my understanding and expectations at that time, acknowledging some of the complexity 
that was emerging and reflecting a little of my learning from those early contributors. 
I did not frame my decisions about how many people should contribute their narratives to 
this research within the usual discourses about sampling, and I do not intend to support 
those decisions here by referring to external sources for validation. The focus of narrative 
inquiry is on stories, not the individual suppliers of those stories. And it is sufficiently 
broad and diverse to include a wide variety of positions and preferences with regard to 
'appropriate' numbers, from in-depth single case research to quite large numbers subject 
to forms of thematic analysis. 
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For my purposes I did not require a large 'sample' of people, but sufficient to provide a 
breadth, or richness of contexts and experiences and yet few enough that there would be 
space and time to allow full and rigorous tellings and re-tellings of the narratives and 
associated elements of life-history. The exact number could not, therefore, be decided or 
determined beforehand but was part of an ongoing review and assessment, and as such I 
frequently returned this decision as my iterative process further unfolded. 
From those who responded to my requests for volunteers, a final group of six was selected 
on the basis that the volunteers identified themselves as having a significant experience of 
being pressured, or coerced to conduct themselves, as counsellors, in ways that they felt to 
be unethical. It was also vital that they were able to describe this experience without 
disclosing confidential counselling material that might lead to any clients being identified. 
Finally, I needed to be assured that they each had sufficient personal support in case the 
research raised difficult emotions or memories. I did not make these decisions alone, but 
in discussion with the potential contributors themselves, some of whom withdrew in the 
initial stages due to concerns that either they might be identifiable from their story, or that 
they may breach conditions of employment, in one case this included The Official Secrets 
Act. There can, therefore, be no further discussion of these people or their experiences. 
Fortuitously the group of six who continued with the project was interestingly diverse: 
" The forms of coercion experienced were multiple and unexpected 
" The organisational settings in which the incidents occurred were varied, including: 
- the voluntary sector 
-a large statutory organisation 
- residential addiction rehabilitation 
-a police counselling service 
-a higher education establishment 
- personnel management 
" There was significant diversity in the life-histories and identities of the people 
themselves 
" Two were male and four female 
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" The time lapse between the incidents described and the research ranged from two to 
approximately twenty years 
" In five out of the six cases the counsellor had been a relative novice at the time of the 
incident. 
- One (Caroline) was not employed as a counsellor per se, but used 
counselling skills in personnel work. She has since qualified in counselling. 
- Three (Maira, Anthony and Roberta) were still in training. They are all now 
qualified and have substantial experience. 
- One (Clara) had qualified but was still quite inexperienced at that time. She 
is now a very experienced counsellor and trainer. 
- Only the last contributor (Richard) had been an established and 
experienced counsellor at the time. 
In view of the sensitivity of some of the material included, and in order to protect the 
identities of potentially vulnerable third parties, anonymity has been privileged over 
ambitions of either individual or contextual authenticity, and so any further potentially 
identifying detail has been omitted or changed. 
In attempting to manifest and communicate my trustworthiness as a researcher (see 
Chapter Three and Bond, 2006), and also mindful of O'Neill's (2002) concerns that usual 
technologies of consent are defective (again see Chapter Three), I chose to use a 
negotiated / process form of consent (Grafanaki, 1996; Etherington, 2000,2001a, 2001b; 
McLeod, 2002), which likewise honours the local and relational. I also wished to find ways 
to combine this inclusion of the contributors with my commitment to iterative learning. 
One way in which I did this was to take the comments, questions and concerns raised by 
each of the early volunteers and include them in my meetings / negotiations with the 
following volunteers. Thus the consent procedures were collaboratively developed. The 
broad framework for this was as follows: 
1. I sent an information sheet to each potential contributor. This included detailed 
information on the research rationale, strategy and process, ethical issues and data 
management. In particular it was intended to give reassurance that my handling of 
their material throughout the research project would be sensitive and respectful 
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and would conform to the 1998 Data Protection Act. All data would be anonymised 
and contributors would only be identified through a pseudonym. 
2. They were informed that they could withdraw consent at any time. 
3. I met with each of them to discuss the research in detail, including any ethical 
concerns. In this we attempted to negotiate a way forward that both parties were 
comfortable with. I, as researcher, attempted to include as many potential 
difficulties as possible; particularly relating to the dissemination of the research, 
some of which they might not have considered. 
4. My understanding and abilities to communicate potential difficulties were 
developed and enriched by each successive encounter, particularly up to and 
including the fourth contributor (see Table One below for examples). The final two 
raised no additional difficulties. Perhaps the issues had all been raised by this 
point and we had reached 'saturation'. 
5. At this meeting I also asked each contributor to select their own pseudonym. In 
this way I was again trying to disrupt my own powerful position and also avoiding 
the possibility that I might select names that reflected my interpretations or 
impressions of that person. Some of the initial pseudonyms did, in fact, have to be 
changed. One because the first name chosen was also publicly connected to that 
person, one because the name chosen was connected to the narrative of another 
contributor, and one because it was very similar to a pseudonym already selected 
by another contributor. In each of these cases the person concerned also chose 
their substitute pseudonym. 
6.1 recorded and transcribed each discussion ensuring that any identifying 
information is omitted and that only pseudonyms were used. 
7. I sent each transcription to the person concerned for him / her to consider in his / 
her own time. They then fed back any comments, concerns, wishes and feelings 
regarding the research. 
8. This formed the basis for a working contract, which the contributor could 
withdraw from or amend at any time. 
9.1 agreed with each contributor that we would have two meetings in addition to the 
initial contracting conversation. The first of these would be a'narrative gathering' 
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session, where they would have space to tell their core stories. And the second 
would be a'follow-up' opportunity to me to check my understanding and explore 
further areas of interest as well as for them to add to, clarify or amend these 
stories. I assured them that I would (personally) transcribe these conversations 
and send the transcripts to them for checking between the two meetings. 
10. This required a substantial space of time between the initial narrative telling and 
the second re-telling and runs thus counter to the recommendations of The 
Biographic Narrative model (Wengraf, 2001) but was consistent with the 
relational and heuristic aims of this research. It gave sufficient space for both 
researcher and contributor to engage in `in-dwelling' (Moustakas, 1990). 
11. The remainder of the research also proceeded in this way (and is further described 
where relevant through the remainder of this chapter). 
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Table One. Examples of concerns and suggestions raised by contributors 
The learning for Excerpts from the transcript of the contracting 
me conversations 
A stark and effective Please protect your sources 
warning to me to 
keep identities 
secure 
Recognising I think if we're that careful about anonymising everything. I don't 
relational think that would be... I don't see, I don't see a problem 
responsibility in the 
anonymising 
process 
Understanding that I think I need to think about that This different sort of availability of 
a longer time is information on the web. I would need to think about that, I mean it 
needed to consider doesn't make my heart race at the moment But can you leave that as 
some of the issues an open question? 
Recognising that And I think the fact that you're coming back to check from time to 
contributors may time also enables me just to check my own boundaries from time to 
want to change their time too, which may shift or may alter. My own experience is that 
mind and will need tend to be too open, and then go, 'Ow! That's too much'. And maybe in 
time to do that the spirit of this I want to be open ... to askyou... 
A challenge to my It's interesting because most of the things that I felt uncomfortable 
initial emphasis on with all came back down to my personal values, of me feeling that 
professional rather had to put them to one side and I couldn't 
than personal ethics 
Becoming One other question I had ... was, the depth of the interview. At the 
particularly aware moment I'm having personal counselling myself, and I just wondered 
of the potential how far ... your questioning or whatever is going to go in terms of 
personal and getting into the real the real stuff about me ifyou like 
emotional impact 
General helpful And actually, actually, whatyou might want to do is to check that 
advice and ideas this interviewee and other interviewees remain at the same address. 
Ifyou wanted to get in touch ... People change their email addresses 
with great rapidity, frequently. 
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4.3 Companion planting: Meeting and relating with contributors 
My identity shift from counsellor to researcher was more problematic than I had been 
prepared for. I had not wanted a stark division from my past. As an experienced counsellor 
I held a conception of myself as a skilled listener and did not want these abilities left to rot 
in the ground. On the contrary, I hoped that in some way they would provide rich compost 
from which new skills would flourish. After two decades in the counselling and 
'communication skills' professions this was one area where I expected to be comfortable 
and confident. I may be struggling with poststructuralism and the 'linguistic turn' I told 
myself, but at least I know how to listen, how to be with a person as they told their story. 
And I was going to be using narrative methods, what could be easier? Counsellors are used 
to working with story, and engaging empathically with meaning-making and the nitty- 
gritty of lived experience. This, I assured myself, was familiar territory, my own backyard. 
Again, my experience of being interviewed by my supervisor, Kim, and the subsequent 
processing of this provided my first significant unsettling of this complacency. Kim is also 
a counsellor and, while we have some similar influences on our practice, I was also aware 
of differences. Despite this knowledge of our differences, I was surprised at how active she 
was when she interviewed me and at the number of questions she asked me. At that time I 
struggled to understand whether this was because of our different approaches to 
counselling or (more worryingly) because my more person-centred approach might be 
inappropriate for narrative research. In my practice I have tried to avoid questions in an 
attempt to stay in the client's frame of reference, to not intrude, distort, distract, or to put 
them in a position of being obliged to answer my curiosities. My aim has been to witness 
deeply, to avoid co-construction. Kim, however, believes co-construction to be inevitable 
(see also Holstein and Gubrium, 1999), and embraces it in both her counselling practice 
and her research and further argues that researchers are legitimately more directive than 
therapists (Etherington, 2004a: 110): 
"I believe that although there are many similarities between my roles as 
therapist and researcher, there are also differences. The main difference being 
that as a therapist my purpose Is to assist my clients re-search (into themselves 
and their lives) and in my role as researcher the positions are reversed - they 
are there to assist mein discovering something about a topic or concept that ! 
am curious about. As a counsellor people seek me out: as a researcher ! seek 
them. " 
So, for her the research is primarily 'for' the researcher and this is clearly the case for me 
as well. My hope is that contributors (and others) will find this research to be some 
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benefit, but this is not the primary intention. I have to admit that the whole project has 
been brought into existence primarily by me and for me, and I am the one who hopes to 
gain a PhD. As Wolcott (2005: 133) says, "It's just a bit awkward having to face up to being 
our own beneficiaries. " But it seems to me that this increases my responsibility to 
contributors; it becomes more important than ever that I relate to them with 
consideration and respect Again I recollect Cooper and Rowan's (1999) challenge to keep 
the human being in mind as we embrace contemporary critical thinking. Now 
remembering the dual aspects of this challenge, I realise that I had been focusing on my 
existing skills and experience with regard to the humanity of the contributors and 
forgetting to embrace contemporary critical thinking in this. 
Links are often made between the practices and ways of being in therapy and in 
qualitative, and particularly heuristic, research (Etherington, 2004b; Leitch, 2003; Martin, 
2001; Plummer, 1995; West, 1998,2001). But, as became clear in Chapter Two, both 
therapy and research are contested areas and, moreover, there have long been grumblings 
in the corridors of therapy departments about the extent to which overlap between them 
is welcomed or censured. I suppose there must have come a time, a tipping point in my 
research preparation where I would have no more truck with these expectations of clear 
demarcation and associated constructions of perimeter fences, for this is the position that 
I now happily occupy. But here too there is no clear demarcation and I am in fact aware of 
multiple tipping points. One of these was my growing realisation that reading postmodern 
philosophy was one of the most therapeutic experiences I had come across. 
Lyotard (1979: 71), in particular, roused me from my stagnant'knowing' about the 
appropriateness of questions. His differentiation between 'talking-in-order-to-listen' and 
'listening-in-order-to-talk is a neat way of summarising this. Asking questions, from this 
position, is a means of engaging with what you don't know, of acknowledging that'not- 
knowing', and wanting to hear the other's understanding and experience. And yes, this 
seems obvious and superficial until we remember how and why questions (particularly 
personal questions) are often asked. In our class-ridden society this includes 
performances of status; doctors ask patients personal questions, for instance. To reverse 
this would be considered inappropriate and may even be taken to indicate a mental health 
problem! And frequently we ask questions simply to seek confirmation for pre-existing 
assumptions. 
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I, unsurprisingly, also have Levinas and Buber in mind here (see Chapter Three). Insofar as 
I have a responsibility towards the contributors in this research Levinas seems most 
pertinent. And, bringing his 'infinite unknowability of the other' (Levinas, 1993) into the 
mix alongside Lyotard, produces yet another seeming paradox in this research. I found 
myself more willing to question contributors about their experiences and meanings, 
particularly on those areas where I was aware that I lacked understanding, whilst always 
acknowledging the impossibility of ever understanding. It occurs to me that this is what is 
parochially called 'being on a hiding to nothing'. And yet this is where I did, eventually, 
find a place of comfort, and which was not, in fact, dissimilar to my experiences as a 
counsellor. This research did not, after all, have a naive ambition to find any kind of truth, 
not even what it'really felt like' for the contributors. As Riessman (2002a: 706) points out, 
narrative methods are unsuitable for "investigators who seek a clear and unobstructed 
view of subject's lives [and] those who orient to language as a transparent medium. " 
What was more difficult for me was what Clough and Nutbrown (2002: 24) refer to as 
'radical listening', which includes trying to understand "something of what lies behind 
what is said by research subjects ... and trying to understand what this means within their 
particular social frameworks". For Clough and Nutbrown all research is political, and it is 
therefore important to listen to the 'voice' of research participants, which "embodies a 
particular political position (however implicit this may be)". 
This reminds me of Kvale's (1996) metaphorical identification of two types of research 
interviewers: miners and travellers. Although Clough and Nutbrown are not positioned as 
simple realists, the searching 'behind' for something'implicit' seems to embrace the miner 
identity. Kvale sees the traveller, who collects stories en route, as more postmodern. But 
where does a gardener fit in all this? A fair bit of digging was certainly involved in my 
research, and as my supervisor had told me, some treasures were found that way. So some 
radical listening was included, though I didn't rush to interpret, even with a radical 
agenda; I was quite content'not-knowing' what I had dug up. And, like the traveller, I was 
more interested in swapping a few tales about them. 
Lyotard's ways of listening are also less straightforward than first appeared, and include 
openly voicing objections and differences so that they too can be answered. So in engaging 
with radical listening I would need to express my position with regard to what was being 
unearthed. This raised a further paradox in that I would inevitably be claiming objections 
and differences with something that I did not fully understand. In response to this my 
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practice became to express such differences tentatively, to strive to be willing to shift 
position and to endeavour to critically reflect on this co-constructive process. 
It subsequently occurred to me that, for such interactions to be productive, it would 
require that the contributors were also interested in'talldng-in-order-to-listen'. And I 
realised that, perhaps, my concerns that I should be perceived to be trustworthy in this 
research were a little one-sided and conceited. I had not, until this point considered 
whether I was perceiving the contributors as trustworthy. They too are professional 
listeners, some of them very experienced. And of course, they will have their own 
curiosities and desires to understand me and my agenda. 
Parker (2005) reminds us that interviews have often been described as conversations 
with a purpose, though surely all conversations have multiple and competing purposes. 
What we are all now realising, within the context of postmodern narrative inquiry, is that 
these interactions that would previously have been labelled interviews also have multiple 
competing purposes, and in fact, are also best described as conversations (e. g. Kvale, 
1996). In this way my sense of responsibility was, to some extent, mediated by an 
increasing mutuality with those contributing to this research, though I shared Sparkes' 
(1998a) "unsettling thoughts" about such aspirations and hope that I maintained the 
balance with responsibility. 
When I met each contributor for the first of their narrative tellings there was, in fact, little 
opportunity for me to engage in co-construction. The stories were told with an energy that 
left few spaces for me to contribute or question so, after all, my old ways of listening had 
been most useful in this. But the follow-up conversations were different. By this point, 
there had been email interaction between us as well as checking of initial transcripts. We 
were now, together engaged with the task of making meaning of the narratives and of 
more thickly describing them (Geertz, 1973; White and Epston, 1990) with additional and 
alternative stories from both of our experiences. This was a salutary reminder that even 
these decisions about my ways of being could not be made by me in isolation. They too had 
been worked out locally, in relationship with those concerned. 
4.4 Selection and arrangement Approaches to analysis 
In many research traditions analysis is presented as a clearly delineated stage in the 
research process and as such is neatly'written up' as a subsection of the procedure or 
methods sections of the report. But in the real messiness of lived research it can be 
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difficult to separate analysis from other aspects of the research process, and this is 
generally more apparent in narrative inquiry, and particularly where the narrative 
approach has been, in Polkinghorne's (1995) terms, a narrative analysis rather than an 
analysis of narratives. That is, where there has been no attempt to separate out themes or 
to identify conceptual categories by sifting the narratives through a common, pre-defined 
analytic frame but rather a concern to maintain the particularity of each individual story 
as told and to focus on meaning and meaning-making within that story. Such research is 
informed by narrative knowing rather than paradigmatic knowing (Bruner, 1986): it does 
not relate to demands for prediction or verification but makes the world "newly strange" 
and "rescues it from obviousness" (Bruner, 1986: 24). 1 too was keen to ask how each 
particular story in my research made the world'newly strange', how it unsettled our 
knowing and how that unsettling could be continued in the (re)presentation of the 
narratives. I felt that this was best achieved by preserving the personal voices of the 
contributors, honouring the unique understandings of what they had lived through and 
attempting to maintain an experience-near quality. 
My decision to approach the narratives in this way means that my account of the analysis 
is not so clearly delineated. My analytic decisions were unique to each narrative, were 
ongoing, and often subtle. They could be found in: what I attended to when I was with my 
contributors; how I recorded and transcribed their stories; what I transcribed and what I 
omitted from the transcriptions; what I then selected for (re)presentation; how I 
(re)presented what I had selected; how and when I included my own researcher's voice; 
and how I positioned the voices of other researchers and theorists, including meta- 
narratives that seemed to speak to the local narratives gathered in the research. 
During the research conversations many such decisions were inevitably made 'in-the- 
moment', these included when to reflect, when to question, when to express my own 
position or to contribute to the conversation in any number of other ways, including when 
to remain silent. In transcribing these conversations however, I could take my time and 
also return to them as and when I felt it to be necessary or useful. I chose to use voice 
recognition software which meant that instead of typing the words as I re-heard them I 
spoke them out loud and I found myself speaking them in ways that echoed how they had 
originally been spoken in terms of pitch, intonation, inflection, modulation and timbre. 
This provided a powerful means of immersion, in-dwelling and identification with the 
narratives and indeed the narrators. 
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I started the (re) presentation process by making a line-break for each pause in the speech, 
for each discernible breath taken by the contributor (and therefore by me). Sometimes the 
breath was between each word. Assuming the discipline necessary to make myself slow 
down sufficiently to take each breath at these times forced me to do justice, not only to the 
words as originally uttered, but also to the spaces between them. In this way I became 
aware of the importance of spaces between words more generally and from here I found 
my first recognition that speech can be closer to poetry than to prose (Tedlock, 1983), my 
first understanding of poetry found in'natural speech' (e. g. Glissant, 1989; Ginsberg, 2001) 
and perhaps also my first real understanding of poetry per se. Later on it also enabled me 
to maintain this slow pace in the re-readings at seminars and conferences, to resist any 
pressure to speed up and hence lose the compelling quality of the initial utterances. 
My increasing appreciation of the poetic aspects of the texts was also encouraged by the 
evocative nature of the language used, initially by the first contributor (Clara) and 
subsequently by the others. As Shotter (1999) expresses, poetic forms 'arrest us'; 'put 
reality on'freeze-frame'; move us to explore it and respond to it in new ways; and allow a 
dialogically structured understanding. Again I wanted to honour and preserve this quality 
and after comparison with prosaic presentation, poetic formats seemed to the best way to 
facilitate this (see Table Two). This stanza-form (re)presentation is, in fact, becoming 
increasingly popular in social and psychotherapy research (see for example Gee, 1986, 
1991; McLeod and Balamoutsou, 1996; Richardson 1992,2002; Etherington, 2000; 2004a; 
2004c). 
So for a long time I was committed to this form of presentation but a couple of experiences 
served to challenge this as a routine practice and prompted me to look again at my texts. 

































































































































































































































































































































The second was the reaction of my last contributor Roberta. After seeing the transcript of 
our first research conversation, she said, " I also found it really difficult to read in those 
little short sentences". 
My motivation for using narrative inquiry had been in part due to an aversion to other 
methods that appeared formulaic and lacking in creativity but I now found myself to have 
been using a formulaic approach to narrative. It was obviously necessary to return to the 
transcripts to consider which sections really benefited from the stanza-form presentation 
and which did not, and to consider additional forms of both prosaic and poetic 
presentation. In short, I needed to be more open to each contributor's creative voice and 
also to my own creative ear. 
I started with Roberta's transcript as she had played a key part in drawing my attention to 
the issue. Working from the beginning of the main conversation I took out line breaks and 
replaced them with a more conventional prosaic structure and punctuation. As I did this a 
new rhythm began to take hold and I found myself newly engrossed and working at an 
increasingly rapid pace. I reached the end and had kept none of the original stanza 
structure. I read it through again and it seemed to work. I also became aware that I could 
hear Roberta's voice more clearly and more forcibly. There was poetry to be found there, 
but Roberta was clearly a talented raconteur and this was (at least for me) a better way of 
representing Roberta's voice. I then returned to the transcripts of each of the other 
conversations, engaging with them in new ways, trying to hear and include a fuller range 
of rhetorical / discursive strategies used. 
Through these experiences I had unexpectedly found myself in the fast growing field of 
art-based research (see for example Eisner, 1997a, 1997b; Barone, 2001; Bochner and 
Ellis, 2003; Leitch, 2003; Slattery, 2003; Sringgay et al, 2005; Piercy and Benson, 2005). 
Here the power of poetic and evocative forms are appreciated for their ability to generate 
more complex and multiple perspectives and new ways of seeing things, leading to a 
"productive ambiguity" (Eisner, 1997a: 8). Again the unsettling of certainty and 
obviousness (see Bruner above) is kept alive. 
In this, however, there were difficult decisions to be made as to what I should retain and 
what I should weed out or trim back The conversations had lasted up to two hours each 
and produced reams of transcribed text. This could not all be included and I knew that 
dead-heading would bring better blooms; the poetic is parsimonious. As Robert Frost 
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apparently puts it, "A poem is the shortest emotional distance between two points" (cited 
by Richardson, 2000). But there are numerous possible strategies for making selections. 
For instance, it is self-evident that all of the talk recorded was not narrative, and the 
implication of this for some narrative researchers (e. g. Riessman, 2002a) is that the 
specific narrative segments are separated from the rest of the text and preserved in their 
entirety for analysis, as they are seen as essential meaning-making structures. In other 
traditions, narrative is taken to include the entire life story and the researcher may 
amalgamate a variety of autobiographical material including retrospective accounts, 
diaries and letters as well as dialogue (e. g. Etherington 2000). 
My solution was to take a multi-layered approach: 
"I started by separating out narratives that related to key critical incidents (for 
some contributors there was only one such incident, whereas for others there 
were several). 
"I also preserved a range of supporting narratives where other life events and 
memories were described as relating to the critical incidents. 
"I added additional related material that contributors made available to me, 
including emails and journal writing. 
" It was clearly important to keep the evocative quality of each narrative, including 
the metaphoric language used 
" Having embraced a creative approach to this inquiry I used fictional devices in the 
(re)presentations. In a few instances this means that the order of utterances has 
been changed, for instance where a speaker has returned to an earlier topic I have 
sometimes presented the two excerpts together for a clearer effect. 
" Presentational decisions relating to individual narratives are explained as those 
narratives are presented in Chapter Five. 
Decisions about how to represent my'voice' alongside those of my contributors was more 
difficult. With the exception of a few key sections, I decided to omit my speech from the 
transcripts of the narrative gathering sessions (where my input had been minimal) but to 
include it in the transcriptions of the follow-up meetings (where I had been much more 
engaged in the co-construction). Including my own researcher's voice throughout, as 
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recommended by Gilligan et al (2003), would have disrupted the narrative flow, the 
evocative story would have been lost. The exceptions correspond to times when the 
dialogue or relationship between the contributors and myself was particularly poignant, 
evocative or theoretically interesting. 
Of course, there is more to the researcher's 'voice' than their speech during interviews or 
conversations. I had trickier decisions to make regarding how to include my critically 
reflexive voice and also the 'voices' of other researchers or theorists. In particular I needed 
to respond to recommendations by a number of researchers to take a sceptical approach 
to contributors' testimonies. Ochberg (1996: 97) for instance, advocates an approach to 
listening that, "systematically refuses to take them at their own word". This position of 
doubt and distrust tends to be related to concepts of performance and positioning, 
particularly with regard to identity clams, and to the psychodynamic notion of a 'defended 
subject' (Hollway and Jefferson, 2000). The evocative language used by the contributors in 
this research may also raise suspicion. Potter (1996: 180) ironically describes such 
concerns thus, "literal descriptions may be just telling it how it is, while metaphorical ones 
are doing something sneaky". 
There are associated allegations of naivete in researchers who refuse this stance, for 
instance through the implementations of member checks. As Freeman (2003: 339) puts it: 
"There are some narrative researchers who think it is vitally important, for 
both empirical and ethical reasons, to come up with narrative accounts that are 
consonant with how research subjects view themselves and their pasts... There 
might even be some attempt on the part of these researchers to play back their 
own accounts to their research subjects to make sure that the story being told 
is consonant with the subject's own version. " 
Freeman is clearly referring to narrative researchers like me, though his assumptions of 
the reasons for member checks are simplistic and would themselves benefit from member 
checking. My concerns are that such analyses are over-simplified in three ways: 
1. Withholding access to the interpretations made by researchers unnecessarily 
excludes participants from a potentially rich and fruitful learning process and also 
prevents them from shifting or reflecting further on their position and so 
thickening the research data. 
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2. As far as processes of anonymisation are concerned, it places the locus of 
responsibility clearly in the hands of the researcher and excludes the contributor 
(see Table Three below for two illustrative examples). 
3. These analyses tend to privilege the representation of the researcher as 
sophisticated and knowing over the respondent as essentially nave and self- 
serving (again see Table Three below). 
Table Three. Illustrations of concerns regarding analysis without member 
checks 
Specific concern Illustrative excerpt from 1st contributor (Clara) 
Locus of responsibility a) now terrified that this might be identifiable 
and exclusion of the 
contributor in the 
anonymising process b) (this highlighted bit will have to be erased or 
somehow changed - too identifiable) how 
about .... 
Specific concern Illustrative excerpt from published analyses 
Privileging of a) The narrator has crafted a narrative 
researcher's performance in which she has no 
interpretation and responsibility whatsoever... readers might 
participant positioned as question Gita's attribution... Gita had 
nave or self-serving conceived twice, but could not sustain 
pregnancies, implying a possible "defect". 
Gita's performance, however, implies that she 
wants to be known as a "perfectly" normal 
woman "with no defect at all" (Riessman, 
2002b: 703-704) 
b) Abandoned by her father and molested 
repeatedly by a ten-year-old neighbour when 
she was a child, Amanda constructs one plane 
of her identity as a victim through the 
narrative she tells (Keller-Cohen & Gordon, 
2003: 8) 
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I therefore ensured that all transcripts, analysis, interpretation and (re) presentation were 
made available to each contributor for'member checking'. In the light of my commitments 
to a relational approach, to privileging local narratives and my more recent discomfort 
with considering researcher trustworthiness to the exclusion of contributor 
trustworthiness, I welcomed their reactions, feedback, and requests to make changes or to 
delete sensitive information. Again this meant that they were more fully integrated into 
the iterative research process. 
The contributors' perspectives were not presented in isolation, however. I have included 
my own perspectives and those of others, sourced from published research and theory, 
but I have not privileged these or accompanied them with a spurious truth claims. Nor 
have I included them without the knowledge of the people that they are being applied to. I 
have tried to acknowledge layers of meaning and to allow space for resignification and 
transformation in contributors, researchers and, indeed, audiences; whereby new and 
more complex understandings emerge. 
No doubt there remains a need for further consideration of validity, verification and other 
judgements of research quality, but this will be kept for later. For now I recommend that 
the reader endeavours to adopt Sparkes' (1998a) 'letting go perspective', to let the 
narratives speak for themselves but in relation to myself, to the other theories included 
and to future audiences. 
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Chapter Five 
Early crops: The main narratives 
5.1 Approaching the storied landscape 
I explored many potential strategies for selecting excerpts from the narratives to include 
and (re)present, and I found myself to be in affinity with the narrative therapy practices of 
Johnella Bird (2000,2004). There is considerable overlap between the ideas and values of 
narrative therapy and narrative inquiry and these practices seemed to translate well into 
my work, particularly in terms of witnessing and (re)presentation (see also Etherington, 
2007). In her therapeutic work Bird is'drawn towards' aspects of the conversation that: 
" Are emotionally resonant 
0 Illustrate significant life themes 
9 Encapsulate or reflect lived experience (evocatively called 'talk that sings') 
a Contradict truth regimes 
9 Imply movement, and so challenge assumptions of static reality 
These aspects also seemed particularly pertinent to my core research questions: 
What is the quality of the experience of being coerced in a way that was ethically challenging, 
and how do such experiences relate to conceptions of identity and personal life-story? 
My selections have therefore been influenced by the presence of these aspects, which are 
evidently not equally present in each of the narratives, and as such the selections for each 
contributor are unique. 
I know it is not possible to direct you, the reader, as to how you should approach this text; 
you will have your own ideas. And it is probably unwise for me to try. I am uncomfortable 
with books that include a'how to use this book' section, I find this both patronising and 
annoying. But I feel a strong responsibility toward the contributors here. With good 
reason I have carefully considered my ways of witnessing the stories told (Chapter Four), 
and although I have started to put them into the public arena at conferences and seminars, 
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I have always been present at such times, able to hear how they are being received and 
interpreted, and to respond to any misunderstanding. Presenting them here in this written 
format is different; I am not with you as you read. 
Fear of disapproval, rejection and having to explain perceived unethical practice have 
been identified as major concerns of counsellors (Smith, 2003), and each contributor here 
is exposed to this potential disapproval and criticism. I am concerned that in our'blame 
culture' it may be all too easy for readers to find fault, and that preferred grand narratives 
may be imposed to make truth claims about either the narratives or (more worryingly) the 
narrators. 
So I will take the unwise path and appeal to readers to step out from any places of 
knowing and judging as they approach these stories. Perhaps I can also be audacious 
enough to suggest some of the narrative practices of 'outsider witnessing' (Myerhoff, 
1986; White, 1995) or'reflecting teams' (Andersen, 1987) as effective means to achieve 
this. Here the witness or reflector avoids hypothesising or interpreting (White, 1995) but 
rather acknowledges the struggles being narrated in "a spirit of respectful, engaged 
interest" (Martin Payne, 2000: 172). Such witnesses are also open to their own embodied 
responses, to what is evoked for them from their own lives, to their resonances with the 
storyteller, and they are willing to situate their reactions and responses within their own 
lived experience (Parry and Doan, 1994). If the readers were able to adopt this position, 
they would also be continuing the relational practices that have infused this study thus far 
and would contribute to the opening of safe arenas for these difficult issues and 
experiences to be discussed, as recommended by Smith (2003). 
I wondered, should I present the narratives in the order that I heard them, or perhaps 
chronologically? Or should I order them in terms of years of the narrators' experience, or 
some attribute of the narrative such as those identified by Bird (2000) above. What 
seemed clear was that I should start with my first contributor Clara, as working with her 
had formed a strong basis for my iterative procedure. Hers was also the first event to have 
occurred chronologically so I could defer decisions about the ordering of the remaining 
narratives until after I had presented hers. 
In the event, I have presented all of the narratives in the order in which I experienced 
them, except for that of Richard, the police counsellor. He was in fact my penultimate 
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contributor, but I have presented his narrative last as it seems to me to have interesting 
points of contrast with those of the other contributors. 
I have used a range of text boxes and fonts so that the reader may readily differentiate 
between the various 'voices' presented. 
Contributors' narratives are 
presented in shaded text boxes. 
Like this. 
Whilst my attempts to provide a somewhat 
over-arching narrative, where I connect 
My personal reflections, evoked from 
either my experiences of the 
conversations themselves, or my 
subsequent immersion in the 
transcribed text, are presented in 
bordered text boxes. 
Like this. 
various aspects and excerpts of the 
Key sections from the 
dialogue are presented in 
double-bordered text boxes. 
Like this. 
contributors' stories and experiences and also include 
occasional input from theory, research and the 
experiences of others are unboxed. 
In this the beds, borders and pathways of my garden 
j begin to take shape. 
I have used a different colour for each contributor, so that the pages for that person can be 
more easily identified. It was obviously important that the text was visible through the 
shading but pastels seemed too light and inconsequential for these narratives. I wanted 
each of the colours to have substance, to reflect the substance of the stories. I also wanted 
to avoid primary colours, which seemed too essentialist and individualistic for a relational 
project. So I have settled on a range of colours that appear to speak to each other, and to 
be positioned in the spaces between the primaries. 
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5.2 Clara's story 
Clara described an event that had occurred approximately twenty years previously when 
she was working as a recently qualified counsellor in the voluntary sector. Despite the 
passing of two decades the incident had been sufficiently painful to have had an ongoing 
impact on her life and her sense of identity as a counsellor. 
As Riessman (1993) points out, the narratives we tell are often boundaried by entrance 
talk and exit talk, or other bracketing devices, though these are not always obvious. The 
contributors to this study likewise found ways of indicating to me that they were about to 
move from our'meeting and greeting' talk and into their story. For Clara this 'entrance 
talk' showed that she considered her ability to give a relatively straightforward account 
was worthy of note (see below). Perhaps she was concerned that this might belie the 
difficulty that she was, in fact experiencing. And perhaps we can take this as an indication 
that we should listen or read with 
The beginning bit of the story 
I suppose (cough) 
I suppose this beginning bit of the story 
actually it's quite sort of tidy because 
I've thought about 
how do I set the scene? 
because these bits of the scenery 
sensitivity. 
Here the line breaks correspond to 
breaths and, as I remark above, 
sometimes the breath is between each 
word and so the spaces or pauses 
between each line become invaluable in 
making the breath palpable. 
I have to put in place 
for the rest of it 
with my upset 
to make sense 
so 
it seems actually rather sort of tidy 
As Clara continues to set the scene she 
helpfully offers me reassurances about 
why she is including details of her 
personal circumstances (in parentheses 
below left). I too include this here, for the 
same reasons. 
not at all florid and difficult 
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My personal life is in total ruins 
And I was a mother of three secondary 
school children 
in a relationship that was 
extremely 
fragile 
and at some point during that year 
my husband had left several times 
and there were periods of extremely 
bizarre behaviour 
on his part 
so that was going on 
(which is relevant to what happened 
later) 
and it is Friday teatime 
and the kids are coming home from 
school and 
my personal life is in total ruins 
right? 
(so there's the scenery) 
I hear the build-up before it is spoken. 
And recall my own times of fragility, 
And disintegrating relationships. 
And connect to folklore that has 
Such misfortunes occurring in multiples 
Bracing, as the camel 
For that anticipated 
Final straw. 
I recall too, evidence professing to show 
how solid support enhances resilience 
(Gencoz and OzIale, 2004; Thoits, 1982, 
1984; Turner and Noh, 1983), and how 
pre-existing stress increases vulnerability 
(e. g. Etherington, 2003a; Meares, 2000). 1 
try to hear behind these discourses, and to 
avoid pre-empting Clara's account. I know 
that she is telling me this purposefully, 
and that she too knows of burdened 
camels. But I do not yet know of the 
significance for Clara. 
The most common advice given to would- 
be creative writers is 'show, don't tell' (e. g. 
Booth, 1991; Hunt, 2000). As Clara begins 
her core narrative (below), the details that she includes and the evocative language she 
uses seems to be in accord with this advice. We are indeed shown and not simply told what 
it was like for her when she received a telephone call which she would remember twenty 
years later. 
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The police are after you 
I had a 'phone call at home. 
the time of the year was November 
I remember standing in a, in a dark cubby hole 
standing up 
taking this 'phone call 
at about four-o-clock on 
what I think was probably Friday afternoon 
and I suppose the kids would be coming home from school soon 
and it was this receptionist at the office saying, 
I just wanted to let you know 
that the police are after you 
and she immediately said 
they know your first name 
but they don't know your second name 
and I made jolly sure that they didn't get any information 
that would allow them 
to find you 
And I said to her 
do you know what this is about? 
I mean, I can't now imagine 
if I could have possibly guessed what it might be about 
in connection with what 
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And she said 
it's something about 
an ex-client of yours 
who 
is in some way connected 
to a police inquiry 
about 
the sexual abuse of females 
in a professional setting 
(I need to pause, is that alright? 
And I can see this cubby-hole I'm standing in 
dark and rather 
gloomy 
and I ... there's a ... there's a um 
a shelf at sort of 
waist level, you know, like a kitchen counter 
and I think I'm holding on to it 
and it would be a Friday wouldn't it, at four 'o clock? 
these things never happen 
when you think you can get hold of somebody 
When Clara was contacted by the police it became clear that they were seeking access to 
the counselling records of a past client. As the counselling had been focussed on a 
relationship the records included references to a third party (the other participant in the 
relationship) who had not been present in the counselling. For some days Clara was 
unable to contact colleagues or management in her organisation and so held the 
responsibility for managing this situation alone. She was at that time a newly qualified and 
relatively inexperienced counsellor. 
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Clara describes the agency as being, "in a very 
poor way" with key managerial vacancies and 
Nobody's there 
all other positions part-time and mostly 
unpaid. Thus isolation and lack of support 
What I now see as a 
became a theme of this experience. I am again very empty top to the pyramid 
conscious of the claimed relationship between it felt 
support and resilience under duress. I realised later 
Clara's powerful use of metaphor in these it felt as if 
excerpts expresses the quality of this the parents had departed 
experience and her own sense of inadequacy. 
and there was no substitute 
caregiver 
This family has been deserted 
we were 
I wanted somebody we 
to walk alongside me and hold my hand the very fragmented team of 
counsellors 
back me up 
not even a team 
and with the absences at the top of the 
organisation I knew 
there was this myth of a team 
were like ships that passed in the night immediately 
that nobody was going to come to my 
we were all part-time 
assistance 
out of the shadows that I was actually and it occurs to me 
going to have to rattle a few cupboard the caption would be 
doors to get help 
I'm not old enough to do this 
because that was the feeling in the 
organisation 
very much you're on your own 
nobody taught me how to do this 
this family has been deserted 
nobody's there 
very much the abandoned child 
you've all got to scratch for yourselves 
very much, yes 
palpable at the time 
quite shocking in retrospection 
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In both the BACP and the BPS (DCoP) 
counsellors are required to have regular 
supervision. As the supervisor does not 
have line management or clinical 
responsibilities for the work of the 
counsellor it is sometimes, perhaps more 
appropriately, known as consultative 
support This is the first port of call for a 
counsellor having difficulty in their 
work, especially if that difficulty involves 
ethical dilemmas. As such Clara would 
be expected to contact her supervisor for 
a detailed consideration of her situation 
including any ethical, professional and 
therapeutic implications. But here too 
she describes lack of support and 
effective isolation (right), which 
continued as she sought legal advice 
(below). And we see growing 
uncertainty and self doubt in her 
accounts of her own professional 
identity. 
Did this count as an emergency? 
The counselling supervisor, who 
came to the organisation 
um one day a month 
to do 
individual, one-to-one supervision 
and group supervision 
and this person 
er lived 
quite a long way away 
and you could telephone her 
only in an emergency 
and it had to be a full-blown emergency 
for the 'phone call to be justified 
Yes and 
Did this count as an emergency? 
I said to the supervisor that I thought that I should be getting legal advice and ... she 
had 
to inform me that there was no tame solicitor that somehow in the absence of the 
organisation the person who used to do it had retired, gone away, whatever. 
And I asked what could be done about it? And she said that it would be my job to contact 
the vice chair, to get a solicitor. Which at this distance in time I think was shocking 
Absolutely shocking dreadful 
And I mean II think I was a bit of a pushover 
Could I Could I have done any different? 
To say that's not my job You pull your finger out 
I really don't know It occurs to me now that 
If I'd been a different person I'd have said I'm not having this 
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Whilst Clara lacked contact with those who may have been able to help and support her, 
there was an excess of contact with the police who increased their pressure to gain access 
to her counselling records. Their claim was that the client had given permission, but Clara 
did not have access to this, and in any case there was a third party involved who was not 
privy to the current situation. 
At this time (see Chapter Three) ethical 
guidance to counsellors tended not to recognise 
the complexity of such predicaments, and they 
were effectively deontological, privileging the 
right of the individual client to confidentiality. 
This would contrast, of course, to the ethics and 
values of the police of that day. Their work is 
often presented as being, 'for the public good', 
and the associated ethical position might thus 
be considered more utilitarian. 
There was quite a lot of vilification like 
"You don't sound very professional" 
Two decades ago I too was a 
recently qualified counsellor. I 
recall, not only my own naivete, but 
also what I now see as the naivete 
of the profession. An image persists 
in my memory: I have taken a 
'dilemma' to my supervisor, and we 
are both scanning the 'Code of 
ethics' to see what is permissible. It 
would not have occurred to us to 
question these rules. We would 
never have considered breaching 
confidentiality. 
The sergeant who dealt with Clara certainly 
"Shabby organisation you work for" failed to understand her position and 
Horrible, horrible 
disparaged her behaviour and that of the 
counselling service (see left). 
Denigrated by the police and unsupported by her counselling colleagues Clara increasingly 
looked to other sources for information, guidance and a more robust identity. She found 
this through her training at a law centre where she also worked (see Chapter Four: Table 
Two, for an illustration of the benefits of this training). 
Some days later Clara was able to contact the vice chair of her counselling service. She 
explains to me that, in addition to this part-time, honorary role, he was also a member of 
an unconnected "principled organisation" which meant that he had "great respect for the 
principle of confidentiality" and also that, "by the nature of the work he did that he was 
very worldly wise [and] knew a great deal more about how it might feel to be pursued by 
the police than [Clara] then did". For Clara this was "a great blessing" but it also meant that 
he was not easily accessible and she had not previously met him, he was a stranger. And so 
the sense of isolation continues. 
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The vice chair then arranged for her to meet a solicitor who would act as a 'tame solicitor' 
for the counselling organisation. But this solicitor was known to Clara from a different 
context, and thus she experienced a threat to her personal / professional boundaries. Such 
boundaries are considered particularly sacrosanct for psychodynamic counsellors (Langs, 
1988; McLeod, 2003), which Clara describes herself as 'becoming'. As she says, "it was a bit 
too close to home". 
A bit too close to home 
So I went to see this solicitor in his office and 
first of all I have to tell you that he was a parent of 
older children 
were at the same school as my children 
knew on the grapevine that 
had a recent bereavement 
I don't know what the relevance of that is 
terrible 
reluctance 
to burden him 
awful 
I felt protective of him 
and also 
it's a very small world 
there were overlapping connections 
and that felt 
felt 
well you know the counselling world is very incestuous 
it just felt a bit too close to home 
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I wondered how much he knew about my personal marital circumstances 
now I had no reason to think he did know 
although subsequently 
fast forward from then to ten years later 
guess which firm 
was chosen by my former husband 
in the divorce proceedings? 
guess which firm 
was chosen by my landlord 
when I was in temporary accommodation 
to evict me 
from my home? 
I just couldn't believe it 
but this was my first encounter with this solicitor 
but there were those subsequent encounters 
Clara now effectively employs rhetorical questioning to draw me in to her experiencing 
(see above). Where she may have been isolated during the original incident she / we 
dismantle this isolation as she asks me, "Guess which firm? Guess which firm? " And I do 
not need to answer. We both know the answer, and the awfulness of that answer. My reply 
was in fact, "I'm speechless". But I know that our non-verbal communication had intensity. 
I was leaning forward, my mouth was ajar, our eyes were locked. Clara has moved from 
her original disconnection to strong connection, enabled by her evocative and emotionally 
resonant use of language. And in this she has illustrated a life theme that had some 
persistence. There was an absence of beneficial associations and an excess of detrimental 
associations. 
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In recent times, some therapists make notes during sessions, in the presence of the client. 
This is usually in a spirit of transparency and inclusiveness, and has probably been 
influenced by the 1998 Data Protection Act which gives clients rights of access to their 
case notes. At the time of Clara's experience however, such practice would have been 
almost universally frowned upon as diminishing the quality of the therapeutic 
relationship. This evidently contrasts with the professional requirements of solicitors. The 
criticism of Clara's professionalism by this solicitor, regarding such practice, was not 
explicit as was that of the police, but it was nevertheless evident (below). 
What notes do you keep? 
And the solicitor immediately said to me, 
"What notes do you keep? " 
The sort of things I write down are not the sorts of things that solicitors write down. 
And he said, 
"Well when do you do them and where do you do them? " 
"Well I might do them the same night". 
And he said, 
"You mean you don't write them contemporaneously? " 
And I said, 
"No I don't write them in the room in front of the client" 
And he said, 
I said, 
"Doesn't the client sign them? " 
"No. I don't sign them. " 
And he said, 
"Well those notes have got absolutely no status in law. The only notes that have any 
significance in law are those that are made contemporaneously. " 
And he said, 
"Tell me something else. " 
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This was the scary bit 
And this was the scary bit you see, about the boundaries, because the nature of the 
client's material was sexual and was the trampling of a sexual boundary. 
It seemed relevant to the solicitor to say to me, 
"Tell me, what is the state of your own marriage? " 
And I think I said, 
"Why are you asking me that? " 
(Which I think was pretty good. ) 
And he said, 
"Because if you appear in court the barrister for the defence will tear you to shreds. 
You will be asked to talk about your own sexual history. " 
It just never occurred to me 
I at... at that point 
Ithought 
if I can do something for my client 
then it is my duty to appear in 
court 
and I will, I will 
have control of the material 
I will say what I need to say 
I mean, I 
Such innocence, such innocence 
Clara relates how her sense of responsibility becomes confused here. She is given the 
impression that she will become personally vulnerable if she meets the demands of the 
police. At that time self-care was not included in the ethical guidance for practitioners but 
when the solicitor instructs her to dispose of her notes she interprets her obedience as 
self-interest (see overleaf right). 
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Again Clara's use of imagery, metaphor 
and evocative detail matches Bird's 
(2004) idea of 'talk that sings'. There is 
also the implication of movement here, 
though this movement constitutes a 
further threat to Clara's professional 
identity. Her sense of her morality is now 
challenged, it seems that the discourses 
that have sustained her thus far are now 
questioned. 
Like a thief in the night 
So I suppose I hot-footed it back 





anybody seeing what I was doing 
like a thief in the night 
spirited away the notes 
and took them to the vice chair 
and said to him 
eyeball to eyeball 
"These are to be locked away" 
"Ah, " he said, "That's fine. " 
And they're probably there to this 
day 
My altruism was blown to pieces 
I was very shocked 
that was the point at which my altruism 
was blown to pieces 
and I felt 
I mean, I can remember the walk back from 
his office 
very windy street 
-id I suppose there was wind in my head 
made me 
really challenged my sense of my 
orality 
I the person who is going to say 
going to put myself before 
are the dient? 
Going to put my interests before those of 
the client 
Clara's increasing isolation is again evident: 
- Without permission 
- Without anybody seeing what I was doing 
And her deteriorating sense of identity and her 
evocative use of language collide: 
Like a thief in the night 
She has obeyed the solicitor but must face the 
police alone. 
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That shocking, intrusive and terrible moment 
The worst conversation 
again took place when I was in 
my home 
in this cubby hole 
with this sergeant... 
I had taken legal advice, I told him. 
And I had established 
that without written 
instructions from the client 
I could have no further conversations with the police 
This conversation went backwards and forwards 
I was simply doing my broken record bit 
that I had taken advice 
that I was acting on the instructions of my lawyer 
and the person who represented the organisation. 
That I was not going to get engaged in this conversation 
that there was nothing more that I was going to say 
And he then said, 
"Tell me. Do you have children? " 
And I... what I would now say is, "That's not a relevant question. Go away". 
But what I actually said was, "Yes. " 
Bad moment Very bad moment 
"Got a daughter? " 
Bad moment 
"Yes, " I said 
"How would you like it if she'd been sexually molested? Wouldn't you like to get the bugger? " 
My memory is of that shocking, intrusive and terrible moment. 
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Clara was asked by her supervisor to give some feedback about this episode for the 
instruction of the other counsellors in her organisation. She did this willingly, hoping that 
others might then be spared the worst aspects of her experience should they find 
themselves in a similar situation. However, another member of this group knew the police 
sergeant from another context and approached Clara at the end of the session to defend 
him, saying, "He's my local copper. He's a really nice chap". This was a painful experience 
for Clara. This group could have been a source of support for her, but the support was 
instead given to the person who she felt had 
I was speechless actually bullied her and she was left feeling vulnerable 
And I felt terribly exposed and wrong-footed, again with that painful 
And again 
combination of exposure and isolation. 
Terribly rattled by Below she connects her experience to that of 
The feeling that her client about whom she feels "deeply guilty". 
I'd done something wrong 
She feels that she let this woman down, denied 
her the chance to be heard. Paradoxically this 
I was bullied 
silencing connects them. I hope that, through 
I was a victim this research I will be able to mitigate this 
And it was all my fault silencing. 
I'm only making sense of it as we 
speak So many layers of the marginalised, the 
it's about silencing the victim silenced 
don't bring your dirty washing here and I would, I would 
would have thought think about the way in which 
(she said hopefully) [the client] had been marginalised 
that after sharing my distress in trying to get heard 
people would have given me a hug with this sexual abuse by 
people would have said this person 
gosh how bad it was for me and I mean I think there are so many layers 
or a few weeks later of 
how are you? the marginalised, the silenced 
nothing 
it's the infinite regression of mirror images 
nothing 
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Toward the end of this conversation, with Clara's metaphor of 'abandoned child' resonant 
in my mind, I am drawn into an understanding that Clara has not directly expressed and 
which startles her. This is an experience familiar to counsellors working with relational 
depth (Mearns and Cooper, 2005). Somewhere in the liminal space between us I realise 
that the power of this metaphor reveals something more of Clara's lived experience. 
Nell: Yes and I heard you say how much responsibility you were left with 
and how much support you were lacking 
and talking about the family metaphor, the family ... 
Clara: and my personal circumstances 
Nell: Having to grow up too soon 
Having to grow up too suddenly? 
Clara: No no, being a single parent 
was part of it 
which I actually was 
[pause] 
Yes growing up too soon which in my, in my own personal history 
very large part of my personal history 
which you know we all know about why people become counsellors 
Yes. I mean 
well spotted, well spotted 
Yes that's a curious moment actually 
to have that pointed out 
because I hadn't 
I hadn't remembered that bit 
Here boundaries between my researcher and therapist identities blur, and I wonder about 
a relationship between evocative language and the empathic process. I realise too that I 
have effectively been using my identification of such evocative language as a research 
technique. I have sampled according to a criterion of evocativeness, and have, in this way, 
gained access to what appear to be the key aspects of Clara 's experience. I bear this in 
mind as I meet my next contributor. 
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5.3 Maira's story 
Maira had come to the UK to train as a counsellor in a residential drug and alcohol 
rehabilitation centre, expecting that, in this country she would find particularly high 
standards and so receive a rigorous, good quality training. 
I knew this place here in England 
because my relative was 
an addict in recovery at that moment 
so that was the centre 
the rehabilitation centre 
he went in and he came out clean and sober so 
so after my relative finished 
a year after my relative finished 
Her narrative does not focus on one 
specific incident, or series of related 
incidents, as had Clara's, but rather 
on an increasing awareness of 
exploitation and poor standards 
brought about by expectations to 
work beyond her limits of 
competence and an associated lack of 
support. The difficulties and 
dilemmas she experienced seem to 
have been confounded by the I came over here 
personal nature of her initial 
connection to the organisation (above) and having been required to undergo a therapeutic 
process, "like a patient" as part of her training (below). 
And did I wince? I feel 
it now as I return to 
this submission to a 
course of treatment 
(initially mistyped as 
curse of treatment, ) 
and the acceptance of 
a label that conflates 
person and problem. I 
I had to spend two months like a patient. 
Follow all the levels that the patients were following, 
and that was partly 
because I am a co-dependent as well. 
I am a co-dependent of my relative. 
So that was to make sure that 
I am in recovery as well, 
and I have treated some of my issues and 
am uneasy at this, but second, to treat any areas where there has been a big block 
also at my own strong 
that needs to be treated 
agenda intruding into 
and third to know how it feels from client's point of view 4 my witnessing. 
to go through the process 
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I didn't have a lot of idea 
In the beginning it was quite fascinating and 
I didn't have a lot of idea 
how counselling is conducted 
because I've been only in volunteer services 
and I didn't know about any professional 
counselling service 
how it's set out and 
what is the ethics and 
all the values 
so the only image I had 
was from this specific job 
As I hear Maira tell me of her lack of 
knowledge and experience in 
counselling (left), I recall Clara's self- 
assessment of "such innocence" and 
feeling like an "abandoned child" as well 
as my own early naivete. 
In Maira's narrative this sense of self is 
juxtaposed with positive memories of 
her early days in this organisation. It 
was "quite fascinating" (left) and "quite 
nice" with so many new things to learn 
(below). But there was no other source 
of information, nothing to challenge the 
"only image... from this specific job". 
And add to this Maira's confidence that 
this way of working had 'cured' her relative. I wonder at the implications of this 
combination of inexperience (and gratitude? ) with a single and fascinating provider of 
reality and the identification of Maira herself as having a problem / being a problem. 
I mean, this is my illness From this 
tangled 
It was quite nice in the beginning, because there was all so many things... 
context and 
new things I was learning. But looking back to it... identity 
I can remember myself for the first six months being really, really drained claim Maira 
because of the amount of work, and the amount of new things begins to 
that I have to learn, to put into practice 
detail the 
demands 
and also the emotional issues that were coming up... 
she was 
being with people. exposed to 
I mean this is my illness (in inverted commas) and reveals 
it's my co-dependency so... a further 
there were a lot of emotions coming up for me, and things in the past 
complex of 




I felt it was my responsibility 
I started realising 
first of all that I was working too many hours 
say a typical week from Monday to Friday 
it would be work from 8.30 in the morning till five o'clock in the afternoon 
there might be days that I would have two groups plus seven sessions 
with seven clients 
if I had seven clients or six clients or whatever 
I would definitely have to see them twice a week 
and put twice a week 
notes on the file 
so that would be the minimum 
but working in such a challenging environment 
where people are really vulnerable 
they could come and ask to see me whenever they wanted 
so in the beginning 
I would certainly see everyday the client 
because I felt it was my responsibility 
to check how things were 
plus 
there would be weeks where I would be on call 
that meant I would work from nine till five 
with all the things I already told you I had to do 
and then 
at a quarter to eight and a quarter to ten I had to go in check the residents house 
you have to monitor how things were done 
to make sure that everything was safe 
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Maira explains that this busyness left no time 
to "reflect on what happened, to take in all 
the counselling procedure, check if 
everything went okay... and if there were any 
issues [she] needed to speak about". She 
begins to reveal the effect of this regime on 
her own professional practice. 
I was not competent to do it 
And there were times 
like in one-to-one sessions 
and group therapy 
that I was not competent to do it 
She questions her own 
competence in these 
circumstances (left), which 
seems compounded by a 
sense of helplessness and 
inevitability (below), and 
because I was so tired I couldn't take the information in 
lack of appropriate support 
(overleaf). 
I hear, not just I felt I couldn't do anything about it 
what Maira 
experienced as And I could understand that, 
but I felt I couldn't do anything about it 
tacit pressure I couldn't go and say to the manager that I couldn't take this group 
to meet the 
demands to I had to take it. 
keep going She wouldn't say straightaway to me 
under duress, 
but also a No you are going to take it 
subtle offer; But she would convince me of this. 
the promise of 
recognition She would say to me 
and a prized Okay I know it's a stressful period but 
identity, "I 
know you can I know you can do it and 
do it. " It would you need to keep up on doing it 
be this that 
would be So I felt there was no other way of doing things 
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effective in I got this job and I need to do it 
tempting me 
to submit, if I Why complain 
were ever to There is no reason for complaining find myself in 
Maira's place. No reason for discussing it really 
It was really, really hard 
to do all the amount of work I had to do 
and be as committed 
as I should have been 
as I would like to be 
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I have heard Maira's self questioning: 
I felt it was my responsibility 
I was not competent 
And I have heard her report of her manager saying to 
her: 
I know you can do it 
You need to keep up on doing it 
Maira's testimony (below) 
shows that it is not the 
promise of a prized identity 
that drives her to push herself 
beyond what she feels to be 
her capabilities, but rather 
the fear that she would be 
judged incapable or 
unsuitable. She fears rejection 
I wonder how the combination of these forces will play and so 
hides from those with 
out and she tells me how she hid how she was feeling. the power to reject her. J 
I hid it from the work 
I didn't talk a lot about how I felt at that moment because of the feeling that if I said 
anything that they might think I'm not capable of doing it. 
I felt that if I said the whole thing, how I felt, and how I felt at the moment, then I might 
be not suitable. They might judge me as not suitable. 
Well I hid it um from the work. 
I didn't talk to anyone superior than me, to anyone who had the authority to say I was 
not suitable for this or anything like that. 
Whatever they were giving me to work on I was willing to take it even if it was more 
than I could take. Just to prove that I could do it. 
And even whilst Maira is making 
considerable efforts to cope with the 
demands made, and to hide her 
struggles, there is ambiguity. She 
also wants someone to notice her 
stress (right), to realise that she is 
overloaded, perhaps to rescue her. 
This does not happen and the 
isolation that results is reminiscent 
of the isolation that was evocatively 
described in Clara's narrative. 
Nobody noticed... nobody 
nobody noticed that I was so stressed 
nobody 
they kept on giving me work 
I'm sure if the people who were above me 
checked how much work they were giving me 
they could see that it was too much for a person 
who was just starting 
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I have tried to take a deliberate position of 'not-knowing' in this research, but for Maira 
this position was not willingly adopted, but rather brought about by her combination of 
naivete, isolation and fear of being found unsuitable. It seems that the knowing she is left 
with was a vague, embodied sense that something was amiss. A gut feeling, or 'felt sense' 
(Gendlin, 1978; 1996). But she doesn't trust this and so continues to work and to hide. 
I had a gut feeling that something was going wrong 
I was naive at that moment 
because I had no information 
because everybody wanted to do that training 
I thought I should do it 
That maybe there was no other ways to be trained 
because everybody was trained that way 
I thought that is the job 
Still 
In my gut level I could feel 
that something was going wrong 
because I couldn't understand how counsellors can work 
with so much pressure and be as well 
ethical 
I had a gut feeling that something was going wrong 
but I had no proof 
no academic knowledge 
or counselling 
or information off anyone 
So 
had to do it because I didn't know any other way to do it 
I thought that was the right way 
and either I do it 
or I'm not suitable for the job 
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In counselling, the 
For two years I was doing this job... with no supervision supervisor would be 
For two years I was doing this job expected to provide an 
with no professional 
arena for self-doubts and 
contradictions, such as 
outside of the job 
those expressed by Maira 
supervision (above), to be explored. 
the only kind of supervision I would have But the managerial 
and the rest of the counsellors would have supervision that Maira 
was like staff meetings 
describes (left) is not 
supervision as any 
twice a day before the groups 
professional counselling 
and we were talking about issues organisation would 
that came up in the groups understand it. 
that came up in the one-to-ones As such, Maira's 
maybe to highlight something or give additional information misgivings about both 
that other counsellors might not have had 
her situation and her 
own diminishing sense of 
in a sense that was a kind of supervision 
adequacy as a developing 
but still it was not that intense practitioner are left 
or really supporting anyone unspoken and without 
it was more to clear out things any explicit 
check out things and move on 
consideration or 
reflection. 
because these staff meetings was for 
The recommended 
fifteen minutes 
baseline for supervision 
twenty minutes has consistently been 
half an hour maximum given as 1.5 hours per 
so if you have five counsellors... month (Mearns, 2004), 
but this would be 
expected to increase 
significantly for a novice 
counsellor, or a counsellor in-training. As Maira tells me of the duration of the meetings 
provided and the number of counsellors in each group, she leaves me to work out the 
sums and the implications. There was no time for considered reflection. 
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Maira persists in her It didn't feel safe... it wasn't confidential 
attempts to reach out for And the sad thing was 
support, this time to the I could talk 
centre manager. But again, 
what she is offered falls far 
to the manager who was a counsellor as well 
short of a supervisory who was the most experienced of anyone else 
relationship as understood which I did sometimes 
within the counselling it was not that I didn't 
community. As Mearns 
but still he was not supervising 
(2004: 1) explains in the 
BACP information sheet, still 
it was inside the job 
'How much supervision he was part of the job 
should you have? ' "... the So it didn't really feel safe 
aim is to develop a that the manager was 
relationship in which your 
a safe and secure person 
supervisor is regarded as a 
trusted colleague who can that I could go and talk confidentially about something 
help you to reflect on all I knew that there would be things 
dimensions of your that he would say to the director 
practice" (my emphasis). He really, really cared about me 
This is related to counsellor 
and still cares about me today 
well-being and the 
principle of self-respect as but still it was not 
well as to the provision of it was not safe 
an effective and ethical I knew it wasn't confidential 
practice (Thompson, 1990; It wasn't a typical supervision 
and Chapter Three). 
It wasn't like somebody who was specifically appointed 
Maira strives for some 
to be the supervisor 
balance in her 
representation of the so you never 
had the feeling that there is this one person 
manager's relationship you can go and talk to and it's going to be 
with her. Although he was kept confidential what you're going to say 
not "a safe and secure and you are going to get all the support 
person" he "really, really 
" and that made things even worse for me . cared . 
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Maira's attempts to get support and information, this time from self-help groups are now 
thwarted by her manager, apparently for commercial or protectionist reasons. 
My manager told me that I shouldn't say really anything 
there was um 
there is er 
there was and there is a lot of competition between rehab centres 
with which centre is more successful 
and how many people they're taking 
and all these things 
and so there is always 
I don't know how to put it 
with the treatment I was working 
and the other treatments 
they are like enemies more or less 
so there is a kind of competition 
was going into self-help groups and 
my manager told me that I shouldn't say really anything about my job 
even if it was anonymous 
because there might be somebody there in the group from another treatment 
so not to give any information as to how we work 
I was shocked at what I seemed to be hearing and needed to check my 
understanding. I asked: 
i You're saying that he was asking you to be quiet, not to protect the confidentiality 
of clients, but to protect the information, to stop the information getting out 
about how they were working? 
Maira replied clearly and affirmatively: 
Yes, yes, yes 
102 
And now, it seems that Maira is no longer 
able to deny the exploitation that she 
experienced in this organisation, no longer 
able to maintain her balanced or positive 
representation of the organisation and its 
management (see right). 
And she begins to look back on some of her 
more worrying experiences. She is 
particularly concerned about client records, 
Their way was an exploiting way 
They wanted us to work in their way 
Their way was an exploiting way 
And they were exploiting me 
And they were harming me 
And they were harming the clients 
and her concerns relate to yet another unhappy combination of circumstances; many of 
the clients had chaotic lives which meant that they previously committed crimes and were 
making disclosures about these crimes to Maira, and again Maira was left unsupported 
and unguided in making therapeutic notes from these 
sessions. 
I was taking this saying into notes 
and they were saying with me 
so when I was taking this saying into notes 
nobody ever told me you know 
how responsible I had to be 
with taking this saying into notes 
they checked it for a while 
to see if my English was ok 
or just to see how they were structured 
and if I have all of the information they need there 
but then I was left alone 
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I particularly notice the broken 
English with which Maira 
describes this situation (left). 
And it jolts me back into an 
awareness of her expecting 
high standards and appropriate 
practices here, in this country. 
And that she had come to 
England for her training, with 
this expectation in mind. 
And I feel shamed for my 
country, and my profession. 
I find this term broken English 
strange but somehow 
appropriate. 
And I find Maira's language 
particularly poignant here. 
As though the struggle to 
express through a second 
language is especially 
evocative. 
The words are carefully 
chosen. There is no easy cliche. 
When Maira begins a college counselling course, her understanding of the problems that 
she is encountering at her employing organisation crystallises. She now has some external 
information and so is no longer exclusively dependent on this organisation for her 
understanding of counselling and what constitutes good practice. So when she hears of an 
imminent inspection visit she feels sufficiently sure of her ground to raise her concerns 
and attempt to raise standards, specifically with regard to supervision. The manager 
foresees this and takes pre-emptive action by trying to control what staff say to the 
inspector (see below). Maira defies the manager and resolves to speak with the inspector, 
but her 'wh istl e-bl owing' attempt comes to nothing. 
We've been pressurised about what we were supposed to tell him 
We have an inspector come and inspecting us 
from outside 
and we've been pressurised 
about what we were supposed to tell him 
so about the supervision issue 
the manager said 
The inspector is coming today 
And probably he's going to ask about this and the other and the other 
and he mentioned supervision, he said 
If he asks you if you want supervision 
what he means by supervision 
he means the relationship I have with you 
which is not true 
which I thought 
Hang on a moment 
but I didn't debate it at the moment 
Ithought 
Let the inspector come 
And speak directly to him so I spoke with the inspector 
and I said 
Well we don't really have any supervision 
And he said 
Okay I will look at this 
And he never came back with anything 
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Maira had been looking, without success, for someone safe to support her practice. In this 
she seems to articulate Bond's (2004a, 2004b) requirement for an ethic of trust, though 
not as a client but as a trainee, a supervisee and an employee. The action, or rather the lack 
of action of the inspector represented a final failure to find a 'safe' or 'trustworthy' person 
and Maira now tells me, "I then knew there would be nothing safe". And she feels she is left 
with a stark choice, to either comply or leave and here Maira perfectly illustrates the two 
means of influence identified by Hirschman (see Chapter Three); voice or exit. And she 
gives evocative access to the lived experience of this situation. She has tried to give voice, 
but with her fears of being judged, and with the lack of a safe arena, she feels she must 
comply until she can leave. 
I would have to leave or I would have to comply 
So I then knew there would be nothing safe so I just ignored it 
because either I would have to leave 
or I would have to comply 
there was no other way out 
That was the case with everything 
from the start really 
you either would comply with what they were saying to you even if it was 
very, very pressurising on you 
and in an extent harmful to you or other people 
dangerous to you or other people 
there was no way of talking it out 
no new adoptions of ways to work things out 
that was it 
you accept it or don't 
So I thought I just want to leave and carry on with my studies 
and learn more about counselling 
and move on with my life 
so I just accepted it 
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But Maira's sense of her I started to be really uncomfortable with myself 
ethical identity suffers. 
I know I wouldn't be here standing Like Clara she questions 
her own morality, and my relative wouldn't 
be alive 
feeling "really if counselling was not in place 
uncomfortable" with and was not done properly 
what she finds. 
so I really, really value 
This seems to be made how counselling service is given to people 
more acute by her and how much empowering that is 
valuing of counselling, 
and how much damaging it can be 
by her gratitude that the 
life of her relative was So I started in a personal value and personal ethics way 
saved by this centre and to be really uncomfortable with myself 
by her greater 
for doing this job 
awareness of the 
damage that can be and it had to take 
done. There are old 
one and a half years to reach that point 
loyalties and new values 
but when I reached that point it was something that 
competing. This is an 
unsettling web of I couldn't turn off 
complexity. I couldn't ignore it 
But she is unable to and the more 
I was learning about counselling 
ignore it any longer. Her and how it's properly being conducted 
means of coping no the more I felt the urge of running away from this job 
longer work and she 
wants to run away from 
because I knew 
the job. 
And now Maira 
succinctly expresses the 
meaning of the principle 
of self-care, without this, 
how can she care for her 
clients? 
lon't fit there 
id they don't fit with me 
id I knew there would be no way of them changing 
I had to go away 
I cannot take care of myself 
>w can I take care of the people I'm working with 
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Maira now reflects on her 
inability to confront the 
managers of the organisation 
face-to-face, and sees this as a 
responsibility that she did not 
meet. Bauman (1994: 45) tells 
us that "one can tell a moral 
person by their never quenched 
dissatisfaction with their moral 
performance; the gnawing 
suspicion that they were not 
moral enough. " Bond's (2000: 
242 and 2005: 14) concept of 
"ethical mindfulness" also seems 
pertinent. 
Being considered as an enemy of the job 
I didn't confront them about the issues then 
and I'm aware 
that maybe 
that was a responsibility that I didn't 
follow-up 
maybe I should have confronted them about 
the reasons I'm leaving 
but then I knew nothing would change 
the only thing that would change would be me 
being considered as an enemy 
of the job 
There is a sense of helplessness and powerlessness here, "nothing would change". There is 
no exhaustion explicitly expressed, it is not told but we hear it. It is shown, it is evoked. 
And I am also struck by the poignancy of her last phrase here. It seems that there was 
something unbearable about becoming "'an enemy of the job". But we need to bear in 
mind that this wasn't just a job. This was the place where she had witnessed her relative's 
recovery, where she had lived as well as worked, and where she had been required to 
undergo the treatment programme as 'a patient', facing her identity as a 'co-dependant' 
and working with things coming up from the past that had contributed to her situation 
being "really, really stressful". 
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5.4 Caroline's story 
At the time of the events that Caroline narrates she was not working as a counsellor per se 
but was employed to use counselling skills to support the development of high potential 
middle managers as part of a personnel and training service in a large corporation. In 
Chapter Three I reflect on the position of counsellors in the corporate context where they, 
and their associated skills, are present only in their capacity to support or supplement the 
core business of the organisation, their role is not central to the principal organisational 
purpose. Such practitioners might 
experience dilemmas of loyalty to 
either their employing organisation 
or to the values of counselling. 
Here Caroline shows how she 
I was quite new 
into personnel and training 
and I was really green 
didn't know a heck of a lot about anything really 
experienced some of these 
don't know why they gave me the job 
difficulties, and stories her professional and ethical identity in relation to them. She gives a 
view of herself as naive and inexperienced at the time that she began this work (above 
right), an identity that seems at odds with the expectations of senior colleagues (below). 
She relates her subsequent decision to complete counsellor training and work as an 
independent counsellor to these experiences of feeling coerced to engage in unethical 
practices within this corporation. In making this transition she feels that she will be more 
able to choose work that is compatible with her values. 
And I think it was on my second day in that organisation. I was doing lots of reading 
around everything for the induction. And my colleague (who I was quite reliant on) said 
to me... 
There was a guy that she'd been working with very closely (Harry). She put the idea in his 
head that he should be doing an MBA. And there was another guy (Tom) who had 
already applied and he got it all agreed. 
And the deadline was coming up for the application to these business schools and this 
other guy that my colleague was working with was really tardy so she was really chasing 
him up. At the time my thought was, "well it's a bit strange, he either wants to do it or he 
doesn't. Seems odd". 
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This really doesn't feel right 
So she came to me and said, 
Oh could you... you know that application you got from Tom 
it was a really good application 
Well what I'd like you to do is; 
do a photocopy, 
Tipex out his name, 
photocopy it 
and then take it down and give it to Harry 
And my tummy said, 
This doesn't feel right 
And so I sat at my desk and I felt really... I guess very kind of perplexed by it all 
thinking, 
This really doesn't feel right 
So I went back to her and said, 
I'm really sorry I can't do this 
I said, 
This doesn't feel at all appropriate 
So I can't do this 
if you think this is the right thing to do then you've been here much longer than 
I have, feel free to do it 
But I can't do that 
And then it came to light... months later, that my colleague was actually having an 
affair with Harry 
And so all this chasing 
And all this giving him a photocopy with the name tipexed out 
That was all about her personal relationship with him 
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This episode begins when Caroline is a novice 
The start of a downhill slope employee, in an unfamiliar situation. Her 
And that was really kind of... struggles to make sense of the 
instruction she 
kind of... 
was given are shown in her feeling of 
perplexity and also by her reference to her 
Wow! first embodied experiencing, or felt sense 
I'm so glad I didn't do that (Gendlin, 1978) as she gives her account of 
But at the time it was... her tummy saying, "This doesn't feel right". 
You know when I said no 
This is also reminiscent of Maira's gut feeling. 
it felt the right thing to do 
And she does not yet know whether she is 
but is also felt the wrong thing to do. encountering usual practices for this 
I've only been here two days organisation or simply canteen culture or 
How can I say no? some backstage and understage version 
(Rugg 
And I guess that was really the start of.. 
and McGeorge, 1999 and Chapter Three). 
of a downhill slope really. 
The hardest thing to swallow 
The hardest thing to swallow was... 
This downhill slope metaphor (above) If the individuals that were identified as 
evokes a sense of powerlessness and having potential weren't 
perhaps pathos. Caroline's downhill 
slope begins early in this career, when a 
particular favourite of this divisional director 
she is still green. And (ironically) the I would then have to go back to them 
verb 'career' can also be defined as to the individual 
moving rapidly downhill. and tell them that 
Metaphor and embodiment are well I wouldn't 
be working with them 
combined (right) as Caroline refers to like saying to them, 
"the hardest thing to swallow". And we you haven't got potential 
/I are implicitly told that there were 
when actually 
many things that were difficult to 
swallow. It's just that this was the 
they actually did 
hardest. and that was... 
that was hardest of all 
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The second episode that And I would just have a huge dilemma 
Caroline narrates is a He would then get on to me and start really having a go 
specific exemplar of what saying, 
seems to have been a Do you know who you've just said no to? 
routine request to provide I would say, Yeah. I just said no to this person 
one of her clients to meet 
a specific organisational 
Yes but you know what level he is in the organisation? 
demand. When there was Yes I know what level he is in the organisation 
a "good reason" Caroline Well why did you say no? 
would refuse these (There would be very good reasons why not) 
requests and was And then he would just say, 
frequently challenged by 
her manager for this 
Well tough. We cannot say no to this person 
(right). The command- And I would just have a huge dilemma 
driven, top-down, goal- It didn't really matter to me that much to please this person 
oriented culture of this What mattered to me was doing something really effective 
company is evident here. 
for the people I was responsible for 
And then I had this request It was just horrible 
There was one person that I worked with very I found it really difficult 
closely 
Because of his leadership potential and Although Caroline refers to 
Because he was an incredibly bright guy and 
Because he had really good knowledge 
herself as experiencing a 
[There was] a really good opportunity for him 
dilemma here she sounds very 
clear about "what mattered" to 
It was a really good move for him 
her, i. e. the individual person. In 
And then he took a step up... this she seems to be describing a 
And then I had this request... 
preference for a deontological 
I was told by my manager to go and talk to this guy 
And tell him he had to apply for another position 
They wanted him to go back out into the field 
But purely as a bit of crutch for this other guy 
But it wasn't really going to do very much 
For him 
ethic. 
The request that she describes 
(left) was particularly 
unacceptable to her as she 
considered it to be clearly 
detrimental to the person she 
was working with. 
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That was just too uncomfortable for me 
So I thought, Goodness me what am I going to do? 
So I thought, Well the only thing i can do is be completely honest with this guy 
Because if I go and talk to him and start advising him to go and do 
something 
Because i really felt like he had... 
I really felt that he had a lot of trust in me 
So if I go out and tell him he's got to apply for something 
He'll maybe just do it 
Because he thinks I... 
He'll trust my judgement 
That was just too 
Too uncomfortable for me 
So I met with him 
And I was just really honest 
And he wasn't silly 
He knew straight away what it was all about 
And so he didn't apply 
An ethic of trustworthiness is clearly important 
to Caroline. It was "too uncomfortable" for her to 
betray the trust of this person. And it seems that 
this principal took precedence in her decision- 
making, over the demands and values of her 
employing organisation. The strength of her 
convictions are attested to in her struggle to say 
much more than, ' l couldn't; it didn't; it wasn't: 
But as Bauman (1994) asserts; modern, 
bureaucratic organisations do not want people 
to be sidetracked by their own beliefs values or 
convictions, no matter how heartfelt 
I couldn't... I couldn't... 
For me it was obvious 
what that was all about and 
I couldn't... 
I couldn't mislead him 
I couldn't let him trust my judgement 




Me being completely useless 
Meanwhile I went off on holiday 
and came back 
and came back to complete uproar 
It had all been communicated 
that it was me 
that I had completely cocked it all up 
And 
it was all me being completely 
useless 
But in a way it was well, 
'Phew' 
I'm glad I... 
Well I'm glad 
In the face of the disparaging 
attributions applied to Caroline from 
within the organization she makes 
more positive identity claims for 
herself (right). 
I like truth, she tells me 
As though it's a matter of taste, I 
muse, as I re-read this 
Hmm, I'm more partial to a tasty 
bit of deceit-an imagined reply 
And yet it seems that some do 
have such tastes 
And Caroline's choice of expression 
seems to avoid judgment 
She just has different preferences 
And so Caroline must take the 
consequences of the organisational 
disapproval. These consequences seem 
to include the imposition of an all- 
embracing and negative identity. She 
has completely cocked it up and she is 
completely useless. And again we have 
the modernist conflation of problem and 
person. Caroline has not just caused a 
problem in this view; she is a problem. 
And the 'downhill slope'that she 
describes earlier is again evident. 
And yet she shows some relief, "it was 
well, Phew! " And she begins to tell me 
tentatively, and then tells me with 
conviction that she is glad. It seems that 
the contempt of her managers was less 
uncomfortable than violating her ethics. 
I like truth 
I'm very much um 
I like truth and 
I think when you're playing with people's 
lives 
in terms of their abilities 
and more importantly 
you're playing with information 
that can affect how they feel about themselves 
then that seems a really risky thing 
to not be truthful about 
and I found that very 
very uncomfortable 
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The third episode that Caroline recounts concerns personal reports and assessments 
compiled by psychologists for individual employees. She explains that they had an 
eighteen month to two-year shelf-life. After two years the report would be out of date, and 
some were already out of date by the time she arrived at the company. Despite this she 
was not allowed to destroy this documentation, and was expected to make it available to 
managers who were not qualified to understand or interpret it. And this was done without 
the knowledge or consent of the individual concerned. The principle of autonomy was not 
applied here and it seems that the interests of the company were significantly privileged 
over those of the employee. Caroline, however, continues to privilege the welfare of the 
individual, her fear is that a "person's future... can be written oJJ' 
And you know, the contract is between me and the individual 
He would come and say to me, 
"Give me the report on such and such person. " 
And I would look through and say, 
"But that report 's now out of date. " 
"Doesn't matter. I want the report. " 
And I would say, 
"Well I can do you a summary. Would you like you me to? " 
"No, no, no. I want to give it to such and such a divisional director to read. " 
And you know the contract is between me and the individual 
The only person that sees this report is the person that writes it 
me that reads it and yourself 
I will share it with your line manager because your line manager can work with you 
If you choose to show it to anybody else than that's fine 
These reports are so easy to misinterpret if you read them out of context 
Then sometimes what's written can be taken out of context 
And that person's future in the organisation can be written off 
Just by reading something that you don't really understand 
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Caroline begins her fourth and They would be raided by gunmen 
final episode. 
I was working in a branch network 
Does this narrative have a 
and occasionally 
different quality? Or am I 
bringing that? I hear the 
they would be raided 
words branch, raid and 
by gunmen and whatever 
gunman and am taken to a and um 
memory of a past client an area manager came in to see me 
who had suffered repeated he wanted to move people from one branch 
experiences of such raids. I 
to another 
am still aware my 
he was the manager so I inadequacy at that time . . 
if he wanted to do that he could do that 
He was Mr Militant and he was encouraging her Yet there is a difference 
But there was a lady in the representation. 
who he was having real difficulty with 
The fragility of this 
woman contrasts with 
and she refused to move branches 
the strength and ability 
and she refused to change her hours of working of the other employees 
she wanted things exactly as they were that Caroline deals with. 
didn't want any change They are selected to 
work with her because 
And so he came in telling me this woeful story they are identified as 
of this really obstinate member of staff having high potential as 
who would never be flexible managers. The woman, 
who wouldn't do extra or change a day or anything 
and also her husband, 
are defined as problems 
And then painted this picture to the organisation. And I 
of how her husband was a trade unionist am reminded of 
how 
Caroline seemed to be 
and so he was behind all of this 
identified as a problem 
He was Mr Militant 
once she ceased to 
And he was encouraging her to do this comply. 
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So I went to see this lady and I was absolutely amazed when I got talking to her. 
She'd been in a branch raid where a gunman had come in, fired bullets around the 
place and stole lots of money. And they hadn't had any of the emergency screening 
or anything. 
So you know 
Complete trauma 
Caroline spoke up for this woman, and managed to arrange counselling for her, and at the 
end of this, with the woman's permission, the counsellor confronted Caroline about how 
she had been treated. Caroline is now associated with this organisation, she feels her 
identity merging with this organisation; "I felt like I was the organisation". And yet she had 
found its values unacceptable to her, and her values had been trivialised by it. And again 
she faces up to her management, represents the woman's interests, and again suffers the 
consequences for her moral stance. 
I felt like I was the organisation 
I felt like the really rotten person 
I felt like I was the organisation 
So I went back 
to the area manager and to my boss 
and said we shouldn't be moving this lady 
these are the reasons why 
And so this lady didn't move branches and didn't move hours 
Nell: You did well for her? 
Caroline: I did well for her yes 
but I didn't do too well for myself really 
because then I was 
I was just... 
just being all soft and getting in the way as usual 
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I really can't hack anymore of this 
Caroline increasingly 
I realised very quickly realises that the demands 
that I wasn't going to go anywhere really of the job just don't fit with 
because 
her. And, feeling unable to 
compromise her values, 
the things I would have to do 
she leaves. 
to be seen as 
When reflecting on this 
or regarded as 
decision she, herself 
real good stuff makes the connection 
just didn't fit with me so between deontological and 
utilitarian ethics herself 
I guess in any job you have responsibilities to people telling me: "My boss's focus 
but within personnel and training is on the business whereas 
that's what the job is all about my 
focus is on the 
individual person"". it's all about people and 
valuing them In Nash's (2002a) terms 
she has a dominant 
And it was just completely not valuing an individual deontological gene and a 
and just manipulating everything recessive utilitarian gene. 
it was horrible And, to borrow the same 
genetic metaphor, she also 
That's how it is seems to have a dominant 
That's how it's going to be agentic gene. 
Go and do it Unquestioning obedience 
I used to come home feeling really torn in two and floating responsibility 
(Bauman, 1994) are not 
Ithought acceptable to her. And she 
I really can't hack anymore of this will not accept being 
Because there were so many occasions when positioned as exempt 
from 
I was having to compromise my values 
moral evaluation 
(Bauman, op cit). 
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And Caroline now explicitly allies 
herself with deontological ethics as she 
espouses the more usual form of Kant's 
Categorical Imperative, 'do as you 
would be done by'. 
I had been wondering about the 
constitutive force of religion, which is 
so often claimed as an upholder of 
moral action. But Caroline rejects this, 
offering instead a value system based 
on a secular philosophical framework. 
And yet Caroline doesn't present her 
actions as being carefully measured 
against an objective or external 
theoretical standard. Instead she 
utilises subjective, introspective 
practices. She imagines how the 
experience / treatment would feel for 
her should she be put in that place. 
I don't have a religion 
I'm not a religious person 
but I do have this thing about 
Do unto others 
And when we got married 
neither of us wanted a religious ceremony 
because we don't go to church 
and we didn't want just a registry office 
because that didn't mean anything either 
so we fell upon the 
British Humanist Association 
I'd never heard of them before 
but it was just absolutely spot-on 
it really, really suits us 
That's their thing isn't it 
Do unto others 
As you want done unto you 
This identification of subjectivism is And that's... 
continued overleaf as Caroline tells us I think that's really 
that she thinks she was being "driven by 
her feelings". This is the position that 
how I have to 
has been described as, "patently 
incoherent", by Lewis (2003: 227). And 
interestingly, Caroline seems to be 
having this very debate with herself. 
She tells herself, "but that's only 
feelings, push that one back down". 
live my life 
which is 
That would just be so awful 
I wouldn't want that so 
I wouldn't do that to others 
And then Caroline qualifies her statement, she is more likely to trust her gut feelings, to 
follow a subjectivist position, when the dilemma relates a person. When she may be 
putting a person at risk she favours subjectivism over "what theoretically seems the right 
thing to do" : And in this her apparently simple subjectivism becomes relational. 
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I think I was being driven by my feelings 
You know with this guy from marketing? I was telling him the truth about a factual 
situation. And I think I was being driven by my feelings. 
But probably at that stage I wasn't that clear about what those feelings were. 
All I would know was: This feels really uncomfortable 
This feels like it's wrong 
And that, actually thinking about it 
That's quite big thing for me because 
When my gut usually... 
When my gut tells me something 
hear it 
I feel it 
But I don't follow it 
I don't listen to it 
There are heaps of occasions in the workplace, where I've been going to do something, 
which theoretically seems the right thing to do. 
My gut tells me No that doesn't feel right 
But that's only feelings 
Push that one back down 
Let's go on with this thing that, theoretically 
Is the right thing to do 
Then when I've done it and the result hasn't been that good I've thought: 
I knew all along that that wasn't the thing to do 
But I didn't follow it 
But this is interesting 
Because in this situation 
When it's dealing with a person 
And I'm potentially putting a person at risk 
Then I will listen to what my gut tells me 
Even though I don't understand what it's telling me 
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It led to a lot of harsh discipline 
You know as a child 
While growing up 
Well the entire time of living at home 
Was very much about 
Telling the truth 
I was always told to 
Tell the truth 
About what I'd done 
And most of the time... 
That always... 
Led to dire consequences 
For me 
it led to a lot of harsh discipline 
If I did something wrong 
They would force me to tell it 
Then I knew I was going to get a punishment 
From my dad 
I would then be 
Sent to my room 
Punished 
Didn't have a mother who would come in and 
Give me a bit of sympathy 
As Caroline now narrates these 
childhood memories of being 
forced to tell the truth and then 
punished for telling the truth, I 
recall her earlier words, "I like 
the truth". 
I am now taken aback at this. In 
this context of what appears to 
be intimidation and "harsh 
punishment", I wonder, how can 
she like truth? And how can she 
relate her relationship to truth in 
this apparently simple way? 
In her childhood, Caroline was 
coerced to tell the truth with 
unpleasant consequences. In my 
childhood I was coerced to tell 
lies. I have long felt that I have 
been sensitized to dishonesty 
through this experience. But 
more recently, particularly 
through engaging with this 
research, I wonder if I have 
simply been on the lookout for it. 
And a bit of there, there 
I am also reminded of both Clara and 
Maira as Caroline describes the 
Had no contact 
isolation that she experienced when she 
Would be on my own was left alone in her room after being 
physically punished by her father. Her statement here, "had no contact" stands out to me. I 
think I hear a subtext; if only her mother had gone to her and made contact she would 
have been more easily able to bear her father's treatment of her. Again relationship is 
needed. 
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It was my responsibility In Caroline's account of 
being positioned as 
And when I was allowed back out of my room 
responsible for the 
My Mum's words would be punitive actions of her 
Well you know what your father's like father, her loneliness 
Which meant seems to be intensified. 
That was your responsibility The situation and the 
You shouldn't have done it because you knew 
attributions of blame are 
individualised. Like Maira, 
if you did that you would get a good hiding 
Caroline is seen as being 
I was being a difficult child 
the problem. She is "a 
difficult child', another 
I was this child who should have had a lot more self-control modernist totalising 
Because then I wouldn't make my dad hit me judgement. 
So I was making him do it 
And she has accepted, or 
been constituted by, this 
It was my responsibility discourse. She says that 
there are still situations 
And I would say even now 
where she accepts 
In some circumstances without question, that she 
I wouldn't even ask the question is to blame. 
I would just accept that it was me 
In the context of the episodes that 
she has narrated, Caroline's tendency 
to accept personal responsibility 
seems to have been exacerbated by a 
moral ethos that was assumed and 
therefore obscured (Warner, 2001; 
Reavey and Warner, 2003). As other 
staff reacted to requests as though 
they are acceptable and appropriate 
then Caroline's resistance was 
individualised. 
So for a long time I thought it was me 
I guess 
Because nobody else... 
Because this lady that I took over from... 
Because she didn't seem to react to any of these 
Inappropriate 
What I call inappropriate requests 
in the way that I did 
I just thought wow it's me 
So for a long time I did 
I thought it was me 
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5.5 Anthony's story 
Anthony had been a very successful professional with significant responsibility prior to his 
decision to make a career change and train as a counsellor. At the time of the (two related) 
incidents that he described to me, he had not yet completed this initial counsellor training 
and he explains that whilst, "on one level [he] may have masses of experience" he feels 
"like a child as a trainee". 
As Anthony describes feeling like 
a child I am reminded of Clara, 
for whom the abandoned child 
I'm sort of aware that I've sort of packed this metaphor had been so powerful. 
story away since I ... And, again like Clara, Anthony 
well, before I wrote to you uses entrance talk that 
and um specifically reflects on 
the story 
that he is about to tell, and not 
so it's sort of unpacking the layers again just the experience to which his 
story refers. 
I was at And as I re-read 
his account of 
what seem to be muddied 
a placement boundaries: in this case, 
in a higher education setting manager 
/ assessor / supervisor, 
I again recall Clara. 
there had been some confusion about my 
appointment Was I actually uncovering 
themes? Despite my rejection of 
I had been appointed earlier thematic analysis and associated 
but before I commenced at the placement attempts to categorise people 
the person who was head of counselling had and their experiences, I clearly 
changed had to reconsider. What was I 
and not only had the person changed but seeing? 
their style, their model had also changed I was taken once more to 
and the woman in question who relationship as research. There 
was no evidence that I was 
was head of counselling revealing shared truths; but, at 
turned out to be the person who also this early stage, there seemed to 
assesses clients be connections between these 
and passes them on to the student 
two narratives that were simply 
counsellors worthy of note. 
and she is also supervisor 
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Clearly Anthony begins this placement with some disquiet, but he lacks the experience 
necessary to make sense of his concerns or to identify an explicit focus for this. His 
vagueness is revealed in both the content and the manner of his expression as he tells me, 
"I was just beginning my last year of training. I was unaware of... it didn't... you know 
there's this thing about... it didn't feel right but I didn't quite know why. " 
It is from this position of 
doubt and misgiving It's all right its a suicidal ideation 
that Anthony finds 
himself expected to the first client she gave me 
work beyond his 
was a 
competence as he is 
immediately given a 
suicidal client 
client who has disclosed and this must have been about the sixth client I had ever had 
suicidal thoughts. The And she said, 
duty of counsellors to It's all right it's a suicidal ideation 
work within limits of 
that this client is acting out 
competence is listed in 
all UK ethical codes and 
And I said, 
frameworks. That of the Hang on a minute 
BACP (2006) explicitly this isn't right because 
states that the services 
my training actually 
should be provided on 
the basis of adequate 
prevents me 
training or experience. says that 
I should not 
Anthony is further 
disempowered and also 
I cannot take on a suicidal client 
disconnected from his And she said to me, 
training institution Well you're not a student here 
when he tries to raise you're a counsellor 
his concerns (right). 
and your college has no jurisdiction 
within this arrangement 
in fact it's none of their business 
123 
Anthony tried to contact 
an in-house supervisor 
Its just thoughts you know 
from his college but, I was reassured 
despite leaving by the supervisor that had assessed this client 
messages, this person 
that um 
was unavailable and did 
not get back in touch 
he was not trying to kill himself 
with him. it was 
just ideation 
He then took his 
concerns back to the and I didn't know much 
placement supervisor of the difference 
who expressed and I asked what was the difference 
confidence that the (feeling even more nervous about this) 
suicidal disclosures had 
not been genuine but 
And she said, 
were simply ideations Well it's just thoughts you know 
(see right). And I said, 
Anthony thus prepares 
Well how will 1 know the difference if I'm with a client? 
to work (alone) in a 
situation that he has not previously encountered. He describes some persistence in 
seeking clarity and understanding about this diagnosis of suicidal ideation, of which he has 
no substantial understanding. The response he gets seems to him (and also to me) to be 
bizarre and disturbing. 
And she said, 
It gets very sexy in the room 
it feels really warm and exciting 
when somebody is seriously engaged with their own desire to kill themselves 
Those were her words 
I had been keen to follow Bruner's (1986: 24) advice and engage in research that makes 
the world "newly strange" and "rescues it from obviousness" (see Chapter Four). I had not 
reckoned on this degree of strange. 
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And so Anthony's confidence in his supervisor diminishes further and, with the absence of 
the college supervisor, his increasing isolation becomes apparent. He tells me, "I haven't 
any other point of reference". 
And it was in this context, and only two hours after that disturbing supervision meeting, 
that Anthony has his first session with this client. And just a week later, in the second 
session, he acts on his own judgment as he raises the issue of the suicidal thoughts, a 
practice supported by the relevant BACP Information Sheet (Reeves and Seber, 2004). 
He takes the story up himself 
(right) using forms of expression 
Death crept under the door 
and metaphorical language that 
are emotionally resonant and 
And he said, 
which powerfully evoke the (and I can feel it now) 
quality of the experience. `Ah' he said, 
There's a real problem actually 
The hairs on my arms stood 
on end when I heard this 
And what unfolded was that he 
account, and when I spoke it had actually attempted to kill himself 
into the voice recognition 
equipment, and also when I But you know 
reread the printed text. far from it being a very warm sexy environment 
I have omitted the details of actually it was like ice cold 
the suicide attempt that death crept under the door 
Anthony's client described to 
there was like this cool mist 
him, mainly to preserve 
and I was absolutely and totally alone 
anonymity and decency. . 
In any case, these details are And you know there's just 
not needed. Anthony's 
that awful breathless pause of 
account of his own reactions 
is sufficient to evoke the 
fuck 
quality of the experience, to what do I do? 
show and not simply tell what do I do? 
what happened. 
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In my experience, situations where we must balance the principle of autonomy with 
concerns to safeguard clients' well-being are some of the trickiest we deal with in 
counselling. These are at their most acute when we are working with clients who have 
suicidal feelings or thoughts, and particularly when these are explicit and detailed or when 
a serious attempt has already been made. At such times breaches of confidentiality are 
given serious consideration but, as the BACP (2002: 6) guidelines state, such disclosures 
without the explicit consent of the client "requires commensurate justification" and 
"practitioners should be prepared to be readily accountable to clients, colleagues and 
professional body if they override a client's known wishes". Trust and trustworthiness had 
already been raised as important issues for this client and so Anthony's hope was to 
maintain transparency and to discuss the possibility of disclosure with his client at the 
next session. But this was taken out of his hands before the next session. 
The most horrible thing that happened 
And we; the client and I had already built up... 
the trust for him was... 
this was our domain that we were working with 
to help him survive 
to threaten breach of that 
would be... 
would destroy 
the holding that he had 
And the most horrible thing that happened was 
at 9: 30 in the evening my supervisor rang up and said, 
You need to know that I have told his GP 
that he has tried to kill himself 
and that he is at risk 
and now 
I have done my part as a supervisor 
it's now your job to tell the client 
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I reflect on what seems to be an implicit position of certainty in this decision to take 
action without including Anthony in discussion? That moral surety which Blackburn 
(2001: 52-53) describes as having a "coercive edge". I have done my duty and now you 
must exercise yours as I see fit. I also wonder; where is the space for Anthony's moral 
agency here? And what happens to trustworthiness (Bond, 2004a, 2006) when the (- 
thou (Buber, 1958) or the face-to face (Levinas, 1974) is infiltrated by a powerful absent 
other in this way? 
Suicide is considered one of the most difficult issues that therapists have to deal with 
(Rudd eta!, 1999) and it has been associated with a sense of professional 
incompetence and a range of emotional and behavioural disturbances (Reeves and 
Mintz, 2001; Richards, 2000) including vicarious trauma (Fox and Cooper, 1998). And 
this is in the context of therapists' pre-existing, non-specific fears of disapproval, 
rejection and accusations of unethical practice (Smith, 2003). 
And again, isolation and lack of support are implicated in how the experience of crises 
impacts on our lives and our 
identities (right). I was still left holding this horror 
Anthony tells me that it feels like his 
responsibility (right) and he 
experiences the supervisor as 
reinforcing this (below) and his sense 
of threat builds and blame builds until 
he resigns (overleaf). 
The supervisor has indicated very, 
very clearly that it's all my fault. 
Even if it's not all my fault, it's 
going to be my fault. 
I mean she was really threatening. 
I mean it's just unbelievable 
It's crazy 
It's crazy making too 
So I was still left holding this horror 
And I was absolutely and totally alone 
I was still left holding 
this horror 
It was devastating 
it was absolutely devastating 
And yes it feels like my responsibility 
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You do know that you're the one that's fucked up here 
then my supervisor became threatening 
and in trying to hold this 
this incredible barrage of 
dangerous and blaming behaviour 
what became very apparent was 
the only person that was witness to all of this 
is her 
I am locked in a supervision room with her 
And who's the crazy one? 
And who's going to believe who? 
And I then resigned 
I said 
I don't know what's going on here 
this is being hugely damaging to me 
And she said, 
Yes I imagine it's been very traumatic 
but you do know 
that you're the one that's fucked up here 
And um 
I just said, 
I need to get out of here 
and get away from this 
Which I did 
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But Anthony returned. He was receiving 
therapy himself at that time and his 
therapist suggested that, "that this was an 
opportunity to hold relationship in 
adversity". As Anthony tried to make sense 
of this he wondered whether the therapist 
believed his account. This doubt begins a 
theme that now spreads through his 
subsequent experiences and adds to his 
sense of isolation. 
Despite this reservation he returns to meet 
The thing to do is to stay in it 
I went back and re-engaged 
I was invited to go back to meet the 
supervisor again 
to try and complete 
and she encouraged me 
to stay 
She was saying that the thing to do 
the supervisor (right). Good endings are 
very sought after in the therapy community. 
is to stay in it 
is to stay in it 
is to stay in it 
But the sense of blame and bullying 
continued. And differences in therapeutic models are offered as an explanation of 
Anthony's experience. Anthony is not reassured (below). 
Psychodynamic work can be perceived as bullying 
So she continued to be extremely bullying towards me 
One week I mentioned to her that 
it felt like she was bullying me 
and she said, 
Well in psychodynamic work 
quite often it can be perceived as bullying 
And then the following week 
I discovered there had been a new book placed 
on the mantelpiece of the counselling room 
about bullying 
so my sense was 
there was a sinister message in this too 
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And for Anthony, his personal history appears to break into his, already difficult, present 
with some force. 
Like a broken dam 
And because you know 
my own mother is borderline and particularly narcissistic 
it evoked like a broken dam 
the real crazy 
mess of 
my own pathology 
my own history 
my own psychological history 
and it was hugely destabilising 
There were sort of 
echoes of past history 
found 
you know 
effectively I found another crazy mother 
Whose vulnerability am I recognising here; Anthony's or my own? 
I once disclosed some of the craziness of my own personal history and 
was told that I should not work as a counsellor, that having had such 
experiences rendered me inappropriate as a counsellor. 
Such categorisation and dismissal sets up an 'us and them' distinction 
that severs the connections between us. 
And in my connecting such history with vulnerability and blame I feel 
concerned for Anthony. And also for me. 
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Anthony now begins to This is why this story needs to be told 
tell his second main story. And the supervisor said, 
He describes working with 
Well I wonder what it would be like if you started to 
a young woman who talk to her about her breasts 
would come each week 
And again 
and "would sit and just 
it's such a startling statement 
cry". His impression of 
that relationship is that 
I'm sitting there going, 
"you could just see the 
Ah ha 
infant". He takes this Okay 
understanding to So I said, 
supervision but is shocked Well I hear what you say but I don't quite understand 
by the response he the context 
i h i I quite 
don't understand what you mean ves (r g t). rece 
And she said, 
You know what I mean. I mean if I was you with the 
I remember my client I'd be saying, 'Well I notice that you have 
feeling of nauseous breasts and I'm just trying to imagine what it must 
anxiety before I was be like 
for you' 
assured that Anthony And I'm going, 
had disobeyed. Ah ha 
I tell him my thoughts 
Okay 
of how vulnerable he 
So I said, 
would have been to 
Why would I be saying that? 
complaint and 
(I kept bringing in the technical to hold the insane) 
disciplinary So she said, 
procedures if he had Well 
acted on that advice. Well, she said 
This client is quite obviously regressed to an infantile 
It is hard to stop state... and we need her to go into the world as a 
myself speculating on fully qualified functioning human being. And so what 
the purpose of this, we need to 
do is speed her through the maturation 
to hold my chosen 
process 
position of 
(This is why this story needs to be told) 
uncertainty. 
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It is so unbelievable 
And you know 
The theme of Anthony not 
feeling believed because of the I'm very aware of being isolated 
bizarre nature of his claims is 
I am the only other person in the room picked up again here. 
and when I go to my training 
to say this to my supervisors they My thoughts turn to practice. 
again they trust me in their experience I have had clients who have 
but it is so unbelievable 
been hurt and distressed by 
they professionally can't believe it enough to act on it 
previous counsellors not 
believing them. I have 
supervised counsellors who 
have not believed their 
My reflection begins to detail this isolation: 
clients, even when the story 
And everywhere you turned 
related seemed very 
to get support believable to me. 
it fell away 
Some years ago I supervised a 
everywhere you turned 
counsellor who was working 
everyone backed off with a client who disclosed 
Anthony accepts my words eagerly: that she had been gang raped 
Absolutely yes twice by the same gang in a 
Everyone backed off small market town. 
This 
counsellor was unable to because it's the old case of, 
believe the story and wanted 
It's your word against mine isn't it? 
to use the supervision time to 
We believe you but... consider why the client was 
Even my training organisation making up such an 
The head finally said, unbelievable story. 
You know we do believe you? Our supervisory relationship 
And with hindsight ended as a consequence of 
Yes I think they did my refusal / inability to 
but I just couldn't get that surety support this. 
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As the isolation builds, Anthony reaches further afield for support, guidance, clarity. He 
approaches his professional organisation, the BACP, and still the isolation builds. As he 
accounts for this his self-questioning (self-blame? ) becomes acute (below) as he offers his 
own incoherence and possible paranoia as explanations. 
I was actually starting to threaten action through BACP, and I did speak to 
BACP about what I could do about this. And they said well your ... your 
commitment is to the client, so you have to stay with the client. 
But I think probably because it was such a bizarre story and I was probably 
not totally coherent by that time either. I don't know. My fantasy is that they 
also were thinking... well maybe it is about me not about the situation. 
Whether that's my own paranoia or not, I don't know. I didn't get any of the 
advice that I was looking for. 
There was some sort of what felt like a dampening down of it wasn't wise to 
bring your relationship with your supervisor to BACP. 
This is not a comfortable story to 
hear. I am a member of the BACP 
Experienced Practitioner 
Network whose purpose is to 
give support and guidance to 
people in situations like the one 
in which Anthony finds himself. I 
feel some culpability for what 
seems like this failure. 
And there comes a point where you go, 
'This really is crazy' 
And there is nothing you can do about it 
And you do need to save yourself now 
I need to save myself 
Yes 
A champion arose 
And what finally happened 
a champion arose 
from my training 
my student tutor finally said, 
No-one's doing anything about 
this. 
This is appalling. 
I am going to talk to the principal 
am going to present your case 
And finally I wasn't carrying it all 
So (audible out breath) 
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Towards the end of our 
conversation I ask Anthony 
I was eight when I walked into the room 
about his sense of ethical 
identity; how he sees himself as 
Oh okay yes 
an ethical person. In reply he That's very good 
talks about the sanctity of space, That's good 
honouring clients for who they because 
are and being prepared to put 
it comes from 
himself into "dangerous waters" 
to protect this. 
I believe 
the incident when I was eight 
These sound like robust aspects 
of his identity and I am curious 
when I walked into the room to find my mother 
about their history (White deep kissing my brother 
2000). 1 begin to express these who was a few years older 
thoughts: "I'm wondering, how and in fact she came at me 
long has that sense been with 
but I think it was such a traumatic incident 
you? " and then (perhaps with 
Anthony's disclosure of his 
I think I must have screamed 
mother's borderline status and because my father came in to the room 
also perhaps with Clara and he worked next door 
Caroline still in mind) I add, and he must have heard it and came running in 
"Since childhood? " Anthony's 
to see what the matter was 
response is immediate (right). 
at which the whole thing unravelled 
And again I feel discomfort that I but I was sent 
may be imposing a formula. But 
I remind myself that I am 
me and my brother were sent out so 
working iteratively, and I he and my mother could... 
progress to the next contributor whatever they did 
with a more relaxed curiosity and then nothing was ever talked about again 
about early history and these But I think that's been a really powerful 
experiences of ethical difficulty 
and resistance. 
Well of course it's a powerful experience 
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5.6 Roberta's story 
Roberta and I found ourselves at the same counselling-related event where she heard me 
refer to my research. She begins here by explaining how hearing me brought her to a new 
realisation about an experience she had undergone some years earlier. 
When you said the subject I suddenly thought, "Cor wow, I've got a story"! And I didn't 
even know I had that story until you said that. I'd forgotten it. It was as soon as you said 
counsellors who'd had some kind of ethical dilemma, which didn't feel right for them. 
realised, 'Gosh yeah! ' I realised how un-right it had felt for me. 
I realised at that stage just how compromised I had felt, and how I held that at the time. 
It was an awful decision to make but it didn't seem as big as it does now. With all my 
learning and all my... With the shift within me I realise just why it was so big I suppose. 
And I guess that was... I want to say the enormity of it. 
I am struck by similarities between what 
Roberta is telling (right) and what I heard 
from Caroline. There is something 
assumed and therefore obscured about the 
moral ethos of the organisation that 
makes resistance difficult. But Roberta is 
telling me that she did something that she 
felt was wrong. There had been some 
expectation within that culture that she 
had not been able to resist, and that, she 
now regrets. 
At the time, in the space I was in it was 
something that perhaps came up more 
often than I would have liked. Not to this 
extent but... it was part of the culture. 
Leaving that culture and now reflecting 
back, I can't believe I ever did it. It's one of 
those, "blimey moments". At the time, I 
didn't want to do it, but I did it. But now 
looking back, it's almost unbelievable that I 
could have done it. 
All of those who have contributed so far seem to have been in a position of some naivete at 
the time of the critical events, and are now reflecting with maturity and experience that 
was not previously available, as well as with hindsight. And from here Roberta begins 
setting the scene for the story that is to follow, the story of the one event that stood out 
from all of the other times when she had felt "compromised" but not "to this extent". And it 
seems that her holding dual-roles was part of the difficulty. 
And I had two roles... Because there was the counsellor side, which was confidential 
and there was also the welfare side of it. The side where if you were easing somebody 
back into work you dealt with personnel and then the managers and say, "yes they can 
deal with two days a week or whatever". 
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Roberta was employed, in these two roles, by a large statutory organisation. The incident 
that she narrates concerns her work with a professional, female employee who was having 
difficulty maintaining her 
role, because a key aspect of 
her work connected to her 
own painful personal 
experiences and difficulties. 
As Roberta explains (right) 
the work aggravated her 
problems. 
It seemed to Roberta that her 
client's manager was 
supportive in helping the 
client to get back to work and 
The wound was going to keep being rubbed 
The nature of this work was affecting her vicariously. 
The subject matter was such that the wound was going 
to keep being rubbed every time she went back to 
work. Because in her profession you didn't know what 
issues would come up that day, so there was always the 
potential that something would clash with the stuff she 
was trying to work through. 
And she would do well and then she would do not so 
well. 
that he was aware that she was undertaking "quite deep counselling" 
It was a horrible, horrible relationship to hold 
So that was the backdrop in which we were working and it was dysfunctional to some 
extent because you had to hold that boundary. You had to hold the boundary with the 
manager and he would ring me and say, " Are you seeing her today because she hasn't 
turned up again? " 
So there was all of that going on 
And always me trying to be transparent, but always me trying to be on her pathway 
I would be in the conversation with somebody and then I would have to make sure I told 
her about it 
it was a horrible, horrible relationship to hold. But I was used to holding triads 
It was part and parcel of the job 
When Roberta moves into telling the specific, or in her words, 'particular' story of her 
ethical difficulty there seem to be some false starts as she realises a need to add in 
additional contextual information. But as she works her way through this I am caught by 
her skill in telling the story as she alternates powerful examples of dialogue with 
reflections on her own process as well as contextualising asides. This is her'particular' 
story: 
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I'm not doing your dirty work for you 
The particular thing where I had the real dilemma was... Personnel rang me to say... in 
the meantime she had been going to various disciplinary meetings to do with her 
absence... So alongside it, they're looking at disciplining her for inefficiency because 
she was unable to carry out her work. So that was all running alongside. 
So one particular day, there was a guy in personnel. He telephoned me to say that they 
had made a decision that this particular client was going to be sacked. And when was 
seeing her? Implying that I'm the person that tells her she was going to be sacked. 
So I said to him, 
"There's no way, no way I am giving her that news. That's not my role. I'm a 
counsellor. I'm supposed to be alongside her. That would feel completely wrong. 
You must speak to her before my appointment on (say) Wednesday. " 
(I can't remember the day but it was like a couple of days in advance of when I was 
going to see her) 
I said, 
"You have to see her about that information. You have to tell her. And you have 
to give her the opportunity to come into counselling to process that and talk 
about that. " 
So I said, 
"I'm not doing your dirty work for you. You'll have to do that. " 
So he said, 
"Okay, we'll meet and her manager will tell her that and we'll see if she chooses 
to come for counselling. " 
(Because this is workplace counselling you know. It's not like a private counsellor 
who's got no connection to the work. She knows I'm in conversation with these 
people). 
So that was how it was left, with the assurance that they would definitely speak with 
her. They would talk with her. They would tell her that they were going to sack her, for 
inefficiency. 
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Congruence, or transparency, is a valued counsellor quality for many practitioners, and 
particularly for those identifying with the 'person-centred' movement. Here it is identified 
as one of three'core conditions', without which, it is argued, there can be no effective or 
ethical therapeutic relationship. Counsellor self-disclosure is criticized by some schools of 
therapy but within the person-centred tradition it is maintained that, on occasions, it 
provides a helpful extension of congruence. In Roberta's early work with this client she 
explains that there were such instances, and that consequently, trust and trustworthiness 
(Bond, 2004a, 2004b, 2006) were especially important in this therapeutic relationship. In 
her words, "The whole relationship was built on the fact that there was the need for me to be 
very transparent, right at the beginning, so it was built on that, it developed from that". And, 
of course this was in the context of her having to hold that "horrible, horrible" dual role 
(see above). 
And so the background is laid out for the forthcoming counselling appointment. 
They haven't told her she's going to be sacked 
So anyway along came ten o'clock on the day. In she walks, sits down. 
"How you doing? " 
"Oh really well. I'm in a really good place. I have managed to go back to work for 
two days this week. " 
She's really positive and I'm sat there thinking, 
Oh my God, they haven't told her. 
They haven't told her she's going to be sacked. 
And I have got to sit here and do what? 
I just remember sitting there at the time thinking, 
This is really not where I want to be 
This is not transparent 
This is not congruent 
It went against every ethical, moral ethical thing. Whether or not it was a judgement 
that I should tell or shouldn't tell, it didn't seem to matter. Sat in [that] place with my 
client and... I had knowledge that was going to change her. Her outlook, everything 
about her was going to change, once I said the words: 
"I've heard you're going to get sacked". 
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As Roberta recollects her experience of that meeting she conveys a vivid sense of being out 
of her depth, of (in the moment) not knowing the best course of action to take. She is a 
counsellor in-training, a novice (like Clara, Maira, Caroline and Anthony). She desires a 
clear solution, but there is no non-aporetic code (Bauman, 1993). 
There was nothing I could do at that point to save it 
At the time I didn't know what to do 
I was completely in a place where I didn't know what to do 
She carried on 
She carried on talking 
And in the moment I was trying to make a decision whether I'm the one to tell her that 
she was going to get the sack 
And I didn't want to be the one. It wasn't right. It wasn't my place. 
I should have been alongside her, not against her. 
So I made a decision to say: 
This isn't how I've heard it... And I really encourage you to go back to your 
manager and talk to him about this... I think it's important that you do... 
And of course straightaway she's like, 
"Well what do you know that I don't know? " 
So it all got horribly mixed up. And it was awful. 
And sitting here now I honestly can't remember if I actually said the words: 
"They are going to sack you. " 
But she got the gist of what I was saying. She picked up that I was privy to information 
that she wasn't. 
It had gone wrong. I knew there and then that there was nothing I could do at that 
point, to save it. 
Knowing and not-knowing collide in Roberta's awareness 
Knowing that transparency is vital to this relationship, and therefore she should tell 
Knowing that boundaries are difficult in this relationship, and therefore she should not 
There is confusion and contradiction and no ready rational solution 
And the relating stops, relationship breaks down 
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Roberta now evocatively takes us into that lived experience where the relationship that 
had been so trusted falls into a void of silence. 
It was in the silence that the destruction happened 
It was in the silence that the destruction happened 
And I can almost feel that silence between us 
When I had to make a decision of whether I should tell her 
And it was then that the destruction happened 
That kind of horrible manipulative, leaving the silence for her to fill in the gaps 
With her going, 
"What do you mean by that? What do you know that I don't know? 
"Well I can't possibly say. " 
Whereas I did know they were going to sack her, I knew that 
it was fundamental to my whole belief system that I told her the truth 
And I didn't 
And that feels wrong 
In Roberta's apparent shock at the situation she finds herself in, and perhaps more 
pertinently, in her shock at her own actions, she portrays something like a breakdown of 
her ethical or moral identity. And her words "I became part of the system" (below right) are 
very reminiscent of Caroline's phrase, "I felt like I was the organisation" 
Uncompromising in her self- 
condemnation and self-parody 
Portraying her actions as manipulative 
Mimicking herself as replying, "Well 
can't possibly say" 
When it is clear that these would not 
have been her words 
She becomes her own accuser 
Offering no justification 
For her betrayal of her own beliefs 
I became part of the system 
I became part of the system 
And she was angry at the system 
She was incensed 
She was angry at me 
She couldn't believe I hadn't told her 
She thought I was in collusion with them 
And never came back, obviously 
It just went horribly wrong 
And I was left thinking of all the things 
I could have done 
That I didn't do 
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Me being part of this terrible system 
I was cross with personnel 
He said that he had intended... he had told the manager and the manager had gone off 
and hadn't got to her before Wednesday 
A hundred and fifty reasons why they hadn't done it 
They had no understanding of the relationship that I had built up with this client: 
Safe and secure, where she told me of these things 
To actually end up with me being part of this terrible system 
Colluding! 
She was being sacked 
And she was going to appeal 
And I became part of the appeal system 
And it just went horribly wrong 
Roberta is sprung into a situation that left her with little moral agency yet with a sense of 
responsibility that she still feels to this day. She still asks what else she might have done. 
What else might I have done? 
And now looking back I realise that it was fundamental to my whole belief system that I 
told her the truth 
And I didn't 
And that feels wrong 
(What else might I have done? ) 
And I have thought about this many times because 
I've never finished with this client 
And they have left 
It's ended 
She's left the organisation 
I've left the organisation 
That connection has completely gone 
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Even when Roberta reflects on her lack of training and experience at the time of the 
incident, she refuses to excuse her failure to be 'transparent' with her client. Again I am 
reminded of Bauman's (1994) definition of a moral person as someone who is always 
dissatisfied with their moral performance. 
Me as a human being with another human being 
And she uses relational 
criteria to explain what By the time I met her I guess I was new to [counselling] 
she sees as her failure, I was only going through my diploma 
combining a So yes, very new to all of this 
recognition of the 
I still don't go away from the fact that 
impact of proximity 
with the other that is 
I hold a real strong feeling, 
closer to Levinas (1974, As a counsellor 
1991) with sense of As a welfare officer 
duty to the other that is As a human being 
reminiscent of Buber's 
1: thou relationship. 
I should not have 
not been transparent 
But Roberta's concern 
There's something about me as a human being 
to honour her 
relationship with her 
With another human being 
client contrasts starkly Feeling her pain 
with the apparent 
failure of the organisation to honour a 
relationship with the counsellors who are 
"out on a limb" (below right). And also what 
may be seen as a failure of other counsellors 
to honour their relationship with Roberta 
when she expressed a desire to challenge 
Out on a limb 
And you are just a little tiny bit 
That they don't want to look at 
Or make a fuss about 
So it's that feeling of being out on a limb 
organisational practices (below). 
They used to say to me, 
"It's not just your job that would be 
affected it would be ours as well" 
And so it went on and on 
In a big organisation 
But out on a limb 
Not actually integrated 
Just out on a limb 
Yeah 
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And as Roberta recounts her decision to leave the organisation she seems to be 
positioning herself within a somewhat postmodern discourse. It is the certainty and the 
simple truth claims that seem to be unacceptable to her. She is aware of complexity and 
the existence of competing worldviews that are (perhaps) not recognised by her 
management, and are certainly not allowed expression. Roberta wants personal moral 
responsibility and again this has appeared to be proscribed by a modern bureaucratic 
organisation. 
I could not work within this organisation any longer 
I began to realise that I could not work within this organisation any longer 
And this was part of it: 
They had the truth 
And they passed the truth on to their staff 
And their staff had to comply 
And blah, blah, blah 
And they weren't prepared to look outside of their circle at all 
And I realised that I couldn't stay in an organisation that held those beliefs 
And left 
[This] was my career from when I was a teenager 
As soon as I left school I went straight into that organisation 
So that was a big, big job to leave 
But actually the day I phoned to say I was resigning I felt nothing 
But that I was doing exactly the right thing and I never ever have looked back 
Roberta lets us know that this marks a profound change for her. This had been her sole 
place of employment. She had belonged here and so, surely, the identity change that 
enabled her to now leave, without ever looking back, must have been profound. 
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As Roberta expresses her sense of being violated and tells me about her decision to leave, I 
wonder about her colleagues who remained in that organisation, the ones who had been 
concerned that their jobs might be affected by Roberta's objections to the organisational 
values. Aware of the significance of isolation for all of the contributors to this research, I 
enquire about how Roberta had differed from the others in finding the situation 
intolerable. 
Roberta: I was finding it more and more difficult being violated every day 
Nell: And it was harder for you than it was for others? 
Roberta: No I think they all suffered in different ways. Two went off sick, one left 
and got really rubbish jobs and the other two just completely suffered in 
silence. So I think we all did it in different ways 
Nell: And your way was to speak? 
Roberta: Well no it wasn't because I didn't speak out, I left 
My way was to leave. And then send a letter, speaking out (laughter) 
After i left, saying how violated I had felt and that I really encourage 
them to start looking at how dysfunctional their system was 
I didn't get a reply 
Roberta argues that her way was not to speak. But this is more complex than she allows at 
that point. Her silence was for her colleagues; it was not a choice made out of personal 
preference but rather was another choice made from relational values. 
They were frightened of me speaking out and I made a choice that I wouldn't make a 
fuss because I knew it would affect their jobs. And I actually had to make a conscious 
decision not to speak out and hence I left. 
I think again of Hirschman's choice of'voice or exit', and my thinking (Chapter Three) that, 
out of those two it is voice that is relational. But Roberta had relinquished her'voice' for 
her colleagues, and so, in this respect her 'exit' had been relational. Another binary 
division crumbles. But Roberta also shows that lack of voice, silence, can feel destructive. 
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Roberta now also makes connections between her experiences of this ethical crisis and her 
early childhood experience. Silence is a core construct for her in making sense of both. 
Silence -a massive parallel 
Silence was so destructive in my own life 
And the breaking of that silence, in respect of a family secret was so healing 
And I knew that on a body level, on a tacit level 
I knew that I held that value really strongly. 
Because I knew how it felt not to talk about something 
not to be honest and open and transparent 
But at the time I was just aware of: 
"You can't make me do this 
You can't make me tell this person, give this person such bad news" 
Which (funnily enough) is exactly the motive for the silence in our family 
I can't hurt this person by telling them the truth so I won't say anything 
My God, I'd never put those two together 
That's what it is 
A massive parallel 
Roberta presents the lessons she learned in her family of origin as becoming taken-for- 
granted practices. What 
The silences and the abuses and the judgements 'was [her] life' at that 
These things are not in isolation time continues 
into her 
career without 
The silences and the abuses and the judgements 
awareness until she 
And the, 'do as I say not as I do' finds a way to 'look 
All of that outside, to find an 
That was my... That was my life alternative discourse. 
It's only when I started to look outside of that It seems that she now 
And think, actually I'm not sure if that was quite right 
finds the experiences of 
And maybe it took a while to filter down before I realised 
that time, silence and 
isolation, particularly 
My career was also part of that 
unacceptable. 
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Her concern for the isolated individual is evident as she gives a codicil to her main 
narrative: 
You're the dysfunctional one 
I remember once in a meeting trying to bring something up about a suicide and one 
of the top people saying, 
"Yes but that's just one person. We can't judge everything on one person, " 
"But that person is dead you know. That person has actually taken their life 
because of it. What do you mean it's just one person? " 
It was that sense of, unless sixty people committed suicide, or a hundred and fifty 
people committed suicide, when would there be enough people for them to realise 
it, to think outside of the box? 
It was that sense of, okay; I was only one out of six children but because the other 
five weren't saying anything what did it matter if I was saying something? 
Not saying anything because knowing that unless everyone said it, it wasn't really 
gonna make a matter. I spoke out and broke my silence but it didn't really matter 
because the other five were okay with it. 
And so, 
"Why are you bothering about it? " 
And that's what this culture was. Me on my own as a staff counsellor was so not 
going to make a difference. So I guess there's that connection which I've made 
today through this conversation. 
That was what was happening with all of these individual people that came to 
counselling they were all ones on their own. 
You're the dysfunctional one. And that's how I came away from this ethical 
situation. I was the one in the wrong. 
And in this, a distinction between utilitarian and deontological ethics again becomes 
apparent. And when there is a clash of moral values, denigration of identity becomes a 
weapon of choice. Roberta's summary of her positioning as: You're the dysfunctional one is 
particularly reminiscent of Anthony being told, "You're the one that's fucked up". 
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5.7 Richard's story 
From the first minutes of my conversation with Richard there seemed to be a stark 
contrast between his story and those of the other contributors. Whereas all of the others 
had reported incidents and experiences that had occurred when they were relative 
novices, Richard's entrance talk was marked by references to substantial experience. And, 
perhaps more to the point, he had been able to build up eighteen years of solid experience 
with no problematic challenge to his ethical integrity as a counsellor. But that had been in 
the voluntary sector. He then moved into an organisational setting as head of a workplace 
counselling service for a police force. 
27 years ago I started as a counsellor. I was selected by a large counselling 
organisation and enrolled with them as a counsellor. And I stayed with them for 
about i8 years. And over the time that I was with them I can't say that I ever had any 
difficulty with confidentiality or the ethics of counselling. 
And in all the years that I worked with that organisation I can't say that 
confidentiality, the relationship, my relationship with my clients was ever intruded 
into. So working, if I can put it this way, in the voluntary sector, confidentiality has 
never ever been an issue. 
I then started work in the workplace in providing a counselling service in a 
workplace. 
Richard considers himself fortunate in that he was able to build up a new department. He 
also believes it was "quite critical" that he was given a clear job description that spelled 
out the requirement to provide a confidential counselling service. The only qualification to 
the confidentiality was that he was required to inform the force if anybody admitted that 
they had committed a criminal offence. Despite this he experienced sustained pressure to 
make client information available to senior officers. But he was always able to resist. 
Senior managers would try and get information from us 
And I think sort of over the sort of ii years or so it became very widely known that: 
Sometimes first-line managers, senior managers would try and get information from us 
Sometimes quite genuinely wanting to help the individual 
Sometimes it was because of disciplinary matters and sometimes it was litigation 
And after "about five or six years" it became widely known that the counsellors would not 
disclose to supervisors or managers without the consent of clients. 
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A general climate of rumour and gossip within the organisation was also a potential threat 
to confidentiality, and to the perception of confidentiality by the employees (below). 
Rumours went round the force 
There was nothing secure in this police force, even at a more senior level 
It was amazing the way things got on to the grapevine and were circulated 
The provision of a "comprehensive post-traumatic stress programme" presented some 
additional challenges to the management of confidentiality for Richard's service. There 
were two aspects to this. Firstly, the potentially traumatising incidents were often 
experienced by a number of staff, and so group diffusing and debriefing was offered. This 
meant that some confidential information was already shared. Secondly, some of the 
incidents were in the public domain through media coverage. 
For Richard this meant that the 
holding of confidentiality was 
especially important in the 
service. And he explains this in 
terms of trust and relationship 
(right), again reflecting Bond's 
concern for an ethic of trust, as 
well as the relational ethics of 
Buber (1958), Levinas (1974)and 
Bauman (1993,1994). 
Relationship of almost total trust 
It was all about trust 
It was all about the relationship 
And the openness of the relationship between 
counsellor and client 
The relationship that was built up between us was 
one of almost total trust 
But this concern for confidentiality is not expressed solely in ethical terms. Richard is also 
motivated by practical matters (below). Yet this aspiration to deliver an effective service 
an also be seen an ethical issue. 
Not only from an ethical point of view from a practical reputation point of view of 
what we were trying to deliver 
In any case, Richard has now effectively set out a set of circumstances where 
confidentiality is essential for the good functioning of the service, and yet where this is 
being challenged from all quarters, including some very powerful ones. 
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And from here Richard immediately begins to tell me of the one specific instance where he 
experienced exceptionally forceful challenges to his holding of client confidentiality. 
I have returned to a stanza-form presentation here because this seemed to effectively 
replicate the thoughtful and measured manner of Richard's expression at this time. Again 
each line break denotes a 
A woman who had been quite substantially 
pause or breath. 
sexually harassed 
I can recall a woman 
There are obvious reminders 
of Clara's narrative in that 
who had been quite substantially 
there is coercion from a 
sexually harassed police force to gain access to 
client notes. 
And she came to see me as a client There are also differences: 
And she eventually went to industrial tribunal - This is an internal matter; 
complainant, defendant 
And the force solicitor and counsellor are all 
And various other people 
employees of this force. 
wanted to have access - The client has explicitly 
to our counselling notes 
expressed her wish that 
the notes are not made 
available. 
And I refused 
There is no suggestion 
that disclosure is in the 
And I was aware of the BACP guidelines interests of the client. 
quite obviously 
In fact there seems to be 
on confidentiality and 
a blatant effort to 
things like this undermine the client. 
and had been talking to this particular client 
This intention becomes more 
apparent as Richard 
The solicitor wanted her notes continues his thoughtful, 
and the client didn't want the solicitor to see them steady account below. 
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They were trying to negate her claim by saying that she was possibly, 
probably promiscuous 
I was under an awful lot of pressure from 
our legal department 
and our discipline department 
from the 
senior officers who 




what had taken place 
within 
the counselling sessions 
particularly information about 
her past relationships 
her past boyfriends and 
the nature of those relationships 
because I think they were trying to 
negate her claim 
by saying that she was 
possibly probably promiscuous 
fairly sexually liberated 
and that 
the harassment 
the sexual harassment 
against her 
had to be seen in that 
background 
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It is now made clear to Richard that the interests of the organisation, 'the force' are 
paramount. And yet again there seems to be a clash of the counsellor's deontological ethics 
with the more utilitarian concerns of the organisation. 
The force is clearly considered to be more important than the individual, and is also more 
important than the counselling service, as Richard has already made clear that this would 
not be sustainable if it were not confidential. 
And the concern to protect the interests of the 'force', particularly from bad publicity, 
becomes ever more apparent as the pressure on Richard increases. 
I am ordering you to give me the client notes 
As the days coming up to tribunal were getting nearer and nearer someone got on 
the phone who was more senior than me and said, 
"tam ordering you to give me the client notes" 
And I said, 
"No you're not going to have them. " 
"You're now disobeying an order and there's a formal discipline structure 
within the organisation. " 
And I could have been disciplined for refusing to obey a lawful order. Without being 
too dramatic about it I could have been sacked or reduced or fined or whatever. 
And then I had the solicitor ring me up and say, 
"We want... " 
And I said, 
"Well, you can't have. " 
"Well it's important because we believe that this would help the force. " 
So it's now my loyalty to the force because it would have made awful headlines. 
Throughout this narrative, Richard never becomes involved in making judgements about 
what these other people ought to do. He simply remains steadfast about what he will or 
(more to the point) will not do. He will not give anyone access to the client notes, even 
when his identity as a loyal member of the force is questioned. 
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Intimidation, bullying, emotional blackmail 
It was 
A type of intimidation 
it was bullying 
There was emotional blackmail 
Going on against it 
There was 
There was a concerted 
Attack 
To try and get this information 
They could not bully us 
They could not intimidate us 
They could not cajole us 
don't want to sound arrogant 
But I wouldn't be bullied 
I can't be bullied 
And right was on my side so 
Now, having established the extent of the pressure on 
him, Richard begins to use a more declamatory style: 
"they could not bully us, they could not intimidate us, they 
could not cajole us; I wouldn't be bullied, I can't be bullied". 
This is so effective that I still feel the desire to punch 
the air and shout, 'Yes! ' when I read it. 
But the intimidation continues. 
I sit in a small room 
With this substantial man 
Substantial in many ways 
(I think to myself) 
A man's man 
(I think, with admiration) 
Showing my own 
Susceptibility 
To misogynist discourses 
Where the highest acclaim 
Excludes female evaluation 
And I hear of efforts to 
Bully him 
And intimidate him 
(And I think) 
If this is done to him 
What help for 
The rest of us 
What help for the woman 
Sexually harassed 
Her moral repute now 
Targeted 
But Richard defies the 
Identity I impose 
Refusing to breach 
This woman's trust 
He is very much 
A woman's man 
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We are ordering you... We can force you... 
There was the internal discipline: 
"We are ordering you. We can tell you what to do because we pay your salary. " 
And I said: 
"Well yes you do pay my salary but I've actually got a contract, which says that 
give a confidential counselling service and so there's nothing you can do about 
that. And I'm steeped in labour law. If you want to sack me then there's unlawful 
dismissal and all sorts of things. " 
So I was able to robustly defend myself. Plus the fact, as I've said already, I knew I was 
right 
Then there was the legal part of it and my loyalty to the force: 
"You've got to disclose. We can force you to disclose. " 
And I said: 
"No you can't force me. The only way that you can actually do this is to get a 
subpoena issued against me to appear in front of the tribunal. if you do that I will 
attend. " 
We now begin to see the why Richard found his job description, including the requirement 
to provide confidentiality, to be such a benefit. As (Bond, 2005) points out (see again 
Chapter Three) clear codes and documentation can be used to provide individual 
counsellors protection from interference by employers. 
Richard's experience is also reminiscent of incidents related by both Caroline and Roberta. 
The power of the organisational ethos is evident in each and boundaries are hard to hold. 
Organisations do this 
But organisations do this 
it really is one of the great difficulties of counselling in the 
workplace 
Treading this line between being known within the workplace 
being valued within the workplace 
yet on the other hand also having a whole host of information 
which the workplace really would like 
Richard conveys some 
of the difficulties this 
raises (left). He wanted 
to be valued by the 
organisation and 
realised that this was at 
risk. 
But this was not his 
greatest anxiety in this 
job. Ile contrasts the relative ease with which he managed this situation with the anguish 
he experienced when clients expressed suicidal thoughts (over). And here his story 
connects with that of Anthony, including the sense of isolation, and an attempt to obtain 
support from the BACP who he tells me were, "most unhelpful, disappointingly so". 
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Dealing with clients who were threatening to kill themselves: A 
very, very lonely place to be 
Whilst I've talked about this tribunal thing 
That was easier to manage even though there was pressure 
But when there is the threat of someone taking their own life and 
They have actually talked about how they're going to do it 
Alarm bells are ringing 
And there was one guy said: 
Well I'm going to get a shotgun 
And he actually got a shotgun 
That caused me more 
sleepless nights than anything else 
because there is part of me which 
is in a constant conflict between 
the idea that someone 
does have the right 
to take charge of their own life 
and the other part of me about 
I've got to do everything I can 
to prevent someone taking their own life 
In this process of talking to you 
I really do believe the 
most anxious personal time for me was 
dealing with clients 
who were threatening to kill themselves 
particularly when they were 
climbing up the scale of risk 
into high risk 
and that sometimes was 
A very, very lonely place to be 
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The contrast that Richard makes between the two types of incident (being pressured to 
disclose and dealing with clients who are threatening suicide) gets my attention. And I try 
(clumsily) to ask him about this difference. Is there something in his personal history that 
would shed light on how one was so easy and the other was so difficult? And it seems a 
question that Richard himself has been interested in, that he has asked himself. 
There was something about self belief With this question in mind 
From time to time I've asked myself the question 
and it's very difficult to 
put this into a context really 
My background is very much a working class 
background 
My parents were Welsh Baptists 
And I was the youngest 
of four surviving children 
Chapel twice a day on Sunday 
for all the time that I can remember 
My mother was 
the head of the household 
She was the dominant character 
She was the matriarch 
She was I understand a very handsome 
well-dressed woman 
almost out of proportion to the income 
the working class income that my parents had 
But there was something about self belief 
Richard begins to muse upon 
his family history. 
Particularly on the religious, 
or spiritual aspects of this, 
and on his sense of his 
mother. 
Richard's memories of his 
Welsh Baptist background 
have some resonance with 
my own memories of my 
childhood in the Brethren 
Assembly. 
Certainly chapel twice on 
Sunday is familiar 
(I wonder if he had bible 
study on Wednesday too) 
Strong mother, a 
matriarch. 
Now there's a difference 
This "something about self-belief , that Richard refers to makes sense of what I have heard 
him say above, and how I have heard him say it, especially those phrases that had 
enthused me: "they could not bully us, they could not intimidate us, they could not cajole us; I 
wouldn't be bullied, I can't be bullied" I wonder about self-belief and agency. 
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Richard takes this theme further, 
asking himself where the self- 
belief comes from. And again he 
makes a connection to childhood, 
and particularly to his religious 
upbringing, which he says left 
him with a valuing of what is 
I trace it back to my childhood 
I sometimes ask myself 
Where did this belief... 
What was this belief... 
And I trace it back to, quite obviously 
right and a willingness to work, 
My childhood 
argue and fight for what he And I suppose what I' 
believes to be right. 
A sense of rig 
If he is confident that something 
I'm not a religious pei 
is wrong he has no doubts about in fact I would claim I 
argue and fight for what he And I suppose what I've been left with is 
believes to be right. A sense of right or wrong 
If he is confident that something 
I'm not a religious person 
the rightfulness (righteousness? ) 
of his resistance. 
And although he recognises that 
these values stemmed from his 
mother's religion, he now 
separates them from the religion 
itself. He has maintained the 
values but not the religion. He 
has (agentically? ) selected which 
discourses, or aspects of the 
discourses are acceptable or 
useful and which are not. 
in fact I would claim I'm an atheist 
But I do believe that the Christian morality 
has well and truly been 
stuck within me 
And I have this sense of 
What is right 
and working, arguing, fighting for 
What I believe is right 
So therefore there has 
never been a problem 
Finding the correct, or best response when faced with clients who express suicidal 
thoughts is less straightforward, less an issue of right and wrong. It leaves us with 
uncertainty and ambiguity, not confidence. 
We particularly have to navigate between principles of autonomy and care, but both of 
these are deontological, both are focussed on the well-being of the person. We do not 
usually find ourselves caught between the interests of the person and those of the 
organisation. 
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In his reflections on his work with suicidal clients Richard has begun to offer a more 
complex view of himself and his identity than was initially apparent in his expression of 
strong ethical convictions and apparent self-assurance. 
A fairly average, bog-standard counsellor who 
He now continues to 
believes passionately in my relationship with my express what I experienced 
client as something less assured, 
more diffident, yet with no 
I'm a fairly competent counsellor 
sense of phoney humility. 
there are other people 
His identity claim is to be: 
I've seen other counsellors 
- Fairly competent 
who are probably better - Fairly average 
more sensitive - Bog-standard 
more able But he recognises 
more knowledgeable counsellors than I am something of considerable 
quicker and all the rest of it 
value in what he offers to 
clients: a passionate belief 
So I've got no illusions that in his relationship with his 
I'm the best counsellor that's ever client which starts with 
been created confidentiality (left). 
I am a We thus return to the 
fairly average bog-standard counsellor values of relationship and 
but who believes 
trustworthiness. 
passionately 
But we also need to 
maintain these values in my relationship with my client and 
under pressure. Richard 
what I actually bring to them listed his clear job 
and it's got to start description and his years 
it's got to start with of experience as being 
the confidentiality of my relationship 
invaluable in this, as well 
as his self-belief which he 
and therefore 
traced back to his strong 
I haven't lost any sleep really Welsh Baptist matriarch of 
over that a mother. 
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5.8 Preparing for a new harvest 
These stories have accompanied my life for some considerable time now, since I first 
heard them in vivo, and then re-heard the recordings, and spoke them into the voice 
recognition equipment, and read and corrected the transcripts, and discussed with the 
narrators what should be retained and what should be weeded out, and worked, and re- 
worked the re-presentation, and presented them at conferences and seminars and then 
completed the final presentations for this thesis. 
These are rich and resonant accounts of really difficult experiences. I have been deeply 
moved, not only by the qualities of the experiences themselves, but above all by the 
manner of the telling, by the evocative and metaphorical language, by the "talk that sings" 
(Bird, 2004), by the ways that these people took me into their world; showing and not 
telling. This has allowed me to access their stories in ways that wouldn't otherwise have 
been possible. It has been an invaluable aid to my empathy; almost grabbing me by the 
collar and making me listen, malting me understand. And I hope it will also be an aid to the 
empathy of readers. 
But the narrative practices that I have been exposed to during the period of this research 
have also enabled me to connect with the stories of the contributors in ways that I would 
not have previously been able to do whilst I was stuck in the bracketing off traditions. 
I have made a commitment to the narrative practices of opening to my own embodied 
responses, opening to what was evoked for me from my own life, opening to my 
resonances with each storyteller, and I have tried to situate my reactions and responses 
within my own lived experience, my own narratives (Parry and Doan, 1994). 1 have thus 
been re-living some of my history whilst I have been living the histories of Clara, Maira, 
Caroline, Anthony, Roberta and Richard. 
Silence, silencing and consequent isolation now shout out from each of the stories and 
cannot be ignored. They do not constitute a modernist theme in this context, but rather a 
commonality of experiencing, a connection between the contributors; threats to trusting 
and trustworthy relationships and again isolation, likewise. And there are the un-chosen 
positions of not knowing, innocence, inexperience, and again isolation. And then there is 
the personal history and the sapling identities whose roots are traced back to the darkness 
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of earth-buried childhood memories. Somehow we have been given access to each of 
these, and to their entanglement with the thorniest of ethical dilemmas and challenges. 
But repeated failure to show and not tell has been a theme of my own life. I have tried 
repeatedly and unsuccessfully to give access to the more difficult aspects of my history, 
including my moral history; and this has led to an incessant, gnawing isolation. But now I 
have learned something of artful telling and my life-stories have been sprouting in 
unexpected ways and in unexpected places. Many of these stories feel resonant with and 
relevant to this research, but deciding whether I should include them here is a thorny 
problem, which will take some considerable reflection and deliberation. Chapter Six will 
take up these concerns. 
159 
Chapter Six 
Common Ground: Co-construction and shared experiences 
6.1 Bad apples or bad barrels: Attributions and conflation 
Some years ago I worked in a counselling service where many of the clients had suffered 
childhood sexual abuse or sexual violence in adulthood, and many of the staff had similar 
histories. Demand for counselling was high and so there was a waiting list. When a 
counsellor was able to take on a new client they usually took the person from the top of 
the list, the person who had been waiting the longest. They would then be given brief 
referral information for that client. 
This system was challenged on one occasion when a counsellor read on the referral 
information that the client who was next on the list had been seriously sexually abused in 
childhood. This counsellor, exhausted from working with clients who were badly affected 
by their experiences, turned to the counselling team saying, "Can't I just have a common- 
or-garden rape victim and not another weird fucker? " This expression clearly resonated 
with the feelings of others in the team who subsequently referred to victims of childhood 
abuse as 'weird fuckers'. The counsellors' use of this term was not meant to criticise or 
blame, but reflected a gallows humour (Moran, 1998; Moran and Hughes, 2006; Moran 
and Massam, 1997; Rosenberg, 1991) which apparently helped them to cope with the 
demands of the work, and indeed it is sometimes understood to be a sign of carer burnout 
(Moran and Massam, 1997). But it was quite difficult for some of us; especially those who 
had ourselves experienced childhood abuse and as such were likewise ascribed as'weird 
fuckers', though this was never said. 
These incidents came to mind when I was re-reading the transcribed conversations for 
this research, but it was Anthony's narrative that particularly alerted me to the issues. 
When I read through this I felt unsettled about how I might present his more bizarre and 
abusive experiences: 
- She said, "it gets very sexy in the room. It feels really warm and exciting when 
somebody is seriously engaged with their own desire to kill themselves. " 
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And the supervisor said, "Well I wonder what it would be like if you started to 
talk to her about her breasts. " 
- It comes from, I believe, the incident when I was eight when I walked into the 
room to find my mother deep kissing my brother who was a few years older. And 
in fact she came at me. 
I was concerned, not only about how Anthony's story might be read, but also about how 
Anthony himself might be read. Other contributors similarly revealed aspects of 
experience and identity that might be seen to invite the 'weird fucker' label, by any readers 
willing to make such attributions, simply by their association with the bizarre behaviour of 
others. And all had told (explicitly or implicitly) of repeating patterns of experience which 
traced back to childhood, including some considerable victimisation. 
This 'weird fucker' attribution speaks to the extensive effects of such abuse on the victim, 
easing the process of conflating person and problem. It is not just their experience that is 
now considered 'weird' but the person themselves. Negative attributions are especially 
likely when the person has experienced repeated abuse and victimisation. As Oscar Wilde 
(1895) tells us via his character Lady Bracknell, "To lose one parent ... may be regarded as 
a misfortune; to lose both seems like carelessness. " And in psychodynamic theory the 
concept of 'compulsion to repeat' disturbing experiences until the person is able to 
integrate the traumatic material (Freud, 1920; van der Kolk, 1989) also amounts to an 
individualising thesis, which is taken up and repositioned by some transpersonal / New 
Age writers. As Edwards (1993: 104) tells: "If we learn the lesson and act upon it, the 
situation will change. If we haven't learnt the lesson, or haven't learnt the right lesson, the 
situation will repeat itself in differing scenarios until we do. " Thus people who have failed 
to learn lessons can be identified by the repetition of unpleasant experiences in their lives. 
And again I am reminded of White's (2002: 35) statement that opportunities to fail to be 
an adequate person have never before been so 'freely available', nor so 'willingly and 
routinely dispensed'. 
A more interpersonal understanding is offered by criminologists (e. g. Pease, 1998; Tseloni 
and Pease, 2003) who suggest that offenders choose particular victims because of many 
attributes, including situational factors as well the victim's personal vulnerability. But 
attribution theory tells us that such situational factors are unlikely to influence audience' 
judgements. I, however, was not able to distance myself from Anthony's repeated bizarre 
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experiences; my own life stories were full of similar episodes and I knew that others must 
have had those same reactions to me telling my stories. When we tell about the odd things 
that happen to us it makes us seem odd. And the stranger our experiences are the stranger 
we are perceived to be. The fault is seen as being located in the one who is treated 
differently, rather than the one who gives that different treatment. As Anthony rhetorically 
asked: 
Who's the crazy one? And who's going to believe who? Again is that my 
paranoia? My sense is he also doesn't believe me... because it is such a 
bizarre story. 
Roberta likewise argued: 
It was about the system, and how crap their system was, but they kept 
thinking it was about me. 
Throughout this work I had been eager to avoid the position of 'detached researcher', but 
my developing perception that contributors' experiences mirrored mine in a number of 
ways troubled this commitment. My connections were stronger and more complex than I 
had realised. I knew that my own life stories could illuminate the research topic. But I had 
to give careful consideration to a) which aspects of my experience I should share with the 
contributors, and b) which aspects of my experience I should include in the thesis. 
I will present my consideration of both of these decisions in turn. 
6.2 Decisions to cross fertilise: limits of self-disclosure to contributors 
Faced with similar decisions, Sparkes (1998b: 648-649) decided that "As an active 
listener" he would share his experiences with participants when he "deemed it to be 
appropriate and when [he] was invited to do so". In practice this involved the "sharing of 
stories and insights into the lives of each other" which he felt reduced the distance 
between them, each becoming "more vulnerable to the other due to the insider knowledge 
that was gained, and this helped [them] to develop a trusting relationship that formed the 
basis of [their] collaboration. " There was some reassurance in Sparkes' positive outcome 
from sharing his stories; but my research topic, the nature of my stories and my 
therapeutic / professional obligations differ from his. I had to consider my situation on its 
own merits. 
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My personal connection to Anthony's experiences was particularly strong and this 
connection would need to be included in any explanation of self-disclosure. Thus, if I were 
to share any related life stories with anyone then I should start with him. But I was wary 
of imposing my story and my issues on him. I was back to the borderlands of 
counsellor/researcher (see Chapter Four). Many schools of counselling and psychotherapy 
frown upon therapist self-disclosure and researcher self-disclosure is also likely to bring 
admonition in many circles. In both person-centred counselling and narrative therapy 
however, self-disclosure is considered to be potentially helpful and hence not to be 
automatically avoided. The advice of Mearns and Thorne (1988) to express such feelings 
only when they are a) relevant to the person and b) either striking or persistent has 
consistently guided my practice, and I again turned to this in my research. I was also 
mindful that Anthony was not my client but had willingly volunteered to participate in 
these research conversations and had declared himself to be sufficiently robust at this 
time to take part Even so I felt the need to be very cautious. 
Anthony and I both seemed to have had repeated experiences of 'victim' status or identity, 
this was clearly a sensitive topic to raise. We also had a shared perception of having 
experienced 'crazy mothering' (again a risky subject) and there were some similarities in 
how we felt this pattern to be repeated in our counselling work environment. 
I also had to be mindful of the possibility that I had misunderstood his experiences. I may 
be assuming sharedness where none exists. I had certainly made one such error. Anthony 
had described feeling "locked in the room" with his supervisor and initially I took this 
metaphorical expression literally because an ex-supervisor of mine had literally locked me 
in her (isolated, rural) house with her. This had been a disturbing experience for me. Even 
when this supervisor eventually agreed to let me out she was too unbalanced and 
incoherent to be able to match key to door. It felt like a long time before I was able to 
persuade her to hand over the large bunch of keys and let me try. But despite these 
obvious differences Anthony's experience of feeling'locked in' with his supervisor still had 
significant resonance for me. 
After discussing these issues in my research supervision I decided to raise them with 
Anthony and ask If he was interested in taking them further. In an email to him I wrote: 
I have been reflecting on my own reactions and 
responses to this work in my supervision with Kim 
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Etherington. This has particularly focussed on some of 
my personal history and experiences that seem to relate 
to or resonate with yours. 
I wondered if it would be interesting and useful to you 
if we were to explore this further together. I think 
there are two possible aspects to this; one would 
involve me sharing my relevant history and experience 
with you, the other would involve me sharing my process 
and experience of hearing your story. Of course there 
would inevitably be overlap between these two aspects. 
We could then discuss if you would be comfortable 
having any of this included in the thesis and/or any 
publications. 
As usual, please feel free to ask any questions or 
raise any concerns. 
His reply was positive: 
Thank you so much for your offer and yes, I would like to 
accept. I feel that your insight and experience would help me 
understand this more fully. 
Please let me know how we can arrange this. 
Following this I gave Anthony a little more background information and sent him a sample 
of my auto ethnographic writing which seemed particularly relevant to his experiences 
(see Chapter Seven). The disclosure of this material now seemed less problematic, 
Anthony had given informed consent and, by having the material in a written form he was 
free to read it or dispense with it as he saw fit. Had I been present he may have felt obliged 
to respond in ways that were beneficial to me, but not to him. What seemed more difficult 
was whether I should express and explore my perception of us both having experiences of 
repeated victimhood and the implications of this for attributions of culpability, and our 
efforts to maintain ethical counselling. However, these decisions about how and how much 
to tell Anthony could not be made by me in advance and in isolation but were inevitably 
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made in the moment, in relationship with him. I experienced Anthony as being interested 
in talking-in-order-to-listen (Lyotard, 1979) and I wanted to trust that, but I also had to be 
aware of my responsibilities to him. 
I have selected a series of excerpts from our follow-up conversation to illustrate a) the 
nature of our worldng relationship and b) how these issues and decisions were played out. 
This begins with Anthony describing his experience of taking part in the research so far. 
He begins by depicting this as important, as therapeutic and as allowing him to integrate 
and contextualise his experiences, but (worryingly) it seems that this had not been an easy 
process for him. I have maintained line breaks for each breath in this, and I have presented 
my speech in bold so that the spotlight is on my process and efforts towards integrity in 
the relationship: 
The process has been very important for me 
It's been like another therapeutic revisiting and experiencing 
It's sort of going over an old road and seeing where the bumps are 
and having a chance to gently smooth them out by 
reliving those experiences 
and also to put that experience into a broader context 
What I tend to do with something as traumatic as 
those experiences were 
is to sort of compartmentalise 
So when it's brought up in discussion I get very 
angry or anxious or whatever 
but 
by revisiting it It somehow allows it to be more 
integrated so 
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that's how useful I felt it 
so there have been occasions when I have sort of felt 
sort of slightly angry or resistant about 
why am I allowing myself to do this 
and I think that's more about avoiding the feelings than anything else 
and generally knowing why I'm doing it 
and trusting that 
I began to feel some alarm at Anthony's experience of anger and resistance at letting 
himself take part in this research. I knew that he had been through some very trying times 
and was still dealing with other exceptionally difficult issues. I mentally reminded myself 
of my tendency to privilege the principle of autonomy over that of care. Was I getting the 
balance right here? Anthony had clearly stated that he knew why he was contributing and 
that he trusted that. My instinct was to respect this but also to check it out further and to 
try to give him the opportunity to explore the situation more closely and to enable him to 
express feelings that he may be protecting me from. I asked: 
But the anger and resistance, is there anything more you would like to say 
about that? Was anything particularly difficult? 




the re-meeting of similar patterns, behaviour, experiences 
This repetition (or re-meeting) of difficult experience was the exact issue that I had 
wanted to raise and I was relieved when Anthony got there first. I felt that it would be 
evasive of me not to say this, and so I took up the mantle: 
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Nell: That's actually one of the things I wanted to talk about. Is that a cue maybe? 
Shall I go with that now? 
Anthony: Of course 
Nell it's simply about when our experiences are repeated when we get ourselves 
into situations or find ourselves in situations of what might be called 
repeated victimisation when we become victims again and again 
Anthony: Okay 
Nell: In the same kind of way 
Anthony: Yes 
Nell: The sense that we make of that and others make of that 
My concern that this was a potentially sensitive issue was confirmed by Anthony's 
response, which was candid and immediate: 
Anthony: Well I can feel you know a sort ot 
tension as you... 
That really went quite deep when you said that because 
I think one of the things that I resent 
around the psychotherapeutic community 
Is that when others and 
particularly those in positions of power or responsibility 
observe a repeated pattern 
it's almost like 
It lets them off the hook 
and 1 feel blamed 
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I feel blamed again 
whether I'm actually blamed or not 
Isuppose 
my feeling is 
my God 
they can see that I've done this again 
this is my experience and therefore it's my 
fault 
Anthony had expressed my concerns cogently, but he did not know my position at this 
point. I am associated with the psychotherapeutic community that he has experienced as 
blaming and as attributing fault in the individual where painful experiences are repeated. 
But I do not want to jump in to defend myself, I want him to have space to clarify, and I 
want space for myself to check my understanding. 
Nell: something about 
this has happened tome again 
and therefore It must be to do with me? 
Anthony: Yes 
the common denominator is me and 
and maybe there is some synchronicity that I 
self select unconsciously 
people to work with that 
will evoke that 
with an idea that this is how we work 
you know how we keep repeating our patterns 
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to work through them 
and that makes sense to me in a way 
as much as I resist and resent it 
We both laugh at this gentle self-mockery but I notice that Anthony reiterates 'compulsion 
to repeat' discourses as truth (see above) and I take the opportunity to reiterate my 
constructivist position and to distance myself from such analytic or interpretive 
perspectives. I notice that I use inclusive language to express this and it enables an easy 
link to our shared experiences. 
Nell: Again, I'm not looking for 
a kind of analytic category 
I'm looking for the meaning that we make of It 
Anthony: Okay 
Nell: And as I said In the e-malls 
part of the reason that I'm interested in this is that 
It's also about my own experience 
ot finding myself In 
a similar situation again and again 
so there's the repetition 
and there's also a kind of bizarre element 
Anthony laughs knowingly 
Nell: and you talk 
about some of these things being unbelievable 
Anthony: Yes 
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Nell: and people having difficulty believing you 
It feeling so strange 
that either 
It's unbelievable 
or It must say something about you 
Anthony: Mmm 
Nell: That very much resonates with my experiences 
Anthony now takes up the issue and begins to relate it to his own experience, which he 
again traces to the unusual occurrences in his childhood and especially the quality of his 
mothering. He goes on to express a rift between his own experiencing and that of others, a 
rift which again evokes a sense of profound isolation: 
my own reality is not... 
my own reality Isn't real to others In some way 
I am aware of feeling that Anthony could be speaking for me here. I feel that he is 
describing my experience. At the end of Chapter Five 1 told of my repeated failure to show 
and not tell and the gnawing isolation that this had led to. So as Anthony continues I urge 
myself to refocus on him and his story. As in my counselling practice, I try to listen for the 
differences between us so that our conversation remains a meaningful meeting of two 
people and not a forum for a'me too' interaction. 
Anthony recalls times when he has felt momentarily understood but expresses a fragility 
in this understanding, and again the anguish that ensues from this lack of durable 
acknowledgment. 
Anthony: And yes there have also been other circumstances 
again very traumatic experiences 
which when recounted to people in responsibility 
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they can get it 
in the five minutes that I'm telling the story 
or the half an hour 
But it's almost like, because they 
don't have the depth of experience themselves to hold 
the enormity of the trauma 
It's lost 
and in one particular circumstance 
I went through the storytelling five or six different times to the same person 
and each time they had forgotten some really 
vital parts of it 
in those days it really challenged my own sanity 
Am I going mad? 
There is a belief in my own experience 
Its so powerful 
of course it is true 
but why doesn't the world out there 
acknowledge it 
I tried to listen for differences between Anthony's experiences and my own, but I found 
none. Reflection, disclosure and co-construction thus combine in my reply: 
Nell: Or even If they do momentarily 
they don't hang onto it 
they can't hold that truth 
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Anthony: Yes. They can't hang onto it 
Others who don't have the experience of holding such traumas 
they will displace it in some way 
It seems that further commonality of understanding has been reached, but as Anthony 
continues it is necessary for lack of commonality to be acknowledged. He adds: 
That isn't good enough 
this shouldn't be how it is 
Why is it that people in positions of responsibility 
don't understand the support that's necessary? 
I realise (somewhat in the moment, though more in the re-reading) that I am one of the 
people in a position of responsibility. I am still asking myself whether I sufficiently 
understood the support that was necessary. And as Anthony goes on to talk of his 
disappointments in supervision I feel a responsibility to give him space to express any 
disappointment in his relationship with me: 
Neil: That's bringing up questions forme about our working relationship in this 
research and I'm wondering if there are any disappointments for you in that? 
Anthony's response is complex and multi-faceted. It has reassuring as well as challenging 
elements: 
Ah ok that's interesting 
No, there isn't disappointment but 1 think it's because 
I suppose I'm old enough now 
not to have expectations 
and certainly in this process 
Its a new process where I haven't actually loaded it with 
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any expectations 
I've been happy to be on the journey and 
to explore and see things as they unfold really 
and I've enjoyed your inquiry 
I just think it's nice to have that... 
somebody having that interest 
in this particular story 
and that really feels 
that feels good 
yes yes 
And I suppose because this is a new type of working relationship 
forme 
there is an element of cautiousness 
and a slight nervousness 
it's almost like when I open the door to you 
1 didn't quite know how to be 
with you 
Looking back at the transcript I am uncomfortable at how I failed to hear Anthony or 
respond to him here, and I am aware of feeling concerned about the potential for crossing 
the researcher/therapist line. Anthony is saying that he didn't quite know how to be with 
me, and ironically I find myself not quite knowing how to be with him! Instead of 
expressing this or acknowledging what Anthony has said, I rush ahead. I ostensibly offer 
him the chance to express difficulties in our working relationship but as I have just failed 
to listen when Anthony tried to express a little of how he experienced working with me I 
suspect this offer may have felt hollow. 
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Nell: And if there are disappointments 
If there's something you feel you need to say... 
Anthony: Yeah that's great 
I try to be more specific and invite discussion of an area that it occurs to me may be 
difficult for Anthony to raise: 
Nell: The other thing that comes up, connected with that, is the 
crazy mother stuff f 
Anthony: Oh yes 
(laughter) 
Nell: And there's gender 
you have a history of women 
behaving in a crazy way 
and I guess there is a curiosity forme in two ways 
one is that I'm a woman 
Anthony: And do I experience you as crazy? 
Nell: Well my questions are going all over the place at the moment 
but just how is it for you 
having experienced 
crazy mother people in your life 
and me being 
a woman with a somewhat crazy history 
and an interest In these things? 
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Anthony's reply challenges my, somewhat one-dimensional, account of his experience by 
explaining that most of his relationships with women have been very equal and 
unproblematic. Relationships in the therapeutic world have been the exception. He is also 
reassuring about his relationship with me and about my management of the research 
boundaries, including my decision to share part of my life story with him: 
Anthony: As far as relating to you and how we've worked 
I was very touched by you sharing your story which 
is a very vulnerable 
thing to do 
but it didn't evoke in me heavy judgements or alarm bells 
so there weren't any Inner 
danger signs going on for me 
and also this does feel very 
collegiate in a way 
so yes it feels okay 
and I suppose in the boundaries that you've set 
and it's perfectly okay for me to stop at any point 
and that sort of stuff f 
it's very different to 
a supervisor who 
is very anxious 
and trying to protect themselves 
Anthony's reference to my vulnerability in sharing my story reminds me of the potential 
for all of us who are engaged in this research to receive negative attributions and 
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judgments. As I begin to express this, Anthony identifies with the desire to collaboratively 
reveal vulnerability but acknowledges that this is problematic. 
Nell: I'm remembering back to the victim blaming stuff f 
wanting to say 
It's not me that's crazy 
It's them 
It's is a crazy situation 
and as we started this conversation saying that 
when It's repeated or when It's bizarre 
it's very easy for you to be the one 
that gets the blame for whatever happens 
If it happened to you three or four times then it must be you 
or it's so strange and unbelievable it must be you 
Anthony: Also partly in my history there is 
a desire to 
be open and vulnerable 
and share all the pieces collaboratively 
so that we can work something out together 
but the world doesn't work like that 
Not enough (I muse) 
Not enough (Anthony agrees) 
And again we laugh poignantly together 
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There seems to be increasing mutuality or, as Anthony described it, 'collegiality'. I begin to 
reflect on my part in this process, and my decision to disclose personal material and 
personal process to him: 
I would have found it very difficult 
I would have felt that I was 
stepping out of line 
doing the wrong thing 
to be discussing these things with you 
and to be challenging you this much 
had I not first of all shown you my story and said 
hey mate 
we're in this together 
(More shared laughter) 
I'm not sitting here in judgement 
but trying to make sense of complex experiences 
that I have also shared 
the sharedness ot that 
the mutuality of that 
which would make lt easier for me to give my 
vulnerable stories to someone 
If I knew they were also in it 
and not standing aloof making judgements 
And also 
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what you haven't heard from me yet Is me 
having people 
having managers 
and a whole range of people 
pressure me to do things that felt unethical 
and behaving unethically towards me 
In my profession as a counsellor 
which then also links back to my early experience 
particularly with my mother 
Anthony: Ah okay 
Nell: and lo and behold 
you tell me your story 
and even my PhD advisor is saying 
this coincidence is bizarre 
Anthony's laugh seems to reflect recognition and relief now. I too feel relief. 
When Anthony returns to his experiences of isolation he expresses the issue that has 
become so important in this research: How do we overcome isolation when we fear that 
we will be seen as crazy? He checks out whether I have also experienced this, and not only 
was I able to confirm this but I could also let him know that other contributors expressed 
similar feelings. 
Anthony: But actually talking about it... 
The Isolation 
is also something that It would help me to look at further because 
on one level I can clearly see that lt is self-created 
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it's such a difficult boundary to cross 
when the fear is that you will be seen as crazy 
How do you find help in that? 
And my experience of that 
And maybe your experience of it too? 
Nell: Sure and also other people who are taking part in this research 
isolation is up there quite powerfully 
there are some very vivid 
explanations and accounts of isolation 
so your experiences fit In with those of other people 
Anthony: Okay 
(Anthony releases an audible out breath, and some of the isolation seems 
to dissolve as he hears that he is connected to others in this) 
Yes, yes 
I think that's an important piece 
That should be fed back to 
training organisations 
The outsider witnessing practices of narrative therapy come to mind again as I realise that 
this research is also working against the isolating and individualising processes of the 
organisations where the original incidents occurred. And in this, my ambition that this 
research should be relational, progresses. 
After this conversation it was easier to know how to progress with the others. For one 
thing, not all of the contributors were equally interested or engaged in the research and 
some limited their commitment (beyond the conversations) to checking transcripts and 
(re)presentations; some preferred to wait and read the thesis in its entirety, once it was 
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complete; some read some of my stories and expressed additional connections with 
stories they did not feel ready to reveal publicly, as one said, "I'm not that brave yet", and 
Clara emailed: 
0 Nell, what a fine and powerful piece of writing. 
I know that I could not be so public about my own 
life story (so similar to yours, I expect you 
guessed this). 
All of this brought me back to my second difficult decision: Which of my own stories 
should I include in the thesis? 
6.3 Sheltered or exposed positions: Inclusion of personal narratives 
Deciding which of my own stories to include was dreadfully difficult and in fact 
significantly delayed the completion of the thesis. In this decision I have somewhat 
competing responsibilities to contributors; to others who have been victimised; to other 
academics and practitioners who might gain valuable understanding from my stories; to 
third parties who may be revealed in my stories; to myself; and to the reader. And, as I 
have been learning, there is rarely an easily identifiable, correct answer to such ethical 
problems. As Frank (2004: 191-192) says: 
We do not act on principles that hold for all times. We act as best we can at a 
particular time, guided by certain stories that speak to that time, and other 
people's dialogical affirmation that we have chosen the right stories.... The 
best any of us can do is to tell one another our stories of how we have made 
choices and set priorities. By remaining open to other people's responses to our 
moral maturity and emotional honesty... " 
Allowing our struggles to be transparent in this way is also a key ethical requirement for 
Etherington (2004d). 
As must be clear by now, one of my motivations for including my own narratives is as an 
act of commitment to, or solidarity with, Clara, Maira, Caroline, Anthony, Roberta and 
Richard. Like Kirk Douglas I want to say "I'm Spartacus", or rather, 'I'm Anthony'; 'I'm 
Clara'. Their victimhood and their artful telling have already been exposed. I wanted to 
stand alongside them and say, 'me too'. If they are to attract 'weird fucker' attributions for 
the benefit of my research, my PhD, then I want to be in it with them. Again, I wanted to 
make myself the "fall guy" rather than leaving the contributors standing alone (Wolcott, 
2005: 198). And I returned to the concerns of Bolam, Gleeson and Murphy (2003) to make 
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reflexive processes more explicit, recalling how they (and I) had 'turned the tables' by 
'interviewing the interviewer'. To include some of my own life stories would continue this 
'table-turning' commitment. This was also supported by the comments of Anthony and 
other contributors who had read some of my writing and who felt this to be beneficial to 
them and who had expressed appreciation of my openness and collegiality. 
But I was particularly intrigued and motivated by Clara who had said to me, "There are so 
many layers of the marginalised, the silenced. Its the infinite regression of mirror images. 
I hope you are not also going to be silenced and marginalised. " In this statement of 
solidarity with me, Clara reflected feminist awareness of the ways that some of our stories 
are included or authorised and others excluded or silenced (Byrne and McCarthy, 1999; 
Swan, 1999). 
My wish to offer solidarity does not end with the contributors but also extends to others 
who have been victimised. If I withhold my own stories of victimhood and ethics then I am 
adding to the cultural silencing of those with similar stories, and furthering their isolation. 
When we know that there are others like us, and that there are identities and positions 
where we may feel more prototypical, then our sense of 'strangeness' is reduced and 
isolation diminishes. 
Personal stories are generally told from a'cultural stock of narrative forms' (see Rapport 
and Overing, 2000) but bizarre life experiences fit less well into these forms. As such, I will 
only consider including narratives that are, not only particularly relevant to this research, 
but also representative of stories that are not usually heard. 
Shame is commonly felt by victims because of their inability to prevent their victimisation, 
because of the humiliation of victimhood, and because of the sense of being different. But 
there also seems to be a secondary shaming, resulting from victims failure to cope with the 
experiences in the way that others seemed to think they should. If they must be victims 
then they at least they should be good victims. In fact they should be survivors. Thus hero 
and restitution narratives (Polkinghorne, 1991; McLeod, 1997) are popular and 
acceptable, but messy texts (Marcus. 1998) of struggle and partial resolution are rarer. I 
believe them to be more valuable for this. 
This means of course that they will also have potential value for other academics and 
practitioners. I have these stories of how (like the contributors) my ethical self was 
constituted in childhood experiences and how the themes that were laid down then have 
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been played and replayed since. And I have easier and fuller access to these stories than I 
have to the stories of the others. For various reasons more details of their stories cannot 
be included here. Some contributors have limited what they will make available for this 
thesis with explanations such as, "I'm not that brave" and, "Not yet, maybe some time in 
the future I'll be ready" (and note that I am not attributing these comments to individual 
contributors but am allowing that additional anonymity). The more detailed personal 
narratives of one contributor are already in the public domain and so any information that 
would allow cross-referencing has been omit ted. My own narratives do not have such 
limits, but nevertheless, they do raise ethical disquiet. There is inevitable involvement of 
other people in personal stories, and consideration has to be given to the representation of 
these other people, as well as to problems of consent and permission. 
I have taken various measures in order to minimise any such offence to the third parties 
who may feature in my stories. First of all, there are many stories that I have chosen not to 
include here and, in those that I have included, I have tried to keep the focus on my 
experiencing and the quality of that experiencing, and as little as possible on these third 
parties. And I have used creative non-fiction and fictionalising devices to give oblique 
views of my experiences rather than putting the focus directly onto problem or person. I 
have only given explicit detail where it is necessary for the integrity of the story. I have 
anonymised where possible. This has not been possible for my parents. Yet the fact that I 
have legally changed my names is a protective factor; very few people will be able to 
identify my family from this work 
Of course, ideally I would obtain their consent, but acknowledgment of my life experiences 
never has been and never will be forthcoming. I have tried to discuss these experiences 
with my family on several occasions. My mother's response was typically, "Now you be 
very careful what you're saying young lady. " My father's response was also to silence, and 
this is considered in more detail in the following chapter. 
And as I write this I realise that the problem becomes confounded, in the processing of this 
decision I reveal more of their lives and actions. Barbour (2004: 73) argues that: 
"To the degree that a writer focuses on her relationship to a parent, she must 
explore the parent's life, explaining how the parent came to have specific values 
and a certain moral character. " 
But this seems to represent a very modernist position with simplistic notions of cause and 
effect, and belief in "a certain moral character". And more worryingly, it also raises further 
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ethical problems; it proposes that having made any disclosure the writer is then obliged to 
make even more. I don't think the third parties in my stories would see it like this. I am 
sure that they wouldn't want me to publicly speculate about what has made them the way 
they are; to apply my favoured grand (or even not so grand) narratives. Nor do I feel it 
appropriate to bring others, from their lives into the frame, as would necessarily happen 
as the trail is traced from generation to generation. 
In a recent seminar that I attended, Carolyn Ellis (2007a) gave advice which is consistent 
with Barbour's position. She suggested presenting other people as complex characters. 
Along similar lines, Weedon (2004: 21) points out that, "in defining their own sense of 
identity, individuals tend also to fix the identity of others working within long-established 
binaries. "I certainly want to resist'fixing the identity of others' and imposing such simple 
binaries, but again I feel restricted in how much I can represent the complexity of others 
without making additional disclosures. I am sure, however, that it will be evident that all 
those included were / are indeed complex characters. 
In her account of her mother's illness, Ellis (2001) too struggled with these predicaments. 
Deciding eventually to progress with partial consent, she did not tell her mother 
everything she had included, and it was the more personal and sensitive detail that was 
omitted (from the consent procedure, not from the ethnography). Although the main focus 
of this paper is on relational ethics, it seems that for this particular dilemma, principles of 
care and the integrity of the story were privileged. 
Others have also have taken significant moral risks in exposing family members as 
drunken (e. g. Leitch, 2006; Etherington, 2000; 2003b), and / or as abusers (e. g. Rambo- 
Ronai, 1995; Etherington, 2003b). But in each case the focus was not on the third party but 
on the writer themselves. This is also my aim. I am constituted by these stories. I cannot 
hide the stories of my family without hiding me. But I can endeavour to focus on myself 
and my experiencing. 
In Chapter Five I expressed concern that, in offering their narratives, the contributors may 
be exposed to disapproval and criticism and that, in our blame culture', readers may find 
fault, and impose judgements and truth claims. Offering my stories will leave me similarly 
exposed. I will be subjecting myself to further approbation, and so it would be easy for me 
to hide here, to offer a detached account of the contributors' experiences and personhood; 
or to partially hide and offer a somewhat reflexive response whist keeping my'self out of 
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harm's way. In his autoethnographic paper on an experience of counselling supervision 
Bond (2002) reports his consciousness that he is "about to invade [his] own privacy". I 
share that consciousness. 
I have a strong sense of allegiance with others who have trodden a similarly difficult path. 
And having lived with the narratives of those who have been ascribed as strange, bizarre, 
crazy etc I have particular admiration for those writers who have exposed aspects of their 
own experiencing that may also be considered somewhat strange, that might also attract 
the'weird fucker' label. Etherington (2003b) for instance, describes an episode of self- 
harm, and Leitch (2006: 360) exposes her sense of an "academic prostitute" identity. 
Of course there are always those who view such practices as navel-gazing, narcissistic 
rambling or self-indulgence (see Chapter Four and Sanders, 1995; Charmaz and Mitchell, 
1997; Mykhalovskiy, 1997; Sparkes, 2002). And I admit that, as well as the obvious 
personal risks, there are also potential personal benefits. 
lt is commonly acknowledged that, as we are social beings, we have a basic need to tell our 
stories (Rapport and Overing, 2000), and that, "Telling one's story promotes a sense of 
knowing and being known and leads to social inclusion" (McLeod, 2004: 22, see also White 
and Epston, 1995; and McLeod, 1999). 1 have long been positioned as problem child, 
wayward teenager, neglectful daughter and so on. There is now something attractive in 
making a stand against these attributions, by letting some of the complexity of my 
character be seen. As Dennett (1991: 418) tells, stories are "our fundamental tactic of self- 
protection, self-control, and self-definition". And narrative work can be seen as an act of 
resistance which helps to restore moral respect (Frank, 2004). Through life writing we can 
begin to disentangle from identities Imposed onto us by others (see Gullestad, 2004) and 
disengage from previous enmeshment with unhelpful / unhealthy identities. 
Rambo (2005: 11) argues that without such autoethnography, and specifically without the 
support and trailblazing of Carolyn Ellis, she, "... would be forced into silence the way 
abused and marginalized people typically are... '. Experiences of being silenced are, after 
all, emotionally painful and problematic (McLeod, 2004: 23). But I am not naive in this. I 
know that Bauman is right when he says, "Disclosure is the beginning - not the end - of the 
war against human misery" (Bauman, 2005: 1097). Yet Rambo's writing offers more than 
the breaking of silence, more than disclosure. It is the creative and relational 
transformation that she describes (Rambo, 2005: 11) that makes this an attractive route: 
184 
"What happened to me in my lifetime is transformed from a senseless disaster 
into a valuable life experience that can be shared with others. The experience 
of writing It transforms me. The experience of reading it, if I have done my job, 
helps the reader to understand me, other people in my situation, and ultimately 
themselves. " 
Though she recognizes that, like all of us who have been adversely affected by our life 
experiences, she is "stuck being what [she is], a little weird, a little needy, a little lost" 
(2005: 8). And, it seems that not all readers will welcome this. 
Any reader is also likely to have academic or practitioner interests in this work, and so 
that discussion relating to these interests (above) will also apply here. However, there is 
an additional concern for the person of the reader, with how they personally receive and 
are affected by the material presented. Eakin (2004: 3) points out that, "Life writers are 
criticized not only for not telling the truth... but also for telling too much truth. " He adds 
that narratives which have "featured abuse as a primary content" have also been 
"perceived by some reviewers to be abusive in their candor" [sic]. 
Bolton's substantial body of work (e. g. 1991,1999a, 1999b, 2001a, 2001b, 2005) testifies 
to the immense benefits of writing for healing and I have personally found a great sense of 
connection and support from this. She is, however, aware that the impacts of her writing 
can be unpleasant. In her poem, 'Communicant' (1991), Bolton powerfully and evocatively 
represents her own oral rape in childhood. As she reflects on this in Etherington's (2003c) 
collective autoethnography, "Trauma, the Body and Transformation', she is profoundly 
apologetic to the reader, yet still includes the difficult material. She says, "I'm sorry; these 
are horrid poems. Rereading them to put them in this chapter, I'm finding them horrid. But 
then it's a horrid subject" (Bolton, 2003: 133). She also apologises to readers who may be 
offended by the poem, "this poem is not meant to be offensive", she explains, but is a 
personal exploration of imagery and symbolism. Of course, if it were just personal she 
would not have had it published. She could have chosen to remain silenced, she could have 
exited the arena rather than giving voice. But as Bauman (1994: 42) tells us, the difference 
is between "engagement and disengagement"; voice is relational. 
I too have no wish to offend or abuse readers, but reading is a choice; you can stop 
reading, whereas the silencing of victims for the comfort of non-victims or because their 
stories are considered 'inappropriate' topics for polite society does not seem ethical. I am 
Inviting the reluctant reader to step out of their bystander position (Cohen, 2001; Bauman, 
2003; Clarkson, 1996), and to connect. 
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It is now time to make space for some of my stories, and in selecting these I have used the 
same criteria that I used in (re)presenting the narratives of Clara, Maira, Caroline, 
Anthony, Roberta and Richard. I have chosen those that are emotionally resonant; that 
illustrate significant life themes; that encapsulate or reflect lived experience (talk that 
sings); that contradict truth regimes; and that imply movement and so challenge 
assumptions of static reality (Bird, 2000; 2004). But my main criterion has been relevance 
to my developing ethical identity and ethical practices. 
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Chapter Seven 
Double Digging: Layering autoethnographies 
7.1 First shoots 
Having established that I will present some of my life stories as they relate to my 
developing ethical identity and ethical practices, I am now faced with issues of style and 
form. At the outset of this research I had intended to use writing as a straightforward aid 
to my researcher reflexivity. I had written through times of difficulty and dilemma and as 
part of my personal development for many years and this seemed a natural way to 
proceed. So I began with my familiar journal writing and with written reflections on my 
reading and on key experiences. I also took a more reflexive approach to my traditional 
academic writing. And increasingly, I used email to advisers, contributors and peers so 
that the reflexive process became less individual, more connected. But the resulting 
representations still seemed to be lacking something and they added little to my 
understanding of the research topic. This writing was boring and I began to bore myself. 
But I knew that my experiences weren't boring, and that they were relevant to this field of 
inquiry. I had discovered what Bolton (2001a: 104) already knew; that "thinking, talking 
and discussing, or writing 'critical incidents' or'events' or case notes" is insufficient. I 
needed to find a way of doing justice to the quality of my own experiences in the way that I 
had been committed to doing justice to the experiences of my research contributors, so 
that this may also contribute to the meaning-making processes herein. 
Regarding reflexive writing, Bolton suggests stories as a more useful way forward as this 
allows more constructive work with our experience. I was doing narrative research, didn't 
I know this already? The evocative quality of the contributors' expressions had helped to 
facilitate my empathic witnessing. Perhaps I too needed to find evocative expressions of 
my own lived experience, but Potter (1996: 180) amongst others has warned that readers 
are wary of metaphoric and 'artful' expression; they see it as doing "something sneaky". 
And Lincoln (1997: 38-39) rightly reminds us that, "The choice implied in reflexivity 
leaves open the possibility that we can consciously take our narrative voice and reframe 
it" And she recognises that such choice is powerful and implies intention and deliberation. 
Throughout the writing of this thesis I have clearly been engaged in "consciously taking 
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my narrative voice and reframing it', with much "intention and deliberation", which is 
evident even in this very sentence. But these are practices which distance us from our 
experiencing as we stand aside from it and consider audience. These were the practices 
which were already failing me. I was aware of the recurring advice of creative writing 
tutors to, 'Show, don't tell' (Booth, 1991; Hunt, 2000) and I had been applying this to my 
contributors' narratives, but not to my own. I had been trying to tell my experiences in a 
way that kept me, and hence any reader, at a safe distance from them. In order to show, I 
had to re-enter those experiences and write from that 'close-up' position. 
But storying and discovery through writing differ from storying and discovery in 
conversation, so my telling inevitably contrasts with that of the contributors. As Bolam, et 
al (2003: 10) argue, "if reflexivity is not just a final written product, but also a part of 
research process, there is a need for qualitative researchers to creatively develop tools to 
engage in their own reflexive praxis". That is what I did. 
As with the contributors, some key experiences took place in early childhood and as I 
began to write from within those early memories I found my first story emerging in the 
voice of the child and in a style particularly apt for a child's-eye view; a fairy-tale, complete 
with dark reprise. This is that story: 
7.2 The Good Little Girl: A Story of Belonging, Listening and the Land 
Well I once knew a very Good Uttle Girl. But she wasn't only very good, she was also very 
scared (and maybe she was only very good because she was very scared). 
When she was a tiny little baby her mummy would pretend to cry so that her friends 
could see how much this baby loved her; because the good little baby would be so sad to 
see her mummy cry that she would cry too. 
As she grew the mummy told her lots of stories about how to be good and about what 
might happen if she was bad. She so much wanted to make the mummy happy that she 
listened carefully and tried very hard to do as she should. Most of the stories were about 
a boy called Jesus who was just perfect. Of course, if Jesus had been a little girl he could 
not have been perfect. He would have had to cover his head for shame when he went 
into the chapel, just like The Good We Girl. 
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The mummy and the people at the chape/also told The Good 
Litte Girl about The One-and-Only God, who watches and sees 
everything 
One of the very good things that Jesus did was to turn the other cheek. The Good Little 
Girl learnt that this meant staying quiet when that boy hit her or flicked her with the tea 
towel or used his dart gun to shoot darts into her legs. She was also taught that 
obedience was very Important as it said so in the bible. Obedience became her friend 
and kept her safe. 
Though sometimes, that boy told her to do things that felt horrible and she knew that she 
would be in big trouble if any grown ups found out. She got very muddled about this. She 
knew she would be bad for obeying and bad for disobeying. 
And The One-and-Only God, who watches and sees everything, 
watched and saw everything 
And The Good Litt!. Girl felt that she must be very bad and that 
everyone would see this badness Inside her 
And she wondered If she would ever find somewhere safe where 
she belonged 
Now she started to really understand about sin and why she had to cover her head for 
shame. She started to become quite a strange little girl. She felt that everything she did 
would show the badness inside her. The harder she tried to hide it the more it seemed 
that it showed. She felt too ashamed to look directly at people or to speak out clearly so 
she always whispered and blinked her eyes with nervousness. Some other children at the 
school didn't like this strangeness so they began to hit her. But The Good Utde Girl 
remembered about turning the other cheek and proudly stood still while they did it. Of 
course, this seemed even stranger to the children and they hit her more. 
One day though she surprised everyone. On the way home from school a child hit the 
boy. In an instant The Good Little Girl realised that the turning the other cheek rules 
didn't apply here and she ferociously thumped the child. The child didn't know the 
turning the other cheek rules and pushed The Good Littl. Girl into a wall and cut her 
head badly. It was worth it though because for a while The Good Little Girl was quite a 
hero! But pride was a bad thing. 
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And the one-and-only God who watches and sees everything, 
watched and saw everything 
And The Good Utt!. Girl felt that she must be very bad and that 
everyone would see this badness Inside her 
And she wondered If she would ever find somewhere safe where 
she belonged 
The mummy explained that all this was good practice for being a really good little girl. 
"One day", she said, "an evil beast will come and everyone will have to choose. You can 
either be very brave in this world and turn the other cheek even when you are being 
tortured or you can give in to the beast and be tortured forever and ever in hell. 
And the mummy told The Good Little Girl about a perfect little girl who had been very 
brave. Some people who were friends of the evil beast took her away from her mummy 
and did horrid things to her and tortured her until she died. No matter what they did to 
her the perfect girl only thought and spoke of her mummy. And The Good Little Girl 
understood that this was the only way for a girl to be perfect. The mummy and the daddy 
also took The Good Little Girl to a ditch to see where the bodies of other tortured 
children had been found. The Good Uttle Girl knew that she had to try and prepare to be 
just as brave as the perfect little girl. 
The Good L itde Girl was so scared that she practised it in her 
mind over and over again 
And she wondered if she would over find somewhere safe where 
she belonged 
The mummy would talk to The Good Little Girl about her sadness and her troubles. She 
told her secrets that were not to be told to the daddy. She told her about wanting to take 
tablets that would make her dead just like the perfect little girl and the children in the 
ditch. She also told her about The Big Plan. The Big Plan was that one day the mummy 
was going to kill the daddy and then take the tablets herself. She would help The Good 
Little Girl to prepare for this by telling her often how it would happen. "One day", she 
would say, "you will come home from school and you will find us both dead. " And The 
Good Little Girl thought about the bodies of the children in the ditch and was scared. 
And she didn't know how to be good. She wondered if she should tell someone but 
Obedience was her friend and she kept the mummy's secret. 
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The Good UK/e Girl was so scared that she practised it in her 
mind over and over again 
And The One-and-Only God, who watches and sees everything, 
watched and saw everything 
Then one day something different happened. The Good Little Girl must have done 
something very naughty but she has tried and tried to remember what it was and she 
can't. But it must have been very naughty because the mummy locked the doors of the 
house and hid the keys and she said to The Good Little Girl, "I have taken the tablets and 
now you will have to stay here and watch me die. " She showed The Good Little Girl the 
empty tablet bottles and The Good Little Girl was very scared. Obedience was no use 
now but a new friend came and opened the window so that The Good Little Girl could 
climb out and run away. And she heard the mummy say, "You are a Hard Madam. " And 
then for years The Hard Madam became one of her best friends. But they wondered 
whether the mummy would really do it one day. 
On the day before The Good Little Girl became a teenager the mummy became very 
poorly and went to hospital for a long time. The Good Little Girl went to stay with 
different people and for the first time in her life she was allowed time on her own. So The 
Good Little Girl walked the land. 
And she found that the earth was firm and steady and held her safely 
And she found that the sun shone brightly and warmed her 
And she found that the moon stayed with her through her darkness 
And she found that the stars twinkled their delight at her 
And she found that the rivers helped her to see how far she had come 
And she found that the seas showed her how great things could be 
And she found that the animals taught her about instinct and staying safe 
And she found that the birds taught her about freedom 
And she found that the turning of the seasons showed her that no winter lasts forever 
And she found that the trees of the forest whispered welcome to her 
And she realised that she had found somewhere safe where she truly belonged 
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And through the adventures in the land a new friend came. This was Wild Girl who loved 
to play and be daring. This fun and adventure lasted just a short time when one day Wild 
Girl went out climbing rocks and she met a hard man. As the hard man got to know her 
more he seemed to like this combination of The Good Little Girl, Obedience and Wild 
Girl and soon she had two beautiful babies. And even though she was now a mummy, she 
still tried hard to be a good little girl. But just like that boy, the hard man did horrid 
things. So Outrage began to grow. She grew and grew and she knew that The Good Little 
Girl was also one of the hurt people who needed to be listened to. But the hard man was 
hurt badly too and didn't understand and couldn't care and called her Bitch and scared 
her. Through this the friends reached a majority decision that Obedience was a liability 
and she was sent packing but The Good Little Girl still worries about this. 
And Th. Good Little Girl was no longer allowed time on her own 
and she began to forget that she had found somewhere safe 
where she truly belonged 
At about this time The Good Little Girl had a neighbour who was also one of the hurt 
people and he wanted someone to talk to. And The Good Little Girl thought that she 
could listen to him like she had listened to the mummy and the hard man. But he drank 
the drink that changes people and he had pointed guns at people and threatened them. 
One day lots of policemen came looking for him and they found the guns under his bed. 
For a while he was taken to prison but then he was allowed to come home while he 
waited for The Trial. 
After this The Good We Girl was scared to listen to him and when he came to tell her 
how sad he was the Good Little Girl hid and the Hard Madam answered the door instead. 
She made him stay on the doorstep and when he told her of the things that were making 
him sad that day she said, "Well that's life. " "I'm beginning to think it is, " he replied. 
Neither The Good Uttle Girl nor The Hard Madam ever saw him again after that. He 
really took the tablets that the mummy had talked of taking so many times. 
And the one-and-only God, who watches and sees everything, 
watched and saw everything 
And the Good Little GM felt that she must be very bad and that 
everyone would see this badness inside her 
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After this The Good Little Girl thought that the Hard Madam should go away too and 
that she should learn how to listen properly to hurt people. She studied hard and learned 
the words of many clever and wise people. And as The Good Little Girl walked the land 
again she thought about the wise words and began to understand how she could listen to 
the hurt people. 
With the earth she would be firm and steadyand hold them safely 
With the sun she would shine brightly and warm them 
With the moon she would stay with them through their darkness 
With the stars she would twinkle her delight at them 
With the rivers she would help them to see how far they had come 
With the seas she would show how great things could be 
With the animals she would show her instinct and how she stays safe 
With the birds she would provide hope of freedom 
With the turning of the seasons she would show that no winter lasts forever 
With the trees of the forest she would whisper welcome to the world 
And she remembered that she had found somewhere safe where she truly belonged 
She also learned that there were some people that she did not have to listen to. So one 
day she left the hard man and though many people were angry with her she became 
stronger and stronger and happier and happier and she found a good man whom she 
loves and who loves her. 
And she thought that she had wasted enough time worrying 
about a one-and-only God who lust watches and sees everything. 
And In any case she thought; a one-and-only God /s no more 
likely than a one- and-only se/f/ 
Well these friends are back studying again now and they are still finding the belonging 
thing quite difficult. Wild Girl is not quite so wild these days. Outrage still hangs around 
but The Good Uttie Girl worries about this because she is still trying very hard to be good. 
She has been reading about'mother blaming discourse' and how people 'construct their 
identity as victim'. And The Good Lithe Girl once again feels that she must be very bad 
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and that everyone will see this badness inside her. Sometimes she thinks, 'Where is the 
Hard Madam when I need her? " 
7.3 Self-Seeding 
So one day I began to write differently. Instead of writing about my experiences I began to 
write from and through them; a profoundly embodied practice, which comes from "close 
attention to the remembered embodied self" while learning to "avoid cliches and 
explanations". (Davies, 2000: 168). And thus I started to find various positions from which 
to re-present my experiences rather than merely relating them. I found words that 
allowed my own experiences to come to life to my self. I surprised myself by my ability to 
make my own experience evocative to myself, a curious sensation. As the research 
contributors had taken me into their world; showing and not telling, I had now taken 
myself into my own world; showing and not telling. And as this process of showing is itself 
constitutive, the `me' I was showing was also changing. I was showing the ever new me, 
the in-the-present-being-constituted-now-through-this-very-experience me. 
And one of the things it began to show me was the quality of my interest in ethical 
difficulty. This was no simple professional interest The "deep and abiding connection 
between one's own life history and one's research and writing" that Bochner and Ellis had 
identified (2003: 508) now took on a new significance. Like many of the contributors, my 
ethical identity and practices seemed to have some deep roots. 
I had found rhythm and repetition emerging as I wrote, which would not have been 
possible in spontaneous speech, and it seemed to be driving the process of writing and 
remembering forward. It brings to mind the rhythm and repetition of many popular 
children's stories where it helps to build both familiarity and dramatic tension: `Fee fr jo 
fum, I smell the blood of an Englishman ; 'Grandma, what big eyes you've got; and 'I'll huff 
and I'll puff..., for instance. And in this it again gives testimony to childhood experiences. 
It mirrored the repetitions and reprises of my childhood where paternal anger was ever 
present in overt or covert forms; there were either storms or calms between storms, 
requiring constant attention to the horizon so that approaching clouds could be 
anticipated and damage limited. The familiar, repeating forms of threats and intimidations 
meant that we knew what was coming. And my mother's frequent disclosure to me; that 
she planned to murder my father and then commit suicide, also took the form of a few 
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recurring phrases which kept me alert to the possibility that one day I would come home 
from school to find their bodies. As time went on the only phrases that were necessary to 
maintain my vigilance were, "it won't be long now" and "I can't take much more". 
But what was I to do? What was the right way to respond? Maintain confidentiality or try 
to rescue? This was the greatest ethical dilemma that I have ever had to deal with. Such 
challenges would be problematic in adulthood; I was facing them from primary school age. 
The ethical code that I was expected to follow was not deontological or relational but 
rather a particular form of utilitarianism. The concern was not for'the greatest good for 
the greatest number', but for the 'Glory of God'. And the principle of obedience was 
privileged over principles of autonomy, care, justice, beneficence and so on. I was 
prepared from infancy for the inevitable 'time of reckoning' where the Antichrist would 
reign and good Christians would resist all pressure to wear 'the mark of the beast'. It was 
made clear to me that I would either have to endure torture in this life or forever in the 
'hereafter', I was terrified and spent a lot of time trying mentally to prepare myself. One 
consequence of this was that I asked to be baptised at the age of ten, which was considered 
to be very early within the Brethren Assembly, and so I had to explain my request to the 
elders. I did so in terms of obedience and consequently made quite an impression. I was 
the youngest person to be baptised in our chapel where baptism was by total immersion. 
And the discourses that I was exposed to straddled the religious authority of feudalism 
and modern expectations of achievement and success. Religion showed the consequences 
of not getting it right; endless damnation and suffering. Modernity gave the promise that 
there was aright!, non-contradictory route to be found, if only I could find it. And the 
responsibility for that was individual; it was down to me. I was never exempt from moral 
evaluation. And the one-and only-God was watching and seeing everything I did or did not 
do; an almighty panopticon! I became ever self-regulating, ever vigilant, but success was 
impossible. There was no way to resolve the contradictory demands and I became one of 
the failures that White (2002) identified (see Chapter Three). But I was still unable to give 
up on the need to be good, as evidenced by the story of my decision to train as a 
counsellor, to learn to listen well; which was embedded in this life story. Caroline 
similarly, had told how her childhood experiences (of harsh parenting) and subsequent 
ethical challenges (where she had felt out of her depth) had led to her becoming a 
counsellor. 
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Brunei's (1986) concern to make the world newly strange also took on a new significance 
for me. Through this writing my own life had become newly strange, and yet there was 
comfort in that. Firstly I knew I had given form to my sense of connection with Anthony, 
Clara and the others. Secondly, I (like Rambo, 2005; see Chapter Six) had always been 
aware of a strangeness about my life, but had accepted the essentialist attributions of my 
family; I just was strange. And as my writing shows, I did become quite a strange little girl, 
and so became a living example of methodological confusions between causal significance 
and correlation (see Chapter Two). But now, through the writing, I was able to begin to 
reassign more of that strangeness to context. 
This reflexive process had thus reconnected me to my own victimhood, to my struggles, 
and failures to find moral agency, and like the contributors to this project, I found this to 
be a very lonely and isolating place. But my contributors had been able to give me access 
to some of their lived experiences. Through their evocative expression I had been helped 
to witness deeply and connect my life to their lives and my stories to their stories. I now 
found myself wishing to give other people access to some of my lived experiences. Old 
hopes, that someone might connect to my life, might get it, and so get me, resurfaced 
(Rambo, 2005). 
So I began to let others see this writing. At first I showed it to just a few people who were 
interested in narrative therapy and writing as inquiry. It was very well received. I glowed. 
And I endeavoured to write more and to learn more about writing, so I joined a Writers' 
Group. And here I found myself revisiting some of the difficulties and dilemmas that I have 
explored in Chapters Four and Six, where the telling of personal stories can attract 
criticism and can increase isolation rather than reducing it. 
7.4 Vulnerable specimens, support and shelter 
I arrived early on the first evening with all the eagerness of a novice and so, when there 
was an invitation for someone to read some of their work, I offered my Good Little Girl 
story (above). A few people approached me with complimentary and encouraging 
comments, and though those in the obvious 'inner circle' of the group were less 
forthcoming, I did not read this as a warning sign. 
The 'homeworle for that week was to write to the title, "First Sight". I was determined to 
do something new with this, to stretch myself. I had wanted to learn about poetry and 
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poetic forms, and so I bought a suitable textbook, found myself interested in the villanelle 
form and wrote the second poem of my life (I had written the previous one as a teenager). 
This poem started out as a recollection of the first time I returned from France to England; 
my'first sight' of England from a non-England perspective. But somehow the poem took 
charge and decided instead to write about my attempt to renew contact with my mother 
after some years of familial exile. The result was a merging of two mothers: earth mother 
and biological mother, I tried to write about the former but the poem seemed determined 
to connect to the latter. My decisions regarding how and when and even whether to 
resume contact with my family had 'felt like my responsibility' (these words incidentally 
echo those of Maira regarding the wellbeing of the residents in her organisation, of 
Caroline regarding her own punishment, and Anthony's regarding his client's 
contemplation of suicide). I had assumed responsibility for rejecting my family but, from 
this poem my understanding shifted, the responsibility did not lie entirely or even 
primarily with me. The rejection was not in one direction. This had in fact been my, rather 
conceited, misapprehension. 
And so I began to more clearly appreciate how new understanding can be gained through 
the process of writing (Elbow, 1998; Goldberg, 1986), how writing can be used as a means 
of inquiry or a method of discovery In itself and how different ways of writing allow 
discovery of different aspects of the topic and our relationship to it (Richardson, 1992; 
2000; Richardson and St. Pierre, 2005). This is not a good poem by any means, in fact it is 
quite raw and unsophisticated, revealing my naivete and inexperience as a writer in much 
the same way that Clara, Maira, Caroline, Anthony and Roberta had revealed their naivete 
and inexperience as counselling practitioners. I therefore include this poem here only to 
show the shift in my understanding through the process of writing, and also so that the 
reader is able to understand the context of what is to come below. 
First Sight 
/ didn't really see you 'till / left you 
Then returning watched your fertile form emerging 
I'd a/ways thought / hated you 
But approaching from the seas ofseparatlon 
Through distant haze /met and held your verdant gate 
/ didn't rsallysee you'tII/ / /oft you 
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Such rich red ground from where /had withdrawn 
Then yearning to return and rest In your enfolding 
l'd always thought / hated you 
But hard, dry bones resist my keen embrace 
Beneath the green and red of you, remains a very different hue 
/ didn't really see you 'till / /oft you 
/reach to meet, my touch revealing rifts 
I'm learning that there was something more about my turning 
/'d always thought /hated you 
A nd pitied you your loss but what conceit 
/ didn't really see you 'ti/l I left you 
/'d a/ways thought/ hated you 
But finally /see that It was a/ways you who hated me 
I was again early and keen for the next writer's group meeting, and when it was my turn to 
read my piece I explained that It was only my second poem... and I was just learning... and 
that I had read about villanelles and was interested.., and that it had started out as one 
thing and ended as another... The responses I got were devastating. Apparently 
boundaries had been breached. Some of my metaphorical garden had apparently 
overgrown into my neighbours' ground, and It was not welcome. I left, shamed but unable 
to stop writing, and I inevitably wrote about this experience. 
This writing took me back to the chapel of my childhood, and to my life-long dilemma 
about whether I would ever be justified in telling 'mummy's secrets' (see also Ellis, 2007). 
I struggled to differentiate between accusations of apparent unseemliness and valid 
ethical challenge regarding my personal narratives (and I know this is an impossible task, 
yet it is ongoing). I reasoned that, whereas I need not be silenced by concerns of 
unseemliness; valid ethical challenge was another matter. And I am thus brought back to 
the dilemmas outlined in Chapter Six regarding what I should, or should not, include here; 
and as such I will now present extracts from this writing, before returning to reconsider 
this problem. 
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As I finished my poem the 'dominant male' caught my eye and grinned, and / felt 
my out-breath of relief. "He likes it". / thought, "He smiled at me" : But / had been 
right In my first Impression that It was a grin and not a smile, and / had read this 
grin wrong. h was not a smile of pleasure, nor of the reassurance / had been so 
desperate for. 
As the grin shifted, this tall and grey-haired man metamorphosed Into a chapel 
elder, looking on me In Judgement, benign in manner, stern In expression. And / 
was revealed as fallen woman with that most shamed status, 'bad daughter: 
But this was not sufficient. This 'elder' then challenged my new truth. He told me 
that my poem revealed that my understanding had been substantially wrong all 
along and so my new understanding was also unreliable. He was not commenting 
on my poem but on me. / could not be trusted. /should not even trust myse/f. 
At the end of the session, as people shuffled papers, replaced 'spectacles Into cases, 
and gathered cups and other remnants from the tea break, a woman took me aside. 
"There are three kinds or writing", she announced to me with some authority. 
"Firstly, there is writing that can be shared with other people general/y, secondly, 
there is writing that can be shared with just one or two close friends, and then there 
Is writing that should be shared with no-one'. A 'meaningful' look then left me in 
no doubt which category my writing had been deemed to fit Into. And also which 
group / had been deemed not to fit Into. 
Some hours after making my retreat I remembered the most popular reading of the 
evening. It was a humorous take on areal' experience of village life, complete with a 
"village Idiot". The writer remarked drolly that it was hard to know whether this person 
was like he was because his father beat him or whether his father beat him because he was 
like he was. This was thought to be uproariously funny. Cause and effect is again 
transposed or at least blurred. The implication is that he (we / I) might be culpable for his 
(our / my) own ill-treatment. And he (we / I) are considered to warrant ridicule rather 
than compassion. As Clara had told me, "It's about silencing the victim; don't bring your 
dirty washing here". 
I thought of my contributors, especially Caroline who had given details of her harsh 
physical punishment, and who had been brought up to believe that it was her fault, 
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'because she was like she was'. I thought of Clara who was warned by the solicitor that if 
she appears in court she will be "torn to shreds" on account of her own sexual history. I 
thought of everyone who had been bullied and who had been held responsible for that 
bullying. And I thought of how I had revealed my identity as 'a strange little girl' and 
wondered what treatment they would consider this to justify. 
There were many times at school when I was bullied, and when my mother found out 
about this her reaction was to befriend the bullies. She would tell me how much she liked 
and admired their bravado and their nerve. And their bullying thereafter included the 
taunt that my parents preferred them to me. My brother's girlfriend also pointed out that 
my parents cared more for her than for me and she too interpreted this as evidence that 
there was something wrong with me, that even my parents didn't value me. 
This tendency to consider victims responsible for their treatment is well documented (e. g. 
Lerner, 1970; Ryan, 1971; Hanson Frieze eta!, 1987). As Stainton Rogers (2003) and 
Nisbett and Ross (1980) had argued, attribution theory is valuable in highlighting the 
human tendency to blame individuals whist indulging in self-justification (Chapter Three). 
We are too often perceived by others to have attracted and deserved what happened. And 
this is thought to lead to increased isolation at the time when social support is most 
needed (Hanson Frieze eta/, 1987). 
All of the contributors give testimony to this sense of isolation and lack of support: 
Clara: I wanted somebody to walk alongside me and hold my hand, back me up. 
Matra: So you never had the feeling that there is this one person you can go and talk 
to... I was left alone. 
Caroline: Didn't have a mother who would come in and give me a bit of sympathy, and a 
bit of there, there. Had no contact. 
Anthony: So I was still left holding this horror, and I was absolutely and totally alone... A 
champion arose... and finally I wasn't carrying it all 
Roberta: So It's that feeling of being out on a limb. In a big organisation, but out on a 
limb. Not actually integrated, just out on a limb. 
Richard: And that sometimes was a very, very lonely place to be. 
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And, for all except Richard this had been linked to them being held responsible for their 
own poor treatment Richard had also felt bullied but his sense of isolation had not 
stemmed from this, but rather from his concerns regarding clients' risk of suicide. 
In our follow-up conversation (see Chapter Six), Anthony had expressed his sense of 
isolation in terms of a specific need for his experiences to be acknowledged and for that 
acknowledgement to be maintained over time, for it to be robust. And he was particularly 
concerned about how this isolation is related to the fear of being thought crazy. 
I too felt a need for such support and acknowledgment. And some years ago my father did 
acknowledge to me that he had been aware of some of the things that had happened to me 
in my childhood. The sense of relief was extraordinary but short-lived; the next day he 
telephoned to say that we must never talk of this again. And soon afterwards, when he 
found out that I was receiving psychotherapy, he gave me an ultimatum. Stop the therapy 
and "toe the line" or "leave the family for good". I took advantage of this opportunity and 
ceased contact for a number of years. And although the space that this created allowed me 
to begin to abandon my futile efforts to gain family acceptance, my yearning to belong 
somewhere persisted. 
Through my experiences at this writers' group I had become more sensitised to the 
personal risks of making my life stories publicly available. But it took me some time to be 
able to appreciate the sensitivities of that audience, that they may have been unprepared 
for the more difficult and emotional content of my writing and may thus have felt abused 
by it (Eakin, 2004 and Chapter Six). I had not extended to them the consideration and 
courtesy that I would extend to clients, and that I had extended to Anthony and the others 
(Chapter Six). This audience had not sought such information from me, but soon 
afterwards I met a woman who did. This meeting again contributed to my understanding 
of identity and identification. 
7.5 Identification and Identity 
A while ago a woman asked me about people who take drugs. 
"Is it because they haven "t got enough patlence7"she asked 
I wondered what might have given her such an idea, but I did not ask. I thought. I 
tried to fit that interpretation onto people 1 have known who have had difficulty 
201 
with drugs; people I have loved, people I have respected. I also tried it on myself. It 
fitted nowhere and I said so, gently. I tried to put something in its place for her and 
so I called upon my own experience, as that is what had prompted the original 
question. 
forme, I said, / think it was about getting some control back getting my head 
under control 
That's what I meant, she said, not being able to accept. 
There are some things that we shouldn't accept 
(My answer came defensively and she looked dubious). 
So I tried to tell her of some of the things I couldn't accept, shouldn't accept. 
What's thatman doing In the field over there? she responded, looking into the 
distance. 
It seems there are some things that none of us can accept, not even the patient. 
This woman was not unusual in her beliefs about people who use drugs. Etherington 
(2006: 234) tells us that: 
"Societal narratives usually focus negatively on drug misusers' personal 
and psychological characteristics, without taking into account the life 
experiences or variable social, political and economic conditions that 
surround a person's life and their relationship with drug misuse-all of 
which impacts upon a drug misuser's sense of self and identity" 
None of the contributors to this study were identified as using drugs; that is not at issue 
here. But Etherington's juxtaposition of imposed attributions and drug users' identities 
raises pertinent questions for identity in general. Identity is a messy issue and identity 
claims are frequently contested. As Etherington points out, this in turn impacts on the 
person's sense of self and identity. 
All of the contributors were subject to disparaging attributions. Some of these were 
individual and some were targeted at groups to which the counsellors belonged, including 
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the counselling profession itself. It seemed that their'social or professional identity' was 
maligned in order to erode the esteem of the individual. For instance Richard reported: 
I can remember a senior officer really trying to rubbish the whole counselling process 
and what we were. We, we weren't psychologists or psychiatrists, we were you know, 
sort of merely counsellors who didn't have any standing at all. He knew better 
because he had been managing people for 30 odd years And that hurt a little. 
It was Clara's organisation that was subject to diminishing comments: 
There was quite a lot of vilification like, "You don't sound very professional": "Shabby 
organisation you work for". Horrible, horrible. 
Where the nature of the contested identity relates to allegations of madness or badness 
they are particularly malignant. As Anthony reports, "They say'You're crazy'". and he was 
told, "You do know thatyou're the one that's fucked up here". 
Such negative attributions, applied either to the person themselves or to groups that they 
are associated with and identify with, are often imposed on those who are not prototypical 
of the group (Jetten, 2006) or who are new to the group (Branscombe et al, 2002). 
And lack of prototypicality has also been found to be associated with lack of identity 
security as well as lack of self esteem (Jetten et al, 2002). The situations that the 
contributors described do in fact appear to have been threatening to their sense of self and 
to their efforts to construct and maintain a coherent and functional identity. 
Many of the contributors presented identities that indicated low self esteem: 
- Such Innocence, such Innocence (Clara) 
- And I mean I think I was a bit of a pushover (Clara) 
- But I always did feel like I was never quite as hard-nosed as any of my peers 
(Caroline) 
-I was naive (Matra) 
-1 was not competent to do it (Matra) 
203 
-I was really green; didn't know a heck of a lot about anything really. Don't know 
why they gave me the job (Caroline) 
- The caption would be I'm not old enough to do this. Nobody taught me how to do 
this. Very much the abandoned child. Very much, yes (Clara) 
- And I don't think I was much of a counsellor then. I was probably a bit out of my 
depth (Richard) 
And as a consequence of the experiences that these counsellors described the identities 
that they claimed became quite disparaging: 
- Like a thief in the night (Clara) 
- Am I the person who is going to ... put myself before? Going to put my interests 
before those of the client? (Clara) 
-I felt like the really rotten person (Caroline) 
-I felt like i was the organisation (Caroline) 
-I was part of their bruising (Roberta) 
-I was part of the abusive system (Roberta) 
-I was bullied. I was a victim (Richard) 
- It's like being the whistle-blower (Anthony) 
-I am a co-dependent as well (Malra) 
-I don't fit there and they don't fit with me (Matra) 
Roberta describes identity struggles that seemed to be characterised by absence rather 
than presence of identification: 
I knew what I wasn't but I didn't know what I was. I knew what I didn't believe in but I 
never knew what I did believe In. I had never looked at what i believed in. I had always 
looked at what I didn't believe in. 
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My own struggles for a place of belonging in the stories above can also be read as a search 
for something to identify with, a search that persisted, taking many forms as I tried to find 
a route between the (countless) proscribed and prescribed options. Again my newly 
discovered writing explored some of these experiences. As Frank (1995: 71) explains: 
"People who are written on from the outside have lost their voices. Speaking in 
a voice recognizable as one's own becomes increasingly difficult so speech 
proliferates in search of that voice. Self-stories proliferate. " 
Mine certainly did and through them I did begin to get the sense of connection I had been 
seeking. The contributors had taught me about evocative showing and not telling, and far 
from it being'something sneaky' (Potter op cit) it was actually profoundly relational. As 
Bronwyn Davies (2000: 34) tells, "the act of taking up and using language seems like an 
intensely personal experience but the effect shows how profoundly collective it is. " 
This next piece of my writing, in particular, has testified to this. Public reading has brought 
warm and enthusiastic reactions and a much greater sense of relationship with others: 
7.6 Seeking positions, being positioned 
My family had a shameful secret No It wasn't the abuse or the fact that we hid the 
wine behind the bookcase when people from chapel came to visit. It was the 
'bloody Irish' in my mother. Whenever she argued with my father he would shout at 
her, "That's the bloody Irish In you ". And when she made mistakes he would explain 
tome and my brother, "That's her 'bloody Irish' coming out "! was warned about 
'Irish Navvies 'and when / referred to a group of travellers frs gypsies / was told, 
"They're not gypsies; they're lust bloody Irish d1ddicoys4" 
/was so grateful that / didn't have any 'bloody Irish 'In mel In spite of my red hair 
which marked me out from 'normal' white people, it took me years to real/se that if 
my mother had Irish in her then surely t would have Irish in me too. But by then / 
felt it was something to be proud of. By then / knew of the struggles and the famine 
and the exiles and forced migration& By ten I knew of the poetry and the music. / 
began to embrace the 'bloody Irish 'in me and, to feel for the plight of the Irish 
people. So / was taken, as an IRA sympathis r and incipient communist, to be given 
a disciplinary talk by an elder from our chapel. 
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There were no 'bloody /rish' In our chapel of course, though there were many black 
people. These were good black people, not like the dangerous and ungodly black 
people outside. These black people knew the truth and how to keep to the word of 
God. We were full of admiration that even black people could be such good 
Christians and we were veryproud of ourselves that we were not prejudiced'and 
could visit a Jamaican family for tea. Some of the black peop/e had large families 
with several children, but unlike the 'bloody /rlsh'they didn't do this as part of a 
plot to take over the world. They were on our side and they were speaking the truth 
and spreading the word. 
/ still love the 'bloody /rlsh' In me, though fashion has caught me up and Is evidently 
tiresome for those with more claim to /rishness than me. As / was told recently, 
"Everyone wants to be bloody Irish these days! " 
Through the experiences that this writing represents, I had begun to learn a little of 
culture and difference; and of discourses of 'prejudice'; and of how we of position 
ourselves and others according to such discourses; and how some are thus included and 
some excluded. And inclusion, or belonging still eluded me. It seemed that I would always 
find myself positioned as other; always'one of them' and never'one of us'. And so I became 
acutely aware of the need to abide by the rules and values of the communities to which I 
aspired to belong. And finding myself in a profession known for its rigorous codes of 
practice and its harsh and public disciplinary procedures (see Danchev, 2005; and Chapter 
Three) I had to be very careful. Working in organisations that did not recognise the values 
of counselling demanded careful navigation of competing demands, but this was familiar 
territory. 
Like most English schools of the 1950s and 60$, my schools held daily religious assemblies 
that involved communal recitation of 'The Lord's Prayer' and 'The Prayer of St Ignatius 
Loyola'. But my parents classed this practice as 'chanting', which was the work of the devil. 
They would not explain this to the teachers, and so I had to learn to disobey school 
authorities from a very early age, unsupported. 
In childhood I learned to mime, in adulthood I learned to bridge. In some of the situations I 
encountered I was trying to span what seemed like unbridgeable distances between 
management and counsellors where both sides were unquestioningly confident about the 
'rightness' of their position and their conviction. I found myself criticised and blamed by 
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both and supported by neither. The more difficult the situation I found myself in, the more 
important it seemed to 'do the right thing'. 
Somehow I always managed to hold the boundary, to keep to the guidelines. And 
eventually it seems that someone noticed something of this; the trying to be good finally 
paid off when a colleague of mine, John Bergin, gave me recognition for my ethical 
struggles. He told me that I had integrity, what I heard was that I was, after all, 'a good 
little girl'. The freshness that this brought was immense, contrasting starkly with the 
messiness and shame of previous identities. 
An early afternoon in May, 1991 
Standing in an open doorway, in a corridor, where the stairway passes 
With the sun sending diagonal shafts of light across metal window frames, 
And institutionally pastel walls, 
John Bergin told me that I had integrity 
And I rejoined the human race. 
I don't know what prompted him to say this 
And I don't know if I knew then, 
But I know that it meant that I had a right of belonging, 
I was no longer cast out. 
(I had used promiscuity to bury Incest; 
Surely another and another and another wi// stop that first one from showing 
through. 
But my hair and my eyes became wild and /hid behind them. 
/ became a worry to my poor mother 
And was often rebuked for that by the many people in whom she had confided, 
Including, sometimes, strangers In the street. 
And about the chip that /had on myshou/der, 
And about being a /ea/ous child. 
And a space opened up In my abdomen, between my ribs 
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And sometimes it became so big that / thought my whole self would fall into it, 
Would implode like my father told me would happen to the television 
If / was clumsy near it, but / wasn't clumsy, not in that way. 
The accidents that / kept having weren't physical, 
But were unspeakable. 
And it always seemed to be me that they happened to, 
And the strangers in the street were confirmed In their view. 
And somewhere in the space between my ribs / could hear an echo, 
As Ina vast empty cavern. 
And sometimes a scream would emanate from Its depths 
That only / could hear, as it was muffled behind the wildness of my hair and eyes. 
Though / feared it would be heard, 
And stuffed what / could In there to stifle the piercing sound; 
Food, drin/ drugs. 
If I could have Ingested stones, piled up in there perhaps that could have worked 
Like putting a gravestone In place to keep the unquietsplr/ts In. 
Sadness, madness and badness are all very close. 
One thing leads to another: ugly emotions 
That the world does not want pushed into Its face. ) 
But integrity is welcome and so must be nurtured and protected, 
Lest it and I should become lost again. 
7.7 Unfettered growth 
The value of this recognition was untold, is untellable (as Leitch, 2003, had warned 
regarding the limits of language). The attribution I was offered became a raft that I 
climbed on in the deluge of criticism and rejection. I was floating on integrity, integrity 
was keeping me safe and dry. I would not risk letting go. But for me at that time, integrity 
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still meant obedience to the codes and rules that I was exposed to, and resistance to 
anything that threatened that. 
Like Richard I had been able to hold boundaries firmly. I felt strong in the moment but 
very vulnerable in the aftermath. I became so depleted by the process that I was left with 
little resilience, and here my experiences were closer to the other contributors. Under this 
kind of pressure and isolation our (my) fragility begins to surface, the messiness of our 
(my) own emotional turmoil begins to leak, we (1) can find ourselves (myself) to be 
shamed, and we again become (I became) a site ripe for victim-blaming discourses. 
In my life, childhood themes of aloneness along with ethical uncertainty and dilemma 
regarding the best course of action continued (continue). I didn't know how to be good, 
but I was surrounded by those who claimed to know all too well. And those who think they 
have found a truth about us become dangerous to us. As Dorothy Rowe (1989: 16-17) 
points out: 
"The most dangerous people in the world are those who believe that they know 
what is best for others. People who believe that they know what is best for 
other people are denying other people's truths. Whenever our own truth is 
denied, ignored or invalidated we experience the greatest fear we can ever 
know: the threat of annihilation of our self. " 
Holly Near (2000) also makes this point in her song '1 ain't afraid, when she sings, "The 
ones who say they know it are the ones who will impose it on you". And yet again, as 
White (2002) tells, there were unlimited opportunities for me to fail to be an adequate 
person. And (supported by my relentless external locus of evaluation; see Rogers, 1961), 1 
fear that I found, and embraced, them all. 
Again I wrote my way into and through my embodied memories and experiences to find 
new meanings, and a new sense of agency: 
lam my father's moustache, 
And / could have been a prize one 
But /looked a little uneven 
Before the competition 
And so he trimmed, 
first this side and then that 
And unable to find the perfect balance 
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He allowed others in to he/p. 
And over time the moustache got smaller and smaller, 
And seeing that it was now so diminished 
But no less wayward, 
He finally cut it off altogether. 
I started life too noisy, greedy and demanding; disgusting qualities for a Christian 
girl child. So I learned the lessons well and my voice became a whisper and never 
asked for anything. 
So at school I was too quiet, docile and remote; embarrassing qualities for a 
working class girl. It took much longer to learn the lessons of how to let my voice 
be heard. 
I was then too wild, undisciplined and headstrong; detestable qualities for a young 
wife and mother. Shame and insecurity are powerful allies In learning the lessons of 
forbearance. 
I then became too house proud, orderly and dutiful; hateful qualities for a woman 
of feminist times. The years of criticism and rejection were by now eroding my 
resistance and I more easily learned the lessons of conformity. 
Next I became too academic, independent and opinionated; unsuitable qualities 
for a humanistic counsellor. Fearing I lacked professionalism, I determinedly 
learned the lessons of adherence and opening to others' scrutiny. 
And I found myself judged to be too dependent, yielding and unsure; unfitting 
qualities for an independent researcher and writer. And I recognise truth in this, 
and how the learning of lessons has brought me here. 
Others still have their opinions about how the moustache could best be saved and 
will continue to trim away as long as I /et them. But now / think the time has come 
for the trimming to stop. 
And it was only at this point, having immersed myself in the rich field of ethical theory and 
philosophy, and having spent time living with the six narratives of ethical challenge 
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included herein, and having been given this opportunity to recreate my own ethical 
understandings within this rich and fragrant garden, that I was able to begin to let go of 
the child's need to be 'good' and move on to a more mature connection to ethics and 
morality. 
I had learned how to disobey within powerful organisations when their demands 
challenged the doctrine of my given faith. Doctrine had been privileged over the authority 
vested in the hierarchical structure of the organisations in which I found myself, both in 
childhood and in adulthood. In childhood, Christian faith took precedence over the 
authority of my school. In my work as a counsellor, professional codes of practice and the 
person-centred creed took precedence over the authority of the employing organisation. 
In my efforts to be allied with the righteous I had been unable to handle the unavoidable 
complexity and contradiction, and therefore unable to practice ethical mindfulness in the 
way that Bond (2000,2005) presents it. Moral agency eluded me, I was oppressed by 
competing discourses rather than being able to navigate skilfully through them. But my 
moral identity changed over the course of my engagement in this research, and so had that 
of the contributors. 
From this process new and more complex understandings began to emerge for all of us; a 
reminder that both text and identity are always and inevitably partial and in the process of 
reconstitution (Esgalhado, 2003). Contributors began to use language such as, "It's never 
straightforward. " Or, "it's not clear cut. " In particular, they began to express more complex 
views about their own actions, and simple distinctions between resistance and 
capitulation became problematic: 
Clara: And I mean I, I think I was a bit of a pushover. Could I... Could i have done any 
different? To say, "that's not my job. You pull your finger out" I really don't 
know. It occurs to me now that If I'd been a different person I'd have said, "I'm 
not having this. " 
Am I just being difficult? Am I standing my ground? Or is this more about me? 
Maira: Well I hid it um from the work... I didn't talk to anyone superior than me, to 
anyone who had the authority to say i was not suitable for this or anything like 
that... Whatever they were giving me to work on I was willing to take it even 
if it was more than I could take. Just to prove that i could do it. 
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Roberta: I was colluding. I was part of this... And now looking back I realise that it was 
fundamental to my whole belief system that I told her the truth. And I didn't. 
And that feels wrong 
Anthony: I still have some resistance to acknowledging my part In this but reading the 
transcript allows me to consider further my own craziness, what I evoke In 
others. 
Richard: I think it's taken me back to, "Am I good enough? Am I good enough as a 
counsellor? " 
And some also began to consider the position of the person from whom they had 
experienced pressure: 
Anthony: Certainly, I have found greater compassion for the supervisor by going 
through this process 
It has been good to revisit the transcript today because It feels like I have 
worked through the unresolved powerful feelings that loaded this experience. 
I am left with a calm acknowledgement of what has happened with little anger 
or blame remaining. 
Caroline: Thinking about truth and reality. This boss that I talk about, some of the 
things that he wanted me to do might not have been about managing his 
career. But I guess... You see one thing that definitely is and therefore 
everything else becomes shaded by that, and then everything that he wants is 
about that. When sometimes maybe It's not. Maybe it's something else. But 
I've kind of lumped it all Into that's what It's about.... He was still getting flack 
for, for me not doing things. 
Roberta: The problem is if you stay outside of the circle... And I'm making plans to 
make links again .... the very person I want to make the link with is that 
personnel officer who'd not done what he said he would do. And that is really 
weird because of all the people I've thought who could I contact to do this, he 
is the person ... And I guess that's because I, 1 do hold this... He was a really 
nice guy. He was a really nice bloke. I'm sure what he was doing must have 
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somehow grated with him, somehow ... I think he did it probably out of him 
not wanting to do it either. 
Maira: I'm really, really grateful for what they gave me as a client and what they gave 
to my relative as well 
Throughout the experience it seemed that they had been motivated by a relational ethics 
that was based on their relationship with clients. Now it seemed that this valuing of 
relationship was extended to those who had pressured them to act against their ethical 
beliefs. The individualising discourses that create heroes and villains (Gergen, 1995) had 
been considerably troubled. 
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Chapter Eight 
Filling gaps and leaving space: Review and reflection 
8.1 Regarding focal points: Some substantive findings 
In a recent job interview I was called upon to explain my PhD research. I was at once 
enlivened. This is what I love to talk about. I went through my take on postmodernism and 
the implications for what can be known, or claimed to be known; I reflected on the ethics 
of uncertainty; and I enthused about evocative telling and witnessing; the panel member 
looked perturbed and sought some clarification. 
"You said that you were nearing completion? " 
"Yes", I affirmed. 
"So what have you actually found? " she replied, more firmly. 
I wanted to say, 'I have found that I am not as I thought I was; nothing is as I thought it 
was. " But pragmatism won; I gave a realist enquirer what she sought. I gave simple 
conclusions on the narratives and in so doing denied the doubt, the uncertainty, the rich 
contradictions and the positioned nature of the whole enterprise. The enquirer smiled, 
seemingly satisfied. 
Of course there are valuable things to be said at this level, and some of them provide 
powerful lessons for the counselling profession. So, despite my preference for a position of 
uncertainty and tentative knowing, I will outline these here and move to a somewhat more 
authoritative voice: 
The counsellors tended to hold deontological and / or relational values but they 
were not in positions of power and those in the more powerful positions tended to 
prefer utilitarian values. 
At times the pressure to breach personal or professional ethical standards was 
considerable and unpleasant 
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There was little if any support for the counsellors and as such the experiences 
were profoundly isolating. 
The counsellors experienced the pressure as bullying and intimidating. This 
pressure was accompanied / supported by efforts to malign the social or 
professional identity of the person. 
They were also subjected to identity attributions that related to allegations of 
madness or badness. 
In the retelling they were reminded of early childhood experiences which they felt 
to have been particularly constitutive of their ethical / moral identity. 
Ethical / moral identity seems to have been further constituted through the 
creation and articulation of the narratives herein, as well as through the impact of 
the critical incidents themselves. 
In the complexity of the experience, it was sometimes difficult to distinguish 
between resistance and capitulation. 
Such complexity was increasingly recognised, through the retelling, as the research 
progressed. 
Richard's narrative differed significantly from the others in its clarity regarding the right 
course of action, and in its presentation of robust convictions and self-belief. There were 
also substantial differences between his situation and that of the others, and these 
differences seem to have served as protective factors. They were, in his words: 
having a job description 
having a piece of paper that I could wave that them 
having it spelled out 
having been in the organisation for a very long time 
documents on confidentiality 
having a contract 
being steeped in labour law 
being an experienced counsellor 
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This is a formidable list, and Richard himself said, "It gave me a shield". None of the other 
contributors had such a shield. They were all relatively inexperienced and lacked 
supportive documentation. 
8.2 Revisiting the ethical landscape 
The new understanding that this study offers regarding the lack of supportive 
documentation is particularly important for the counselling profession in light of recent 
changes in the way that ethical guidance is given to members of the main professional 
bodies, and the ways that members are consequently positioned by these professional 
bodies. In Chapter Three I outlined the move from a clear code of ethics and practice to a 
framework of principles, through which the individual is expected to navigate. This shifts 
the locus of responsibility from the professional body to the individual practitioner. There 
is also an implication that this change reduces the support available to those practitioners. 
As Bond (2005) has recognised, clear codes of practice can and have been used to give 
practitioners protection from interference by employers. But the same protection is no 
longer available. Bond's (2005) thorough analysis has shown that the imposition of a set of 
codes and rules was problematic and undermining of ethical mindfulness (see Chapter 
Three) and so I am not recommending a return to this. But, in the absence of the 
protection that codes offered, a stronger form of agency is now required of counsellors, 
and where the agency of counsellors is lacking, there needs to be sufficient support to 
compensate for this. 
In Chapter Three I turned Edwards (2005a) argument (that, where there is a lack of 
institutional shelter, members require strong agency) on its head. Surely where there is a 
lack of strong agency there should be provision of sound and reliable institutional shelter. 
We cannot expect to find strong agency with trainees and novices, yet the contributors to 
this study give testimony that, as trainees and novices, they were indeed left without 
effective support and shelter. 
The need for safe and supportive arenas for counsellors has also been made explicit by 
Smith (2003), but for all of the practitioners in this study there were no such safe arenas 
and in this the profession seems to have failed them. The contributors variously turned to 
peers, supervisors and their professional association itself for support and / or guidance. 
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The main professional body seems at times to be understood simply in terms of its 
disciplinary procedures and powers of sanction. Whilst it does also have a supportive 
function, only two of the six contributors attempted to access this, and neither of them 
found it to be helpful or effective. Consistent with the seemingly pervasive faith and 
confidence in the supervisory process amongst the counselling community, both were 
advised to seek supervision in order to process their difficulties. But none of the 
counsellors in the study found their supervision to be helpful or effective. 
Lawton and Feltham (2000) have provided a thorough critique of the professional 
"obligation to use regular and on-going supervision" (BACP, 2007: 3). And the poor 
reports of supervision in these narratives may at first glance be taken to support such 
criticism, but the contributors drew no such conclusions. On the contrary, they simply 
wanted effective and ethical supervision, and in fact they worked very hard to try to obtain 
this. 
Like Anthony, the counsellors who reported abuse by their supervisors in Kaberry's report 
(2000: 42) were reluctant to give their stories as they feared being "blamed or 
'pathologised' by other members of the profession". This fear of blame and judgment by 
peers was also shown to be warranted by the experiences of contributors to this study. 
When Clara sought peer support she felt victim-blamed and rejected for 'bringing her dirty 
washing' to her fellow counsellors; for Maira 'nobody noticed' her stress; Caroline's 
discomfort with the practices of the organisation meant that she came to be seen as the 
problem; Anthony's experiences were so strange that he felt others could not believe him; 
and Roberta experienced pressure from her peers to stay silenced as they feared for their 
jobs if she rocked the boat 
The messages from these counsellors are that the consequent isolation and silencing are 
not only painful but also undermining of their practice, and that fears of judgment and 
victim-blaming added to their experiences of being silenced and isolated. This seems 
particularly unjust as counsellors hear the stories that the rest of society does not want to 
hear, and they offer a trusting relationship so that people may tell them the stories that 
they feel unable to tell elsewhere for fear of criticism and / or isolation; but in this study 
the counsellors themselves were criticised and / or isolated for telling their stories within 
the counselling community. 
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8.3 More common, and uncommon ground 
I returned to Richard to explore issues relating to these changing professional 
expectations further, and he helpfully envisages a situation where he experiences the same 
pressure but without the protective documentation: 
At that stage I think I would be responding by saying the client counsellor-relationship 
is the most important part of what I am giving the client. There is trust from the client 
to me. There is an openness and we are, as far as I can see, doing some good work and 
that requires me to not betray that trust by disclosing things that have been said.... 
So underpinning it all is a sense of what is right and what is wrong in the counsellor - 
client relationship. 
Thus, in the absence of clear guidelines Richard, like the others, focuses on relationship 
and duty to the client. This brings us to Bond's (2004a, 1994b, 2006) advocacy of trust and 
trustworthiness as core concepts for ethical counselling. To date such consideration has 
focussed on the local negotiation and demonstration of trust within the therapeutic 
relationship itself. The narratives of this study, however, have brought the wider 
organisational context of the counsellor into the frame, giving vivid examples of how 
counsellor trustworthiness may be qualified by such context. In order to provide a 
trustworthy therapeutic relationship the counsellor must be able to withstand contrary 
organisational demands. In order to trust the therapeutic relationship the client must be 
convinced of this ability to withstand such demands. 
In the envisaged situation without protective documentation, Richard, like the others, also 
seems to become more subjective. His phrase, "a sense of what is right and what is wrong" 
is reminiscent of the more subjective and embodied responses of the other contributors. 
Their reactions to the ethically challenging situations were not explicitly informed by 
theory but were apparently pre-reflexive and subjective, arising from embodied 
awareness, often in the form of a gut feeling. 
But this subjectivism does not seem to be as straightforward as it first appeared to me. Of 
course as a philosophical position, in a serious analysis, or even in reflection, gut feelings 
are insufficient (Nash, 2002b; Lewis, 2003). But in the narratives presented in this 
research the subjective, embodied sense seems to have served an important purpose. It 
acted as an early indicator that something was amiss. And this was particularly beneficial 
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for those counsellors who were novices, who had very little training or experience to call 
upon: 
Maira: In my gut level I could feel that something was going wrong because I couldn't 
understand how counsellors can work with so much pressure and be as well 
ethical. I had a gut feeling that something was going wrong but I had no proof, 
no academic knowledge or counselling or information off anyone. 
Caroline: And my tummy said, `this doesn't feel right'. And so I sat at my desk and I felt 
really... I guess very kind of perplexed by it all thinking, this really doesn't feel 
right. 
And I think I was being driven by my feelings. But probably at that stage I 
wasn't that clear about what those feelings were. All I would know was, this 
feels really uncomfortable. This feels like it's wrong. 
Anthony: I was just beginning my last year of training. I was unaware of.. It didn't... 
you know there's this thing about... it didn't feel right but I didn't quite know 
why. 
It may appear that these responses are uninformed by discourse, but how can that be the 
case? None of us exist in isolation. No awareness and no response can arise in individual 
isolation. There is no (adult) experience that is not always and already subject to 
discourse. And no discourse is free from moral evaluation. The counsellors' Inability to 
situate their gut feelings in the moment does not render them exempt from "external 
justification or credibility" (Lewis, 2003: 227) in later reflection or debate. 
We will have been caught countless times in and between webs of competing discourses 
and we will have been constituted both by these discourses and by our reflections on 
them. We aspire to some communities (and their associated discourses) and not to others; 
we feel a sense of belonging in some communities (and their associated discourses) and 
not in others. 
And identity is clearly bound up in this. Weiland (2003) suggests complementing Gergen's 
(1991) claims (that identity is best understood in terms of dilemmas, as multiple, 
conflicted, protean, variable and relativist) with claims for a more durable and consistent 
model of human experience. I found myself wondering whether subjectivism might be 
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seen as arising from just such a durable identity, that the response doesn't need to be 
thought about because it fits with 'who we are'. But that position offers little and 
eventually leads back to essentialising theses of human nature: 
I just was the kind of person who was obedient 
Richard just was the kind of person who was robust in his beliefs 
And so on. 
But apparent durability and consistency does not confirm such theses. Perhaps it simply 
indicates lack of exposure to competing discourses. The particular groups and 
communities, with which we ally ourselves, all have particular (but not necessarily 
evident) ethical climates and values. It seems reasonable to suggest that such alliances 
then lead to repeated practices (Wetherell, 2005), and thus become consistent with a felt 
sense of rightness, i. e. a gut feeling. These discourses of the groups and communities to 
which we aspire to belong might thus be read as identity constraints. 
The social sites of workplace, counselling profession, training organisation etc represent 
diverse social spaces which are variously associated with both conflicted and cohesive 
patterns of social relations. They are each clearly influential with regard to the 
constitution of identity practices, which are thus also likely to be both conflicted and 
cohesive. The question of what influenced the contributors to act from an 'ethical 
counsellor' identity rather than the 'loyal employee' or 'good citizen' identity is then 
raised. The fact that counsellors are rarely prototypical in organisational settings, and 
therefore are rarely in positions of power seems relevant Most of my contributors did 
indeed occupy lowly roles and were positioned as 'other' by those who were pressuring 
them. It is not surprising then that loyalty and accountability to the group is reduced in 
less prototypical members and that they are more likely to resist that group culture than 
are prototypical members (Jetten, 2006; Jetten et at, 1997). It seems that these acts of 
resistance then serve to further the lack of prototypicality. The sense of difference 
increases and perhaps this too accounts for some of the isolation experienced. Jetten 
(2006) suggests that employees in corrupt organisations may choose to remain on the 
periphery, to not become prototypical. All of the contributors seemed to make this choice. 
And all except Richard left their organisations soon after the incidents described. This is 
reminiscent of Taylor's (1989) suggestion that we are influenced by a'craving' to be 
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connected to or in correct relation to'the good' but, of course, what is considered to be 
'the good' is complex and disputed. 
And perhaps it is the experience of finding ourselves exposed to the moral discourses of a 
different community that brings our own values into awareness. And thus our sense of 
knowing, our sense of certainty fails and we are forced to re-examine what we thought we 
knew to be true. And it is this state of uncertainty that Bauman and others like him 
consider to be the only ethical position: "[Uncertainty] is the very soil in which the moral 
self takes root and grows. Moral life is a life of continuous uncertainty" (Bauman, 1994: 
44-45). 
Perhaps the mindfulness that Bond (2000,2005) recommends should simply consist of a 
constant reminder that we can never know if we are right. As Clara told me, "I don't think 
there is any such thing as the right thing; I think what we're invited to do is to wrestle with 
anxiety". 
This appreciation of uncertainty may be troublesome for some in the professional bodies 
whose job it is to maintain (and raise) standards of ethics and practice. The professional 
associations and societies clearly have a responsibility to protect the public and to 
maintain the good standing of the profession. As such they are understandably concerned 
to uphold and to further professional and ethical standards, but there is little open debate 
about how this is best accomplished. 
And it is the ethical frameworks and codes of practice that render the moral discourses of 
these bodies explicit, including what is considered to be'good practice'. In this model the 
direction of ethical standards is always from the professional body to the member. Yet 
Bauman (1993: 32) also suggests that: 
"it is society, its continuing existence and its well-being, that is made possible 
by the moral competence of its members - not the other way round" 
The evidence of the contributors in this study shows that we should now consider 
whether this might also be true for the counselling professional societies. Is the existence 
of the BACP and the BPS also made possible by the moral competence of their members? It 
is indeed difficult to imagine how they might exist without such moral competence; and 
the experiences of the contributors to this research are testimony to this. They struggled 
against the odds to maintain ethical relationships with their clients in the absence of 
support and even when, as novices, they had had little exposure to the explicit principles 
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and practices of the profession. It was typically their'felt-sense' (Gendlin, 1978; 1996) that 
guided them. Yet it must also be recognised that such a 'felt-sense' seems to have failed 
others revealed in the counsellors' narratives (such as Anthony's supervisor). The 
responsibility of the professional bodies to address issues of malpractice and risk to 
clients and others cannot be denied, and this inevitably places members under scrutiny. 
But the extent to which ensuing self-regulation is a product of mindless obedience or of 
mindful agentic practices is a moot point. 
The contributors' feelings of being personally culpable and shamed can be seen to relate to 
their embracing the profession's expectations for thorough reflexivity and responsibility. 
As Foucault and White had indicated, they made great attempts to become thoroughly self- 
regulating, but in the absence of solid support, and in the chaos of the bullying 
experiences, this self-regulation could not be relied upon to be effective or helpful. 
As Stainton Rogers eta[ (1995) identified `painful paradoxes' in social psychology where 
the teaching of moral lessons may not be moral themselves, perhaps the professional 
associations with responsibility for counselling need to consider whether their way of 
teaching, and upholding, moral practice is itself moral. Blackburn's (2001) assertion that 
there is a great difference between an ethical climate and a moralistic climate also needs 
to be remembered here. 
8.4 Beyond hot houses and cold frames 
The most difficult aspect of this research seemed to relate to the vast potential for negative 
attributions and judgments and the concomitant desire to shelter or hide from the critical 
public and professional gaze. This was exacerbated by memories of past abuses, including 
experiences of repeat victimisation and victim-blaming. Attribution theory has revealed 
our tendency to blame individuals and to underestimate the importance of context 
(Stainton Rogers, 2003), but the contributors to this research told me "it's not that 
straightforward". Again this seems to be a message the profession needs to hear more 
widely, and any support for counsellors also need to take account of such inevitable 
complexity and to communicate a policy of avoiding easy judgment of individuals. 
The bullying encountered as part of the pressure to engage in unethical counselling, in 
itself, amounted to a repeat victimisation for some, and was experienced as traumatic. 
Etherington (2003a: 26) reports that "responses to trauma can often make the sufferer 
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feel 'crazy' or out of control", and it may then become more difficult for us to challenge 
those who ascribe such craziness to us. But in getting to know Anthony, Caroline, Clara, 
Maira, Richard and Roberta I have not witnessed craziness, but rather a robust integrity, 
and sufficient strength and sanity to offer their experiences here so that others may learn 
from them. 
Fears of victim-blaming and perhaps of harsh disciplinary procedures (Danchev, 2005) 
can only serve to close down dialogue and reduce the likelihood that we will share our 
stories. This will then limit our opportunities for learning from others or indeed, from our 
own experiences. 
In counselling we cannot avoid hearing people's stories. We are unable to remain ignorant of 
the existence of a multiplicity of stories behind the various actions and non-actions of others. 
And, as such, perhaps there is little excuse for attribution error or dispositional bias when we 
hear the stories behind the actions, including the complexity of situational factors. But where 
we are committed to hearing the stories of clients, this research has shown us to be less 
effective at hearing each other's stories. 
Again, it is time to heed Smith's (2003) call for safe arenas where such dialogue and 
storying can take place, and where we feel ourselves to be safe enough to rest in not 
knowing. Maintaining ethical counselling requires us to hear each other's stories in ways 
that enable us to enter the experiences related without retreating into positions of 
knowing and certainty. In this research the evocative telling that shows and does not 
simply tell helped me to witness effectively and also to connect to my own experiences and 
stories. Perhaps in these safe arenas there could be space and support for such evocative 
forms of storying. 
There is no evidence, from this research, that the systems and procedures that are already 
in place are ineffective for experienced counsellors. The particular problem that is 
elucidated here is that of insufficient support for novice counsellors. The novice 
counsellors who have testified here had no reliable source of verification for their gut- 
feelings that something was amiss. 
Of course effective supervision could have remedied this, but in some cases the 
supervision was the cause of the disquiet, and in no cases was it effective. So there has to 
be a backup. The BACP already offers an `Ethical Helpdesk' and an `Experienced 
Practitioner Network' but only two of the contributors contacted the BACP, and they both 
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found it unhelpful. It also seems significant that the remaining four did not even consider 
doing this. We must wonder if this says something about the BACP's perceived 
accessibility and approachability. And of course, reputations for harsh disciplinary 
procedures and shaming sanctions will not help here. 
Better and clearer publicity for the support services offered by the professional bodies, 
such as the BACP'Ethical Helpdesk' and 'Experienced Practitioner Network' seems an 
obvious first step. And this should include, where possible, clear communication about the 
confidentiality and trustworthiness of those services, including any limits. Surely the 
professional bodies should also aspire to work within the relevant ethical frameworks in 
their dealings with members. 
We also need to consider whether additional institutional shelters could be made 
available. The current forms of supervision have become taken for granted and hence, like 
motherhood and apple pie, are no longer amenable to genuine reflection. 
Encouragement of more group supervision may go some way towards the provision of 
safe places where counsellors can hear each others stories, and this would also help to 
militate against abusive supervisory relationships where the individual is 'locked in' with 
the supervisor, either metaphorically as with Anthony, or literally as I had been. 
There must be many further creative solutions to this problem, once we as a professional 
community put our minds to this. But whatever forms of shelter are provided, safety and 
the willingness to hear each other's stories with the sensitivity and humanity that we offer 
to clients seems paramount. In short, there should be no rush to judgment, negative 
individual attributions should be avoided and situational factors, including the wider 
organisational context, should be taken into account. And if this is offered, then this is 
what should be communicated, unambiguously, to members. 
If the professional societies themselves were able to communicate a policy of avoiding 
easy judgment of individuals, perhaps in the publicity material for the support services 
outlined above, then the membership and the wider community would also be more likely 
to adopt this position. In this event, it is to be hoped that we would feel less defensive, less 
likely to hide from scrutiny and hence more open to learning and to challenge, and so 
become more agentic as practitioners. And, again, this is particularly important for novices 
where we cannot expect strong agency. 
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To hear each other's stories effectively we also have to hear across the various groupings 
and divisions in counselling, but the 'turf wars' and 'tribalism' of counselling work against 
this. There seems to be a reticence or even resistance to listen to alternative (often, and 
perhaps more honestly referred to as competing) approaches to practice. But this research 
has drawn attention to the ways in which our agency is limited by the discourses that we 
are exposed to, and discourse is thus recognized as the horizon of agency. These 'turf wars' 
restrict our access to competing discourses and cause us to defend against them rather 
than give them open consideration. Again, in order to open to alternative discourses we 
need to take a position of some uncertainty, to consider that the alternatives may have 
something to offer, and to accept that our own favoured schools may not have all the 
answers. 
So the proposed supervisory groups might also be encouraged to welcome increased 
theoretical diversity so that, again, exposure to different discourses may raise 
practitioners' horizons of agency. Of course it can be difficult to move to an open or 
unguarded position as regards those who we have previously considered to be our 
opponents but, in this, we would be in good company. 
I recently watched an interview with a peace activist from the 'Seeds of Hope' organisation of 
Northern Ireland. This woman had been able to put aside generations of conflict and personal 
grief to engage in dialogue with those who many would consider to be her enemies. The 
interviewer, Gloria Hunniford, asked how she was able to work for peace, particularly whilst 
her family were involved in the conflict, she replied, "What helped me was hearing people's 
stories. " 
The valuing of a safe arena for storying, from the perspective of the narrator, is expressed 
by Roberta: 
It's just confirmed my new understanding of how important it is to have a 
platform to tell a story, because I have never told this story, ever... I've 
never told it as a story. And in telling the story, what resonatesforyou, 
your values, value and belief is In some way affected. That's what always 
seems to happen to me. When you tell a story aloud a new story develops 
because you understand the value and belief, and therefore it moves you 
on. That's the transformation of It.. whilst I was quiet and silenced 
nothing changed. Internally there is just a story within your head, which 
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that was, a story within my head... Nothing changes whilst things are in 
my head. 
As Wortham (2000) has found, telling autobiographical stories are transformative acts 
whereby narrators change themselves through the telling. 
8.5 Contemplating the yield, anticipating new growth 
I too found both hearing and telling autobiographical stories to be transformative, so much 
so that I found my own identity, my values and my practices developing and shifting 
during the course of the research process. Such researcher responsiveness during the 
research process has been identified as a valuable constructive criterion, or verification 
strategy, with which to judge the work (Morse et al, 2002; Holt, 2003). In my own 
assessment too, this heuristic, iterative responsiveness was very valuable. It allowed me 
to follow unexpected paths as they emerged, and to engage in research practices that 
could not have been foreseen at the outset, including creative and autoethnographic 
writing. As St Pierre (1997: 176) puts it, postfoundational research aims to "produce 
different knowledge and produce knowledge differently". 
Of course, new research practices arise from particular values, and reflect dissatisfactions 
with existing approaches, but evaluation and critique continue to be made by adherents of 
these existing approaches, who are likely to be more established in the academy than 
those researchers who embrace the new practices. Assessment of validity is therefore 
often in terms of values that are extrinsic, or in conflict with, the new practices and the 
associated values. Some such occurrences have led to the publication of personal 
narratives which give testimony to the anguish this can cause for researchers (see for 
example Holt, 2003; Sparkes, 2000,2002). Associated'crises of legitimation' (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2000) have led to the development of new, more appropriate concepts of validity 
and related terminology (see Seale, 1999; Golafshani, 2003). Davies and Dodd (2002: 281), 
who identified a "quantitative bias in the concept of rigor" [sic], recommend that we 
should now reconceive validity by starting to focus on "subjectivity, reflexivity, and the 
social interaction of interviewing". That has been my position throughout this research. 
Trustworthiness is also increasingly included in such developments (eg. Lincoln and 
Guba, 1985; Mishler, 2000; Bond, 2004a, 1994b, 2006), and this criterion is particularly 
relevant here as the narratives in this project relate, in no small part, to issues of trust and 
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trustworthiness. But this research is also infused with 'artful' content and processes, and 
creativity has been found to be in a somewhat problematic relationship with perceptions 
of trustworthiness (Potter, 1996), where the proximity of concepts such as 'art', 'artful' or 
'artifice' seems to arouse suspicion and scepticism. 
In this I was not alone, I found myself allying with an emerging community of others 
(Bochner and Ellis, 2003; Bolton, 2001a; Bolton, and Latham, 2004; Clough, 2002; 
Etherington, 2000,2003b; 2004; Leitch, 2006; Richardson, 1992,2000; Sparkes, 2002; 
Speedy, 2005,2006) where arts-based inquiry is practised. All of these researchers had 
been discovering and expressing the power of writing for inquiry, creativity, therapy and 
reflexivity and, in doing so, 'troubling' old boundaries between art, science, therapy and 
research. As Eisner (2001: 138-139) explains: 
"There has been a growing realization in recent years among researchers of 
something that artists have long known in their bones; namely, that form 
matters, that content and form cannot be separated, that how one says 
something is part and parcel of what is said. " 
A particular focus on language is identified by Janesick (2001: 539) who argues that for all 
qualitative researchers "the story is paramount. And nothing is so important to the story 
as the words we use, both intuitively and creatively. " This must be particularly true for 
narrative researchers, and certainly was for me. But this deliberateness in choosing the 
words I used was not motivated by artifice but by the effort of, "finding language that is 
adequate to experience" (Bochner and Ellis, 2003: 507), and as the contributors had 
seemingly engaged in a similar enterprise, so I felt inspired to follow suit. This proved to 
be very effective in giving vivid access to each of our experiences of facing ethically 
uncomfortable situations. 
Regarding "the challenge to write social science as art", Clough (1999: 429) muses on the 
lack of methodological apologia in literary texts. As he says, in these contexts, the story is 
its own verification and the terms on which stories are read are contained within the texts 
themselves. He later wonders (2002: 16). "Can ethnography do the same and still be 
ethnography? " This dilemma is more clearly phrased by Josselson (1993: xi) who 
specifically asks, "What must be added to a story to make it scholarship? " 
There have been many responses to such questions. Among these Richardson, Bochner 
and Ellis stand out as having made and defended significant contributions. Richardson's 
(1995,2000) suggestions include emotional or intellectual impact as well as coherence, 
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verisimilitude and interest. And Bochner and Ellis (2003: 507) consider, "what it 
awakened or evoked in the spectator, how it created meanings, how it could heal, and 
what it could teach, incite, inspire or provoke. " Such testaments and tributes have in fact 
followed the various presentations of this research at numerous seminars and 
conferences, but the real test of these criteria will depend on the impact on you, the 
reader. 
Creativity, in this research, has not been confined to the artful or evocative content. In this 
chapter there has been some recognition of the various social sites where new discourses 
may be encountered and where identity and associated practices are reconstituted. I 
would also like to recognise that the relationships between the researcher and the 
contributors also constitute a social site where the renegotiation of identity occurs and 
where new narratives and forms of subjectivity may emerge. I, specifically, did not want to 
"tyrannise [contributors] into a state of 'authenticity"' as White (1995: 47- 48) believes 
much psychology to do, but wanted to hold a space where they could reflect further and 
allow complexity and movement. This too can be seen as a creative enterprise. 
In recognising that research arenas are effective sites for renegotiation rather than simple 
subjugation their potential for emancipatory practices is revealed and, in this, narrative 
inquiry can become allied to action research. The counsellor education program at 
Waikato University, New Zealand explicitly conceives its task as assisting students to story 
a professional 'counsellor' identity (see Mckenzie and Monk, 1997; Winslade et al, 2000). 
Apparently, a significant site for this storying of identity is the students' experience of 
being interviewed by a faculty member whilst other students form a reflecting team 
(White, 1995). In these interviews, unique outcomes and dilemmas in their work are 
explored. This is clearly reminiscent of my conversations with my research contributors. 
But narrative is dialogical and so we must be willing to take account of the power of the 
researcher in the production of the narrative as well as in subsequent interpretations. As 
part of my effort to destabilise and disrupt my own power, I included the contributors in 
negotiating the directions of the research and in the production and member checking of 
the increasing layers of meaning that we were forging together and I also recognised and 
expressed my own strong and personal connections to the research topic. 
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Riessman too appears to have re-examined such issues. In "Doing justice" (2002b: 203) 
she returns to re-examine a narrative that she first published in 1990, and now moves to a 
more inclusive and reflexive position: 
"... then I saw Tessa as an exemplar of an analytic category... To position Tessa 
differently would have forced me to think more deeply, and complexly, about 
victimisation, including complicity. At the time I could only witness the heroic 
self, not its travelling companion: a vulnerable woman whose choices were 
limited, some might even say impoverished and destructive. " 
She goes on to explain that the new (more complex) interpretation was only possible 
when she was able to relinquish her own "'survivor' narrative" (page 204). She now values 
the response of the narrator to her interpretations. As she says, "doing justice, in the final 
analysis, requires more than one voice"(page 210). It also seemed to require some 
recognition and expression of her own personal voice, and this was also the case in my 
research. 
I also found an attitude of incredulity to grand narratives (Lyotard, 1984) and uncertainty 
towards my own favoured positions to be freeing. The creative and transformative 
potential of uncertainty in research is also valued by Gergen and Gergen (2000: 1042- 
1043) who advise us to, "... avoid the impulses towards elimination, the rage to order". 
There must inevitably be some elimination and some order, however. And despite the 
strongly inclusive and co-constructive elements, I, as researcher, must take responsibility 
for this. The selection and the rhetorical forms of researcher narratives, the presentation 
and (re)presentation of theory, as well as contributors' material are not random, and mine 
have at times been intentionally self-conscious and playful to make such forms and choices 
explicit. 
To some extent this must now end. But, despite the completion of this thesis, I will not 
walk away from this work There is, in fact, little if anything that I would have done 
differently in this research; the learning has been too great for such regrets. But there is 
much that has not yet been done. The contributors are yet to witness each other's 
narratives, and l expect that this will provide further rich layers of narrative and 
discursive material. There is the possibility for further consideration of the ways that 
power is manifest and played out in the wider context of counselling. And alternative 
modes of expression and sense-making, including more visual and embodied forms of 
creativity could be fruitfully explored. 
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Thus, the order that I have given to my metaphorical garden will not last but is still in 
process, the growing, the spreading, the sprouting and re-seeding will continue. It is my 
hope that others will join in; pruning, taking cuttings, planting out and weeding, that there 
will be cross-fertilisation with ideas that I haven't even begun to think of. It is, of course, 
possible that there will be no further interest, with inevitable neglect allowing a return to 
the wild, with the semblance of order that I have achieved lost and buried beneath. But my 
commitment is to resist this, to continue to cultivate, nourish and replant so that the new 




Forms of requests for contributors 
1. Format used for posters and flyers: 
Have you ever felt pressure to provide counselling in a way that you thought was unethical? 
Volunteers are sought for PhD research using narrative inquiry 
The focus of this research is on counsellors' struggles to adhere to their ethical principles 
and values when there are external pressures to do otherwise. 
It recognises that: 
1. Experiences of ethical challenge are often complex and difficult to express 
2. Such critical incidents can impact on our sense of our ethical I moral I professional 
identity 
3. Telling the story of the experience may also influence this sense of identity 
For a detailed information sheet please contact 
2. Format used for Professional Journals and message boards where 
space was limited: 
PhD research: Have you ever felt pressure to practice in a way that you thought was 
unethical? Volunteers sought for a narrative inquiry. Please contact: 
References 
Acker, J., Barry, K. and Esseveld, J. (1991) Objectivity and Truth: Problems in doing 
feminist research, in M. Fonow and J. Cook (eds. ), Beyond Methodology. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Alford, C. F. (2002) Levinas, the Frankfurt school and psychoanalysis. London: Continuum. 
Alvesson, M. and Skoldberg, K. (2000) Reflexive Methodology: New vistas for qualitative 
research. London: Sage. 
Andersen, T. (1987) The Reflecting Team: Dialogue and meta-dialogue in clinical work, 
Family Process, 26: 415 - 428. 
Anderson, H. (1997) Conversation, Language and Possibilities: A Postmodern Approach to 
Therapy. New York: Basic Books. 
Atterton, P. (2004) Face-to-Face with the Other Animal?, in P. Atterton, M. Calarco, and M. 
Friedman (eds. ), Levinas and Buber. " Dialogue and Difference. Pittsburgh, PA: 
Duquesne University Press. 
Austin, J. L. (1962) How to Do Things With Words. Oxford, England: Oxford University 
Press. 
Bakan, D. (1966) The duality of human existence: Isolation and communion in Western man. 
Boston, MA: Beacon Press. 
Bakhtin, M. M. (1981) The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays (trans. and ed. C. Emerson and 
M. Holquist). Austin: University of Texas Press. 
Bakhtin, M. M. (1984) Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics (trans. and ed. C. Emerson). 
Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Bakhtin, M. M. (1986) Speech Genres and Other Late Essays (trans. and ed. C. Emerson and 
M. Holquist). Austin: University of Texas Press. 
Barbour. J. D. (2004) Judging and Not Judging Parents, in P. J. Eakin The Ethics of Life 
Writing. New York and London: Cornell University Press. 
232 
Barone, T. (2001) Science, Art, and the Predispositions of Educational Researchers 
Educational Researcher, 30: 24-28. 
Bassey, M. (1996) Three Paradigms In Educational Research, in A. Pollard Readings for 
Reflective Teaching in Primary Schools. London: Cassell. 
Baudrillard, J. (1988) America. London: Verso. 
Baudrillard, J. (1994) Simulacra and Simulation. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan 
Press. 
Bauman, Z. (1993) Post-Modern Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Bauman, Z. (1994) Alone Again: Ethics After Certainty. London: Demos. 
Bauman, Z. (2003) From Bystander to Actor, Journal of Human Rights, 2 (2): 137-151. 
Bauman, Z. (2005) Afterthought: On writing; On writing sociology, in N. K. Denzin and Y. S. 
Lincoln (eds. ) Handbook of Qualitative Research, 3rd Edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage. 
Bayne, R., Horton, I., Merry, T. and Noyes, E. (1994) The Counsellor's Handbook: A Practical 
A-Z Guide to Professional and Clinical Practice. London: Chapman and Hall. 
Beauchamp, T. L. and Childress, J. F. (1979) Principles of Biomedical Ethics. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Beauchamp, T. L. and Childress, J. F. (1994) Principles of Biomedical Ethics. (4th Edition) 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Becker, G. (1999) Disrupted Lives: How people create meaning in a chaotic world. Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press 
Bekerman, Z. and Tatar, M. (2005) Overcoming Modern / Postmodern Dichotomies: Some 
possible benefits for the counselling profession, British Journal of Guidance and 
Counselling, 33 (3): 411-421. 
Benhabib, S. (1992) Situating the Self. Gender, Community and Postmodernism in 
Contemporary Ethics New York Routledge. 
233 
Benhabib, S. (1995) The Pariah and Her Shadow: Hannah Arendt's biography of Rahel 
Varnhagen, Political theory, 23(1): 5-24. 
Benton, T. and Craib, I. (2001) Philosophy of Social Science: The philosophical foundations of 
social thought. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Billig, M. (1982) Ideology and Social Psychology. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Bird, J. (2000) The Heart's Narrative: Therapy and navigating life's contradictions. 
Auckland, New Zealand: Edge Press. 
Bird, J. (2004) Talk That Sings: Therapy in a new linguistic key. Auckland, New Zealand: 
Edge Press. 
Blackburn, S. (2001) Ethics: A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bochner, A. and Ellis, C. (2003) An Introduction to the Arts and Narrative Research: Art as 
Inquiry, Qualitative Inquiry, 9: 506-514. 
Bohman, J. (1991) New Philosophy of Social Science Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 
Bolam, B. Gleeson, K. and Murphy, S. (2003) "Lay Person" or "Health Expert"? Exploring 
Theoretical and Practical Aspects of Reflexivity in Qualitative Health Research. 
Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research [On-line 
journal], May 4(2). Retrieved 14 Aug 2007. Available online at: 
http: //www. analitative-research. nets(fns-texte/2Q3/2-03bolametal-e. htm 
Bolton, G. (1991) Between the Slices (poetry sequence) Bette Noire 10/11: 96-108. Hull 
University. 
Bolton, G. (1999a) Every Poem Breaks A Silence That Has To Be Overcome: The 
therapeutic power of poetry writing, Feminist Review, 62: 118-132. 
Bolton, G. (1999b) The Therapeutic Potential of Creative Writing: Writing Myself. London: 
Jessica Kingsley. 
Bolton, G. (2001a) Reflective Practice Writing for Professional Development London: Sage 
Bolton, G. (2001b) Open the Box: Writing a Therapeutic Space, in P. Milner (ed. ) BACP 
Counselling Reader, Vol. 2. London: Sage. 
Bolton, G. (2003) Around the Slices of Herself, in K. Etherington Trauma, The Body and 
Transformation. London: Jessica Kingsley. 
Bolton, G. (2005) Reflective Practice Writing for Professional Development 2nd Edition. 
London: Sage. 
Bolton, G. and Latham, J. (2004) Every Poem Breaks A Silence That Has To Be Overcome: 
The therapeutic role of poetry writing, In G. Bolton, S. Howlett, C. Lago and J. K. 
Wright (eds. ), Writing Cures: An introductory handbook of writing in counselling 
and therapy. Hove: Brunner-Routledge. 
Bond, T. (1993) Standards and Ethics for Counselling in Action. London: Sage. 
Bond, T. (1999) Guidelines for Professional Practice, in R. Bor and M. Watts (eds. ), The 
Trainee Handbook: A guide for counselling and psychotherapy trainees. London: 
Sage. 
Bond, T. (2000) Standards and Ethics in Counselling in Action 2nd Edition, London: Sage. 
Bond, T. (2002) Naked Narrative: Real Research?, Counselling and Psychotherapy Research, 
2(2): 133-138. 
Bond, T. (2004a) A Question of Trust: An introduction to the ethical guidelines for 
researching counselling and psychotherapy, in Counselling and Psychotherapy 
Research, 4(2): 4-9. 
Bond, T. (2004b) Ethical Guidelines for Researching Counselling and Psychotherapy, 
Counselling and Psychotherapy Research, 4 (2): 10-19. 
Bond, T. (2005) Developing And Monitoring Professional Ethics And Good Practice 
Guidelines, in R. Tribe and J. Morrissey. (eds. ), Handbook of Professional and Ethical 
Practice for psychologists, counsellors and psychotherapists. Hove: Brunner - 
Routledge 
235 
Bond, T. (2006) Intimacy, Risk, and Reciprocity in Psychotherapy: Intricate ethical 
challenges, Transactional Analysis Journal, 36 (2): 77-89. 
Booth, W. (1991) The Rhetoric of Fiction. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Bourdieu, P. and Waquant, L. J. D. (1992) An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
Branscombe, N. R., Spears, R., Ellemers, N. and Doosje, B. (2002) Intragroup and 
Intergroup Evaluation Effects On Group Behaviour, Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 28: 744-753. 
Bridges, N. E. (2006) Learning and Change Through a Narrative PhD: A personal narrative 
in progress, in S. Trahar (ed. ), Narrative Research in Learning: International and 
Comparative Perspectives. Oxford: Symposium Books. 
British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy (2002) Ethical Framework for Good 
Practice in Counselling and Psychotherapy. Rugby: BACP 
British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy (2007) Ethical Framework for Good 
Practice in Counselling and Psychotherapy. Rugby: BACP. 
Bruner, J. (1986) Actual minds, possible worlds. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Bruner, J. (1990) Acts of Meaning. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Buber, M. (1958) 1 and Thou: 2^d Edition. (trans. R. G. Smith) New York: Charles Scribner. 
Butler, C. (2002) Postmodernism: A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Butler, J. (1995) For a Careful Reading, in S. Benhabib, J. Butler, D. Cornell and N. Fraser 
(eds. ), Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange. New York: Routledge. 
Butler, J. (1997) The Psychic Life of Power. Theories of subjection. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford 
University Press. 
236 
Byrne, N. and McCarthy, I. (1999) Feminism, Politics and Power in Therapeutic Discourse: 
Fragments from the fifth province, in I. Parker (ed. ), Deconstructing Psychotherapy. 
London, Sage. 
Carr, W. (1995) Philosophy, Values and Educational Science. Towards Critical Educational 
Inquiry. Buckingham: Open University Press. 
Chalmers, A. F. (1999) What Is This Thing Called Science? 3rd Edition. Milton Keynes: Open 
University Press. 
Charmaz, K. and Mitchell, R. (1997). The Myth of Silent Authorship: Self, substance and 
style in ethnographic writing, in lt Hertz, (Ed. ), Reflexivity and voice. London: Sage. 
Cixous, H. (1993) Three Steps on the Ladder of Writing. New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
Clark, K. and Holquist, M. (1984). Mikhail Bakhtin. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Clarkson, P. (1996) The Bystander: An End to Innocence in Human Relationships. London: 
Whurr Publishers. 
Clegg, J. W. and Slife, B. D. (2005) Epistemology and the Hither Side: A Levinasian account 
of relational knowing, European Journal of Psychotherapy, Counselling and Health, 
7(1-2), 65-76. 
Clough, P. (1999) Crises Of Schooling And The 'Crisis Of Representation': The story of Rob, 
Qualitative Inquiry, 5(3) 428-443. 
Clough, P. (2002) Narratives and Fiction in Educational Research. Buckingham: Open 
University Press. 
Clough, P. and Nutbrown, C. (2002) A Student's Guide to Methodology: Justifying inquiry. 
London: Sage. 
Cohen, S. (2001) States of Dental: Knowing about atrocities and suffering. Cambridge, MA: 
Polity Press. 
Connor, S. (1993) The Necessity of Value, in J. Squires (ed. ), Principled Positions: 
Postmodernism and the Recovery of Value. London: Lawrence and Wishart. 
Cooper, M. and Rowan, J. (1999) Introduction: Self-plurality - The one and the many, in J. 
Rowan and M. Cooper (eds. ), The Plural Self Multiplicity in everyday life. London: 
Sage. 
Cromby, D. J. and Nightingale, J (1999)[eds. ], Social Constructionist Psychology: A critical 
analysis of theory and practice. Buckingham: Open University Press. 
Crossley, M. L. (2000) Introducing Narrative Psychology: Self, trauma and the construction 
of meaning. Buckingham: Open University Press. 
Crossley, M. L. (2003) Formulating Narrative Psychology: The limitations of contemporary 
social constructionism, Narrative Inquiry, 13(2), 287-300. 
Crotty, M. (1998) The Foundations of Social Research. London: Sage. 
Cummings, R. (2005) Stories of Redemption: Embracing redemption and including it in 
counselling. Unpublished MSc thesis, Graduate School of Education, University of 
Bristol. 
Cushman, P. (1995) Constructing the Self, Constructing America: A cultural history of 
psychotherapy. New York: Addison-Wesley. 
Danchev, D. (2005) Counselling Psychologists' Perspectives on Professionalism. Unpublished 
D. Psych dissertation, City University, London. 
Darley, J. M. and Latane, B. (1968) Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion of 
responsibility, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 8-. 377-383. 
Davies, B. (2000) (In)Scribing Body/Landscape Relations Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira 
Press. 
Davies, B. and Harre, R. (1990) Positioning: The discursive production of selves, Journal for 
the Theory of Social Behavior, 20 43-63. 
238 
Davies, D., & Dodd, J. (2002). Qualitative research and the question of rigor. Qualitative 
Health research, 12(2), 279-289. 
Delanty, G. (1997) Social Science: Beyond constructivism and realism. Buckingham: Open 
University Press. 
Dennet, D. (1991) Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown. 
Denzin, N. K. and Lincoln, Y. S. (1994) Introduction: Entering the field of qualitative 
research, in N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln, Handbook of Qualitative Research. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Denzin, N. K. and Lincoln, Y. S (1998) Collecting and interpreting qualitative materials. 
London: Sage. 
Denzin, N. K. and Lincoln, Y. S. (2000) Handbook of Qualitative Research 2nd Edition. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Denzin, N. K. and Lincoln, Y. S. (2005) Handbook of Qualitative Research 3rd Edition. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Derrida, J. (1976) Of Grammatology (trans. G. Spivak). Baltimore: Johns Hopkin University 
Press. 
Derrida, J. (1978) Writing and Difference. Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 
Derrida, J. (1981) Positions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Douglas, B. and Moustakas, C. (1985) Heuristic Inquiry: The internal search to know, 
Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 25 (3), 39-55. 
Drewery, W. and Winslade, J. (1997) The Theoretical Story of Narrative, in G. Monk, J. 
Winslade, K. Crocket and D. Epston (eds. ), Narrative Therapy in Practice: The 
archaeology of Hope. San Francisco: jossey Brown. 
Eakin, P. J. (2004) Introduction: Mapping the Ethics of Life Writing, in P. J. Eakin (ed. ), The 
Ethics of Life Writing. New York and Tondon: , Cornell University Press. 
239 
Edwards, A. (2005a) Relational Agency: Learning to be a resourceful practitioner, Keynote 
at the opening of the Centre for Human Activity Research, Kansas University. 
Edwards, A. (2005b) Cultural Historical Activity Theory: A relational turn, ESRC-TLRP 
Annual Conference, University of Warwick 
Edwards, G. (1993) Stepping into the Magic. London: Piatkus. 
Eisner, E. W. (1997a) The Promise and Perils of Alternative Forms of Data Representation, 
Educational Researcher, 26(6): 4-10. 
Eisner, E. W. (1997b) The Enlightened Eye: Qualitative inquiry and the enhancement of 
educational practice. New York, NY: Macmillan Publishing Company. 
Eisner, E. W. (2001) Concerns and Aspirations for Qualitative Research in the New 
Millennium, Qualitative Research, 1(2): 135 -145. 
Elbow, P. (1998) Writing With Power: Techniques for mastering the writing process 2nd 
edition. New York: Oxford University Press 
Ellis, C. (1995) Rnal Negotiations: A story of love, loss and chronic illness. Philadelphia, PA: 
Temple University Press. 
Ellis, C. (2001) With Mother/With Child: A true story, Qualitative Inquiry, 7: 598-616. 
Ellis, C. (2007a) Informal Exchanges With Carobn Ellis, Centre for Narrative and 
Transformative Learning, Graduate School of Education, University of Bristol, 
April, 2007. 
Ellis, C. (2007b) Telling Secrets, Revealing Lives: Relational ethics in research with 
intimate others, Qualitative Inquiry, 13 (1): 3-29. 
Esgalhado, B. D. (2003) The Writing Cure: Words to another as psychotherapeutic 
practice, Journal of Critical Psychology, Counselling and Psychotherapy, 31: 20-26. 
Etherington, K. (2000) Narrative Approaches to Working with Adult Male Survivors of Child 
Sexual Abuse. The Client's, the Cou lor's and the Researcher's Story. London: 
Jessica Kingsley. 
240 
Etherington, K. (2001a) Research with Ex-Clients: a celebration and extension of the 
therapeutic process, British Journal of Guidance and Counselling, 29(1): 5-19. 
Etherington, K. (2001b) Writing Qualitative Research: A gathering of selves, Counselling 
and Psychotherapy Research, 1 (2): 119-12 5. 
Etherington, K. (2003a) Trauma, The Body And Transformation, in K. Etherington (ed. ), 
Trauma, the Body and Transformation. London: Jessica Kingsley. 
Etherington, K. (2003b) Guardian angel's story in K. Etherington (ed. ), Trauma, the Body 
and Transformation. London: Jessica Kingsley. 
Etherington, K. (2003c) Trauma, the Body and Transformation. London: Jessica Kingsley. 
Etherington, K. (2004a) Becoming a Reflexive Researcher: Using ourselves in research. 
London: Jessica Kingsley. 
Etherington, K. (2004b) Heuristic Research As A Vehicle For Personal And Professional 
Development Counselling and Psychotherapy Research, 4 (2): 48-63. 
Etherington, K. (2004c) Writing Trauma Stories For Research, BACP Research Conference, 
The World Of Counselling Research London: UK. 
Etherington, K. (2004d) Research methods: Reflexivities, roots, meanings and dilemmas, 
Counselling and Psychotherapy Research, 4 (2) 46-47. 
Etherington, K. (2006) Understanding Drug Misuse And Changing Identities: A life story 
approach, Drugs. Education, Prevention and Policy, 13(3): 233.245. 
Etherington, K. (2007) Working With Traumatic Stories: From transcriber to witness. 
International Journal of Social Research Methodology: Theory and Practice, 10 (2), 
85-97. 
Foucault, M. (1967) Madness and Civilisation. London: Tavistock. 
Foucault, M. (1977) Discipline and Punish: The birth of the prison, (trans. A. Sheridan, 
1995). New York Vintage Books 
Foucault, M. (1979) The History of Sexually, Volume 1. London: Allen Lane. 
241 
Foucault, M. (1980) Power/Knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1971-1977. 
(trans. and ed. C. Gordon), New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Foucault, M. (1982) The Subject And Power, in H. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow (eds. ) Michel 
Foucault: Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics. Brighton: Harvester. 
Frank, A. W. (2004) Moral Non-Fiction: Life writing and children's disability, in P. J. Eakin 
The Ethics of Life Writing. New York and London: Cornell University Press. 
Frank, A. W. (1995) The Wounded Storyteller: Body, Illness, and Ethics. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Frankena, W. K. (1973) Ethics. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. 
Frankenstein, C. (1970) Varieties ofJuvenile Delinquency. London: Gordon and Breach 
Science Publishers. 
Frankenstein, C. (1972) This Naked 1. Newcastle upon Tyne: Oriel Press. 
Frankenstein, C. (1982) They Think Again: Restoring Cognitive Abilities Through Teaching. 
New York: Reinhold 
Freeman, M. (2003) Identity and difference in narrative inquiry: A commentary on the 
articles by Erica Burman, Michelle Crossley, Ian Parker and Shelley Day Sclater, 
Narrative Inquiry, 13 (2): 331-346. 
Freud, S. (1920) Beyond the Pleasure Principle, in Complete Psychological Works: 
Standard Edition. Vol. 3 (trans. and ed. J. Strachey. 1954). London: Hogarth Press. 
Fromm, E. (1981) On Disobedience and Other Essays. Harper Row: New York. 
Frosh, S. (2002) After Words: The personal in gender, culture and psychotherapy. New York: 
Palgrave. 
Gee, J. (1986) Units in The Production Of Narrative Discourse, Discourse Processes, 9: 391- 
422. 
Gee, J. (1991) A Linguistic Approach to Narrative, Journal of Narrative and Life History, 1: 
15-39. 
242 
Geertz, C. (1973) The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books. 
Geertz, C. (1983) Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology. New York: 
Basic Books. 
Gencoz, T. and Ozlale, Y. (2004) Direct and Indirect Effects Of Social Support On 
Psychological Well-Being, Social BehaviorAnd Personality, 32: 449 - 458 
Gendlin, E. (1978) Focusing. New York: Everest House. 
Gendlin, E. (1996) Focusing-Oriented Psychotherapy: A manual of the experiential method. 
New York: Guilford. 
Gergen, K. J. (1985) The Social Constructionist Movement in Modern Psychology. American 
Psychologist, 40(3): 266-275. 
Gergen, K. J. (1991) The Saturated Self New York: Basic Books. 
Gergen, K. J. (1995) Postmodern Psychology: Resonance and reflection, American 
Psychologist, 50: 394. 
Gergen, M. M. and Gergen, K. J. (2000) Qualitative Inquiry: Tensions and transformations, 
in N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln (eds. ), Handbook of Qualitative Research 2nd 
Edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Gilligan, C. (1982) In a Different Voice: Psychological theory and women's development 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Gilligan, C. and Attanucci, J. (1988) Two Moral Considerations: Gender differences and 
similarities, Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 34: 223-237. 
Gilligan, C., Spencer, R., Weinberg, M. K. and Bertsch, T. (2003) On The Listening Guide: A 
voice-centered relational model, in P. M. Camic, J. B. Rhodes and L. Yardley (eds. ), 
Qualitative Research in Psychology: Expanding perspectives in methodology and 
design. Washington, DC: American Psychology Association. 
Ginsberg, A. (2001) Spontaneous Mind: Selected interviews, 1958-1996 New York: Harper 
Collins Publishers. 
243 
Glissant, E. (1989) Caribbean Discourse: Selected essays. Charlottesville, VA: University 
Press of Virginia. 
Golafshani, N. (2003) Understanding Reliability and Validity in Qualitative Research, The 
Qualitative Report, 8 (4): 597-607. 
Goldberg, N. (1986) Writing Down The Bones: Freeing the writer within. Boston, MA: 
Shambala Publications. 
Grafanaki, S. (1996) How Research Can Change The Researcher: The need for sensitivity, 
flexibility and ethical boundaries in conducting qualitative research in counselling 
and psychotherapy, British Journal of Guidance and Counselling, 24(3): 329-338. 
Guba, E. G. and Lincoln, Y. S. (eds. ) (1994) Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Guilfoyle, M. (2005) From Therapeutic Power to Resistance? Therapy and cultural 
hegemony, Theory and Psychology, 15(1): 101-124. 
Gullestad, M. (2004) Tales of Consent and Descent: Life writing as a fight against an 
imposed self image, in P. J. Eakin The Ethics of Life Writing, New York and London: 
Cornell University Press. 
Habermas, J. (1972) Knowledge and Human Interests. London: Heinemann. 
Habermas, J. (1996) The Theory of Communicative Action: Vol 2. Lifeworld and system: a 
critique of functionalist reason. Cambridge: Polity Press 
Halfpenny, P. (2000) Positivism in the Twentieth Century, in G. Ritzer and B. Smart (eds. ), 
Handbook of Social Theory. London: Sage. 
Hammersley, M. (1999) Not Bricolage But Boatbuilding: Exploring two metaphors for 
thinking about ethnography, journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 28: 574-585. 
Haney, C., Banks, W. C. and Zimbardo, P. G. (1973) Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated 
Prison, International Journal of Criminology and Penology, 1: 69-97. 
244 
Hanson Frieze, I., Hymer, S. and Greenberg, M. S. (1987) Describing the Crime Victim: 
Psychological reactions to victimization, Professional Psychology: Research and 
Practice, 18 (4): 299-315. 
Harding, S. (1993) Rethinking Standpoint Epistemologies: What is 'strong objectivity'?, in 
L. Alcoff and E. Potter (eds. ) Feminist Epistemologies, London: Routledge. 
Hare, R. (1981). The philosophical basis of psychiatric ethics, in S. Block and P. Chodoff 
(eds. ). Psychiatrics Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University. 
Harre, R. (2002) Public Sources of the Personal Mind: Social constructionism in context, 
theory and psychology, Vol. 12(5): 611-623. 
Harre, R. (1987) The Social Construction of Selves, in K. Yardley and T. Honess (eds. ), Self 
and Identity: Psychosocial perspectives. Chichester: Wiley. 
Harre, R. and van Langenhove, L. (1999) Introducing Positioning Theory, in R. Harre and 
L. van Langenhove (eds. ), Positioning Theory. Malden: Blackwell. 
Henriques, J., Hollway, W., Urwin, C., Venn, C. and Walkerdine, V. (1984) Changing The 
Subject: Psychology, social regulation and subjectivity. London: Routledge. 
Henriques, J., Hollway, W., Urwin, C., Venn, C., and Walkerdine, V (2002) Selections from 
Changing the Subject: Psychology, social regulation and subjectivity, Feminism and 
Psychology, 12(4): 427-431. 
Hermans, H. J. M. (1996) Voicing the self: From information processing to dialogical 
exchange, Psychological Bulletin, 119(1): 31-50. 
Hicks, D. (2000) Self and Other In Bakhtin's Early Philosophical Essays: Prelude to prose 
consciousness, Mind, Culture and Activity, 7 (3): 227-242. 
Hollway, W. and Jefferson, T. (2000) Free Association, Narrative Analysis and the 
Defended Subject: The case of Ivy, Narrative inquiry 11: 103-122. 
Holstein, J. and Gubrium, J. (1999) The Self We Live By. Narrative identity in a postmodern 
world. Oxford: Oxford University press. 
245 
Holt, N. L. (2003) Representation, Legitimation, And Autoethnography: An 
autoethnographic writing story, International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 2 (1). 
Retrieved 14 Aug 2007. Available online at: 
Horkheimer, M. (1982) Critical Theory. New York: Seabury Press. 
Horkheimer, M. (1993) Between Philosophy and Social Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
House, R. (2005) Commentary: Taking therapy beyond modernity? The promise and 
limitations of a Levinasian understanding. European Journal of Psychotherapy, 
Counselling and Health, 7(2) 97-108. 
Howard, A. (2005) Counselling and Identity: Self realisation in a therapy culture. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hunt, C. (2000) Therapeutic Dimensions of Autobiography in Creative Writing. London: 
Jessica Kingsley. 
Janesicl, V. J. (2001) Intuition and creativity: A'Pas De Deux' for qualitative researchers, 
Qualitative Inquiry, 7: 531-540. 
Jetten, J. (2006) Living on the Edge: Loyalty to the group and intragroup position, The 
Psychologist, 19 (1): 36-38. 
Jetten, J., Branscombe, N. R., and Spears, It (2002) On Being Peripheral: Effects of identity 
insecurity on personal and collective self-esteem, European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 32: 105-123. 
Jetten, J., Spears, R. and Manstead, A. S. R. (1997) Distinctiveness Threat and 
Prototypicality: Combined effects on intergroup discrimination and collective self- 
esteem, European Journal of Social Psychology, 2 (7): 635-657. 
Johns, H. (1998) Balancing Acts: Studies in counselling training. London: Routledge. 
Josselson, R. (1993) A Narrative Introduction, in R. Jossleson and A. Leiblich (eds. ) The 
Narrative Study of Lives, Vol 1. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
246 
Kaberry, S (2000) Abuse in Supervision in B. Lawton and C. Feltham [Eds. ] Taking 
Supervision Forward: Enquiries and Trends in Counselling and Psychotherapy. 
London: Sage. 
Karpman, S. (1968) Fairy Tales and Script Drama Analysis Transactional Analysis Bulletin, 
7(26): 39-43. 
Keller-Cohen, D. and Gordon, C. (2003) "On Trial": Metaphor in the telling of the life story, 
Narrative Inquiry, 13(1): 1-40. 
Kennedy, M. M. (1997) The Connection Between Research and Practice, Educational 
Researcher, 26(7): 4-12. 
Kerby, A. P. (1991) Narrative and The Self. Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press. 
Kitchener, K. S. (1984) Intuition, Critical-Evaluation and Ethical Principles: The foundation 
for ethical decision in counseling psychology, Counseling Psychologist, 12(3), 43- 
55. 
Kohlberg, L. (1969) Stage and Sequence: The cognitive-developmental approach to 
socialization, in D. A. Goslin (ed. ), Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research 
Chicago: Rand McNally. 
Kohlberg, L. (1980) Stages of Moral Development as a Basis for Moral Education, in B. 
Munsey (ed. ), Moral Development, Moral Education, and Kohlberg. Birmingham, AL: 
Religious Education Press. 
Kohlberg, L. (1984) Lessons on Moral Development San Francisco, CA: Harper and Row 
Kölb, C. (2002) Blame It On Psychology, Narrative Inquiry, 12(1), 29-35. 
Krumboltz, J. (1983) Private Rules in Career Decision Making. Columbus, OH: National 
Center for Research in Vocational Education. 
Kvale, S. (1996) InterViews. London: Sage. 
Lakoff, G., and Johnson, M. (1987) Metaphors We Live By. Chicago, IL/London: University 
of Chicago Press. 
247 
Lane, D. A. and Corrie, S. (2006) Counselling Psychology: Its influences and future 
Counselling Psychology Review, 21(1): 12-24. 
Langs, R. J. (1988) A Primer of Psychotherapy. New York: Gardner. 
Lather, P. (1991) Getting Smart: Feminist research and pedagogy with/in the postmodern. 
New York: Routledge. 
Lawton, B. and Feltham, C. [Eds. ] Taking Supervision Forward: Enquiries and Trends in 
Counselling and Psychotherapy. London: Sage. 
Leitch, R. (2003) Journey into Paradox: Researching unconscious in teacher identity using 
creative narrative. Unpublished EdD dissertation, Graduate School of Education, 
University of Bristol. 
Leitch, R. (2006) Outside the Spoon Drawer, Naked and Skinless in Search of My 
Professional Esteem: The tale of an "Academic Pro", Qualitative Inquiry, 12 (2) 353- 
364. 
Leppert, R. (2004) The Social Discipline of Listening, in J. Drobnick (ed. ), Aural Cultures. 
Toronto: YYZ Books. 
Lerner, M. J. (1970) The Desire For Justice and Reactions to Victims: Social psychological 
studies of some antecedents and consequences, in J. Macaulay and L. Berkowitz 
(eds. ), Altruism and Helping Behaviour. New York. Academic Press. 
Levin, M. D. (2001) The Embodiment Of The Categorical Imperative: Kafka, Foucault, 
Benjamin, Adorno and Levinas, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 27 (4): 1-20. 
Levinas, E. (1989) Substitution, in S. Hand (ed. ) The Levinas Reader. Oxford, London and 
New York: Blackwell. 
Levinas, E. (1991) Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence. Dordrecht, Boston, MA and 
London: Kluwer. 
Levinas, E. (1993) Outside the Subject. London: The Athlone Press. 
248 
Lewis, Y. (2003) The Self as a Moral Concept, British Journal of Social Psychology, 42: 225- 
237. 
Lincoln, Y. S. (1995) Emerging Criteria for Quality in Qualitative and Interpretative 
Research, Qualitative Inquiry, 1(3): 275-289. 
Lincoln, Y. S. (1997) Self, Subject, Audience, Text: Living at the edge, writing in the 
margins, in W. G. Tierney and Y. S. Lincoln (eds. ), Representation on the text: 
Reframing the narrative voice. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. 
Lincoln, Y. S. and Guba, E. (1985) Naturalistic Inquiry. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
Linn, R. (1989) Not Shooting and Not Crying - Psychological inquiry into moral 
disobedience. New York: Greenwood Press. 
Linn, R. (1997) Soldiers' Narratives of Selective Moral Resistance: A separate position of 
the connected self, in A. Lieblich and R. Josselson (eds. ), The Narrative Study of 
Lives, Vol. 5. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Linn, R. and Gilligan, C. (1990) One Action, Two Moral Orientations - The tension between 
justice and care voices in Israeli selective conscientious objectors, New Ideas in 
Psychology, 8: 189-203. 
Lipari, L. (2004) Listening for the Other: Some ethical implications of the Buber-Levinas 
encounter, Communication Theory, 14 (2): 122-141. 
Lowenthal, D. and Kunz, G. (2005) Editorial: Levinas and the Other in Psychotherapy and 
Counselling, European Journal of Psychotherapy, Counselling and Health, 7(1-2): 1- 
5. 
Loewenthal, D. and Snell, R. (eds. ) (2003) Post-modernism for Psychotherapists: A critical 
reader. Hove: Brunner-Routledge. 
Lynch, M. (2000) Against Reflexivity as an Academic Virtue and Source of Principled 
Knowledge, Theory, Culture and Soclety, 17(3): 27-56. 
Lyotard, J-F. (1979) Just Gaming. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press. 
249 
Lyotard, J-F. (1984) The Post-modern Condition: A report on knowledge. Minneapolis, 
University of Minnesota Press. 
Lyotard, J-F. (1988) The Differ-end. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Mackenzie, W. and Monk, G. (1997) Learning and Teaching Narrative Ideas, in G. Monk, J. 
Winslade, K. Crocket and D. Epston (eds. ), Narrative Therapy in Practice: The 
archaeology of hope. San Francisco: jossey Bass. 
Marcus, G. E. (1998) Ethnography Through Thick and Thin. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Martin, P. (2001) It Takes Two to Tango: Research and practice as an amazing dance, 
Counselling and Psychotherapy Research, 1(3): 163-166. 
McAdams, D. P. (1985) Power, Intimacy, and the Life Story: Personological inquiries into 
identity. New York: Guilford Press. 
McAdams, D. P. (1997) The Stories We Live By., Personal myths and the making of the self. 
New York: Guilford Press. 
McAdams, D. P., Hoffman, B. )., Mansfield, E. D. and Day, R. (1996) Themes of Agency and 
Communion in Significant Autobiographical Scenes. Journal of Personality, 64: 339- 
378. 
McLaren, M. (2002) Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity. New York: State 
University of New York Press. 
McLennan, G. (1997) Review of C. Lemert'Postmodernism Is Not What You Think', British 
Journal of Sociology, 50(1): 168.169. 
McLennan, G. (2000) The New Positivity, in J. Eldridge, J. McInnes, S. Scott, C. Warhurst and 
A. Witz (eds. ) For Sociology. Legacies and Prospects. Durham, UK: The Sociology 
Press. 
McLeod, J (1997) Narrative and Psychotherapy. London: Sage. 
250 
McLeod, J. (1999) The Concept of Story in Counselling and Psychotherapy: A hermeneutic 
approach, Changes: An International Journal of Psychology and Psychotherapy, 
17(3): 171-177. 
McLeod, J. (2001) Qualitative Research in Counselling and Psychotherapy. London: Sage. 
McLeod, J. (2002) Case Studies and Practitioner Research: Building knowledge through 
systematic enquiry into individual cases, Counselling and Psychotherapy Research, 
2(4): 265-268. 
McLeod, J. (2003) An Introduction to Counselling, Third Edition. Maidenhead: Open 
University Press. 
McLeod, J. (2004) The Significance of Narrative and Storytelling in Postpsychological 
Counselling and Psychotherapy, in A. Lieblich, D. P. McAdams and R. Josselson 
(eds. ), Healing Plots: The Narrative Basis of Psychotherapy, Washington, DC: 
American Psychological Association. 
McLeod, J. and Balamoutsou, S. (1996) Representing Narrative Process in Therapy: 
Qualitative analysis of a single case, Counselling Psychology Quarterly, 91: 61-76. 
McLeod, R. (2000) Cold War of the Heart, from Mouth to Mouth. Galashiels: Talkative 
Music. 
McNamee, S. and Gergen, K. J. (1992) Introduction, in S. McNamee and K. J. Gergen. (eds. ) 
Therapy as Social Construction. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
McNamee, S. and Gergen, K. J. (1999) Relational Responsibility. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Meares, R. (2000) Intimacy and Alienation: Memory, trauma and personal being. London: 
Routledge. 
Mearns, D. and Thorne, B. (1988) Person-Centred Therapy In Action. London: Sage. 
Mearns, D. (2004) How Much Supervision Should You Have? BACP Information Sheet, 
Rugby: BACP. 
251 
Mearns, D. and Cooper, M. (2005) Working at Relational Depth in Counselling and 
Psychotherapy. London: Sage. 
Milgram, S. (1974) Obedience to Authority: An experimental view. New York: Harper Collins. 
Mishler, E. G. (2000) Storylines: Craft artists' narratives of identity. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Mishler, E. G. (1986) Research Interviewing: Context and narrative. Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Moran, C. C. and Hughes, L. P. (2006) Coping with Stress: Social work students and 
humour, Social Work Education, 25 (5): 501-517. 
Moran, C. C. (1998) Stress and Emergency Work Experience: A non-linear relationship, 
Disaster Prevention and Management, 7(1): 38-46. 
Moran, C. C. and Massam, M. (1997) An Evaluation of Humour in Emergency Work, The 
Australasian Journal of Disaster and Trauma Studies, 3: 26-38. 
Morse, J. M., Barrett, M., Mayan, M., Olson, K. and Spiers, J. (2002) Verification Strategies 
for Establishing Reliability and Validity in Qualitative Research, International 
Journal of Qualitative Methods, 1(2), Retrieved 14 Aug 2007. Available online at: 
Moustakas, C. (1967) Heuristic Research, in J. Bugental (ed. ), Challenges of Humanistic 
Psychology, New York. McGraw Hill. 
Moustakas, C. (1990) Heuristic Research: Design, Methodology and Applications. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Murray, M. (2003) Narrative Psychology and Narrative Research, in P. M. Camic, J. E. 
Rhodes and L. Yardley (eds. ), Qualitative Research in Psychology: Expanding 
perspectives in methodology and design. Washington, DC: American Psychology 
Association. 
Myerhoff, B. (1986) Life Not Death In Venice, In V. Turner and E. Bruner (eds. ) The 
Anthropology Of Experience. Champaign, IL: University Of Illinois Press. 
252 
Mykhalovskiy, E. (1997) Reconsidering'Table Talk': Critical thoughts on the relationship 
between sociology, autobiography and self-indulgence, in R. Hertz (ed. ), Reflexivity 
and Voice. London: Sage. 
Nash, R. J. (2002a) 'Real World' Ethics: Frameworks for educators and human service 
professionals. New York: Teachers College Press. 
Nash, R. J. (2002b) Spirituality, Ethics, Religion and Teaching: A professor's journey. New 
York: Peter Lang Publishing. 
Near, H. (2000) 1 Ain't Afraid, from Edge. Ikiah, CA: Caliko Tracks Music. 
Neurath, 0. (1973) The Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle, in M. 
Neurath and R. S. Cohen (eds. ), Empiricism and Sociology. Boston, MA: Dordrecht- 
Holland. 
Niemeyer, R. (1998) Social Constructionism in the Counselling Context, Counselling 
Psychology Qu a rterly, 11 (2): 13 5- 15 1. 
Nisbett, R. E. and Ross, L. (1980) Human Inference: Strategies and shortcomings of social 
judgment Englewood-Cliffs, NY: Prentice-Hall. 
O'Neill, 0. (2002) Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Ochberg, R. L. (1996) Interpreting Life Stories. in k josselson (ed. ), Ethics and Process in 
The Narrative Study of Lives. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Parker, I. (2005) Qualitative Psychology: Introducing radical research. Maidenhead: Open 
University Press. 
Parry, A. and Doan, R. E. (1994) Story Re-Visions. Narrative therapy in the postmodern 
world. New York: Guilford Press. 
Payne, Michael, (2000) The Survival of Truth After Derrida, Cultural Values, 4: 127-134. 
Payne, Martin. (2000) Narrative Therapy An introduction for counsellors London: Sage. 
253 
Pease, K. (1998) Repeat Victimisation: Taking stock, Crime Detection and Prevention Paper 
Series Paper #90, London: Home Office. 
Pederson, P. B., Draguns, J. G., Lonner, W. J. and Trimble, J. E. (1996) Counselling Across 
Cultures. London: Sage. 
Piercy, F. P. and Benson, K. (2005) Aesthetic Forms Of Data Representation in Qualitative 
Family Therapy Research, Journal of Marital and Family Therapy, 31(1): 107-19 
Plummer, K. (1995) Telling Sexual Stories: Power, change and social worlds. New York: 
Routledge. 
Polkinghorne, D. E. (1991) Narrative and the Self Concept, Journal of Narrative and Life 
History, 1: 135-153. 
Polkinghorne, D. E. (1995) Narrative Configuration in Qualitative Analysis, in J. A. Hatch 
and R. Wisniewski (eds. ), Life History and Narrative. London: Falmer Press. 
Potter, J. (1996) Representing Reality: Discourse, rhetoric and social construction. London: 
Sage. 
Potter, J. and Wetherell, M. (1987) Discourse and Social Psychology: Beyond attitudes and 
behaviour. London: Sage. 
Prilletensky, I. and Nelson, G. (2002) Doing Psychology Critically. Basingstoke: Paigrave 
Macmillan. 
Rambo, C. (2005) Sketching Carolyn Ellis, Purple Diva of Autoethnography, Studies in 
Symbolic Interaction, 28 (1) 3-14. 
Rambo-Ronai, C. (1995). Multiple Reflections of Child Sex Abuse: An argument for a 
layered account, Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 23 (4): 395-426. 
Rapport, N. and Overing, J. (2000) Social and Cultural Anthropology: The key concepts. 
London: Routledge. 
Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory of justice, in P. Harris (ed. ), Civil Disobedience, Lanham, MD: 
Reavey, P. and Warner, S. (eds. ) (2003) New Feminist Stories of Child Sexual Abuse: Sexual 
scripts and dangerous dialogues. London: Taylor and Francis. 
Reay, D. (1996) Dealing With Difficult Differences: Reflexivity and social class in feminist 
research, Feminism and Psychology, 63: 443-56. 
Richardson, L. (1990) Writing Strategies: Reaching diverse audiences. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Qualitative Methodology Series. 
Richardson, L. (1992) The Consequences of Poetic Representation: Writing the other, 
rewriting the self, in: C. Ellis and M. Flaherty (eds. ), Investigating Subjectivity. 
Research on lived experience. New York: Sage. 
Richardson, L. (1997) Fields of Play: Constructing and academic life. New Brunswick NJ: 
Rutgers University Press. 
Richardson, L. (2000) Writing: A Method of Inquiry, in: N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln, 
(eds. ) Handbook of Qualitative Research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Richardson, L. (2002) Poetic Representation of Interviews, in J. Gubrium and J. A. Holstein 
(eds. ), Handbook of Interview Research: Context and Method. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage. 
Richardson, L. and St. Pierre, E. (2005) Writing: A method of inquiry, in N. K. Denzin and Y. 
S. Lincoln (eds. ) Handbook of Qualitative Research, 3rd Edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage. 
Ricoeur, P. (1984) Time and Narrative. Vol. 1. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Ricoeur, P. (1991) Life in Quest of Narrative, in D. Wood (ed. ), Paul Ricoeur. Narrative and 
Interpretation. London: Routledge. 
Riessman, C. K. (1993) Narrative Analysis London: Sage Qualitative Methodology Series. 
Riessman, C. K. (2002a) Analysis of Personal Narratives, in I. F. Gubrium and J. A. Holstein 
(eds. ), Handbook of Interview Research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Riessman, C. K. (2002b) Doing justice: Positioning the interpreter in narrative work, in W. 
Patterson (ed. ), Strategic Narrative: New perspectives on the power of personal and 
cultural storytelling. Oxford: Lexington Books. 
Ritzer, G. (1993) The McDonaldization of Society. London: Pine Forge. 
Robson, M., Cook. P., Hunt, K., Alred, G. and Robson, D. (2000) Towards Ethical Decision- 
Making in Counselling Research, British Journal of Guidance and Counselling, 28 (4): 
533-547. 
Rogers, C. R. (1961) On Becoming a Person: A therapist's view of psychotherapy. London: 
Constable 
Rogers, C. R. (1980) A Way of Being. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin 
Rorty, R. (1980) Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Rosenau, P. (1992) Post-modernism and the Social Sciences: Insights, inroads, and 
intrusions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Rosenberg, L. (1991) A Qualitative Investigation of the Use of Humour by Emergency 
Personnel as a Strategy for Coping with Stress, Journal of Emergency Nursing, 17: 
197-203. 
Rosenthal, A. M. (1964) Thirty-Eight Witnesses. The Kitty Genovese Case. Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press. 
Rowe, D. (1989) Foreword in J. Masson. Against Therapy. London: Collins. 
Rudd, M. D., Jobes, D. A., Joiner, T. E. and King, C. A. (1999) The Outpatient Treatment of 
Suicidality: An integration of science and recognition of its limitations, Professional 
Psychology - Research and Practice, 30: 437-46. 
Rugg, G. and McGeorge, P. (1999) Questioning Methodology. Northampton: University 
College Northampton, Faculty of Management and Business. 
Ryan, W. (1971) Blaming the Victim. New York: Vintage Books. 
256 
Sampson, E. E. (1988) The Debate on Individualism: Indigenous psychologies of the 
individual and their role in personal and social functioning, American Psychologist, 
43: 15-22. 
Sanders, C. (1995) Stranger than Fiction, Studies in Symbolic Interaction, 7: 89-104. 
Sarbin, T. R. (1986) Narrative Psychology: The storied nature of human conduct. New York: 
Praeger. 
Saussure, F. de. (1972) Course in General Linguistics. (trans. R. Harris. ) London: 
Duckworth. 
Sayer, A. (1998) Critical and Uncritical Cultural Turns (draft), Department of Sociology, 
Lancaster University. Retrieved 14 Aug 2007. Available online at: 
Sayer, A. (1999) Long Live Postdisciplinary Studies! Sociology and the curse of disciplinary 
parochialism/imperialism (draft). British Sociological Association Conference, 
Glasgow, Department of Sociology, Lancaster University. Retrieved 14 Aug 2007. 
Available online at: ttp; Jlwww. comp. lan .u /sociology/SsocO25as html 
Schwandt, T. (1994) Constructivist, Interpretivist Approaches to Human Inquiry, in 
Denzin, N. K, and Lincoln, Y. S. (eds. ), Handbook of Qualitative Research. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Seale, C. (1999) Quality in Qualitative Research, qualitative inquiry, 5(4): 465-478. 
Sennett, R. (1999) Growth and Failure: The new political economy and culture, in M. 
Featherstone and S. Lash (eds. ), Spaces of Culture. London: Sage. 
Shawver, L. (2001) If Wittgenstein and Lyotard Could Talk with Jack and Jill: Towards a 
postmodern family therapy, Journal of Fami'y Therapy, 23: 232-252. 
Shotter, J. (1993) Conversational Realities. The construction of life through language. 
London: Sage. 
Shotter, J. (1999) Life Inside Dialogically Structured Mentalities: Bakhtin's and 
Voloshinov's account of our mental activities as out in the world between us, in J. 
257 
Rowan and M. Cooper, (eds. ), The Plural Self. Multiplicity in everyday life. London: 
Sage. 
Skiotis, P. (2005) Postmodern Ethics: A Buddhist response. Western Buddhist Review 4 
Retrieved 14 Aug 2007. Available online at: 
Smith, M. (2003) The Fears of Counsellors: A qualitative study, British Journal of Guidance 
and Counselling, 31 (2): 229-240. 
Smith, M. J. (1998) Social Science in Question. London: Sage. 
Solomon, R. (1991) A Passion for Justice: Emotions and the origins of the social contract 
New York: Addison-Wesley. 
Sparkes, A. C. (1998a) Reciprocity in Critical Research? Some unsettling thoughts, in G. 
Shacklock and J. Smyth (eds. ), Being Reflexive in Critical, Educational and Social 
Research. London: Falmer Press. 
Sparkes, A. C. (1998b) Athletic Identity: An Achilles Heel to the survival of self, Qualitative 
Health Research, 8: 644-664. 
Sparkes, A. C. (2000) Autoethnography and Narratives of Self. Reflections on criteria in 
action, Sociology of SportJournal, 17: 21-43. 
Sparkes, A. C. (2002) Autoethnography: Self-indulgence or something more?, in A. Bochner 
and C. Ellis, (eds. ), Ethnographically Speaking: Autoethnography, literature and 
aesthetics. New York: AltaMira Press. 
Speedy, J. (2001) Singing Over The Bones: A narrative inquiry, into the construction of 
research and practice cultures and professional identities by counsellor educators at 
the University of Bristol and within the UK Unpublished PhD thesis, Graduate 
School of Education, University of Bristol. 
Speedy, J. (2005) Using Poetic Documents: An exploration of poststructuralist ideas and 
poetic practices in narrative therapy, British Journal of Guidance and Counselling, 
33 (3): 283-298. 
258 
Speedy, J. (2006) The Gulbarrian College Gargoyles and the Narrative Gaze: Landscapes of 
the future, imaginative learning and researcher identity, in S. Trahar (ed. ), 
Narrative Research in Learning: International and Comparative Perspectives. 
Oxford: Symposium Books. 
St Pierre, E. (1997) Methodology in the Fold and the Irruption of Transgressive Data, 
International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, 102: 175-89. 
Stainton Rogers, R. Stenner, P. Gleeson, K. and Stainton Rogers, W. (1995) Social 
Psychology: A critical agenda. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Stainton Rogers, W. (2003) Social Psychology: Experimental and Critical Approaches. 
Maidenhead: Open University Press. 
Stam, H. J. (2001) Introduction: Social constructionism and its critics, Theory and 
Psychology, 11(3): 291-296. 
Stanley, S. and Billig, M. (2004) Dilemmas of Storytelling And Identity, in C. Dalute and C. 
Lightfoot (eds), Narrative Analysis: Studying the development of individuals in 
society. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Strathern, A. (1995) Universals and Particulars: Some current contests in anthropology, 
Ethos, 23(2): 173-86. 
Strawbridge, S. (2002) McDonaldizatlon or Fast-Food Therapy-Paper given at the Annual 
Meeting of the Counselling Psychology Division of the British Psychological 
Society, Torquay, England. May 2002. 
Strawbridge, S. and Wolfe, R. (2003) Counselling Psychology In Context, in R. Wolfe, W. 
Dryden and S. Strawbridge (eds. ), Handbook of Counselling Psychology 2nd Edition. 
London: Sage. 
Swan, V. (1999). Narrative, Foulcault and Feminism: Implications for therapeutic practice, 
in I. Parker (ed. ), Deconstructing Psychotherapy. London, Sage. 
Tajfel, H. and Turner, J. C. (1979) An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Confliciy in W. G. 
Austin and S. Worchel (eds. ) The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. 
Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole. 
259 
Tatar, M. and Bekerman, Z. (2002) The Concept of Culture in the Contexts and Practices of 
Professional Counselling: A constructivist perspective, Counselling Psychology 
Quarterly, 22 (3) 319-384. 
Taylor, C. (1971) Interpretation and the Sciences of Man, Review of Metaphysics, 25: 3-51. 
Taylor, C. (1989) Sources of the Self The making of the modern identity. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Taylor, C. (1991) The Ethics ofAuthenticity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Tedlock, D. (1983) The Spoken Word and the Work of Interpretation. Philadelphia, PA: 
University of Philadelphia Press. 
Thatcher, M. (2006) Are Ethical Codes Ethical?, Counselling Psychology Review, 21 (3): 4- 
11. 
Thoits P. A. (1982) Life Stress, Social Support and Psychological Vulnerability: 
Epidemiological considerations, Journal of Community Psychology, 10(4): 341-62. 
Thoits PA (1984) Explaining Distributions of Psychological Vulnerability: Lack of social 
support in the face of life stress, Social Forces, 63 (2): 453-481. 
Thompson, A. (1990) Guide to Ethical Practice in Psychotherapy. New York: Wiley. 
Tjeltveit, A. C. (1999) Ethics and Values in Psychotherapy. New York Routledge. 
Tridgell, S. (2004) Understanding Our Selves: The dangerous art of biography. Oxford: Peter 
Lang Publishers. 
Tseloni, A. and Pease, K. (2003) Repeat Personal Victimization: 'Boosts, or'Flags'?, Mdsh 
Journal itf Criminology. 43 (1): 196-212. 
Turner, lt J. and Noh, S. (1983) Class and Psychological Vulnerability Among Women: The 
significance of social support and personal, journal of Health And Social Behavior, 
24 (1): 2-15. 
Usher, R. (1996) A critique of the Neglected Epistemological Assumptions Of Educational 
Research, in D. Scott and R. Usher (ed. ), Understanding Educational Research. 
London: Routledge. 
van der Kolle, B. A. (1989) The Compulsion to Repeat the Trauma Re-enactment, 
Revictimization and Masochism, Psychiatric Clinics of North America, 12 (2) 389- 
411. 
Van Maanan, J. (1988) Tales of the Field. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Van Meijl, T. (2000) Modern Morals in Postrnodernity: A critical reflection on professional 
codes of ethics, Cultural Dynamics, 12(1): 65-81. 
Visser, M. (1994) The Way We Are. The astonishing anthropology of everyday life. London: 
Penguin. 
Walzer, M. (1977) Just and Unjust Wars. New York: Basic Books. 
Walzer, M. (1988) The Company Of Critics New York: Basic Books. 
Warner, S. (2001) Disrupting Identity Through Visible Therapy: A feminist post- 
structuralist approach to working with women who have experienced child sexual 
abuse, Feminist Review, 68: 115-139. 
Warner, S. (2004) Contingent Morality and Psychotherapy Research: Developing 
applicable frameworks for ethical processes of enquiry, Journal of Critical 
Psychology, Counselling and Psychotherapy, 4(2), 106-114. 
Weedon, C. (2004) Identity and Culture: Narratives of difference and belonging. 
Maidenhead: Open University Press. 
Weiland, S. (2003) Writers as Readers in Narrative Inquiry: Learning from biography, in R. 
josselson, A. Lieblich and D. P. McAdams (eds. ), Up Close and Personal. The teaching 
and learning of narrative research Washington, DC: American Psychological 
Association. 
Wengraf, T. (2001) Qualitative Research Interviewing: Biographic narrative and semi- 
structured methods. London, UK: Sage. 
261 
West, W. (1998) Critical subjectivity: use of self in counselling research, Counselling, 9, (3): 
228-230. 
West, W. (2001) Beyond Grounded Theory: The use of a heuristic approach to qualitative 
research, Counselling and Psychotherapy Research, 1 (2): 126-131. 
West, W. (2004) Spiritual Issues in Therapy: Relating experience to practice. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Westcott, M. (1968) Towards a Contemporary Psychology of Intuition: A historical, 
theoretical and empirical enquiry. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 
Wetherell, M. (2005) Formulating Selves: Social psychology and the study of identity, 
Keynote Lecture for British Psychological Society, Social Psychology Section 
Conference, Edinburgh, September 2005. 
Wetherell, M. (2006) Formulating Selves: Social psychology and the study of identity, 
Social Psychology Review, 8 (2): 62-72. 
White, M. (1995) Re Authoring Lives: Interviews and essays. Adelaide, Australia: Dulwich 
Centre Publications. 
White, M. (2000) Re-Engaging With History: The absent but implicit, in M. White (ed. ) 
Reflections on Narrative Practice. Essays and Interviews. Dulwich Centre 
Publications: Adelaide, Australia. 
White, M. (2002) Addressing Personal Failure, International Journal of Narrative Therapy 
and Community Work, 3: 33-76. 
White, M. and Epston, D. (1990) Narrative Means to Therapeutic Ends New York: Norton. 
Wilde, 0. (1895) Oscar Wilde, The Importance of Being Earnest, Act 1. 
Willig, C. (1999) Beyond Appearances: A critical realist approach to social constructionist 
work, in D. J. Cromby and J. Nightingale (eds. ), Social Constructionist Psychology: A 
critical analysis of theory and practice Buckinghaar. Open University Press. 
"214 
Willis, R. H. (1965) Conformity, Independence and Anticonformity, Human Relations, 18: 
373-388. 
Winslade, J., Crocket, K., Monk, G. and Drewery, W. (2000) The Storying of Professional 
Development, in G. McAuliffe and K. Eriksen (eds. ), Preparing Counsellors and 
Therapists: Creating constructivist and developmental programs, Virginia Beach, VA: 
Association for Counsellor Education and Supervision. 
Wittgenstein, L. (1958) Blue and Brown Books. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Wittgenstein, L. (1963) Philosophical Investigations (trans. and ed. G. E. M. Anscombe). 
New York: Macmillan. 
Wittgenstein, L. (1969) On Certainty. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Wolcott, H. F. (2005) The Art of Fieldwork 2nd Edition. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press. 
Wosket, V. (1999) The Therapeutic Use of Self. Counselling, practice, research and 
supervision. London: Routledge. 
Wright, J. K. (2003) Writing Therapy and Research: Stuck in the swamp between practice 
and...?, Journal of Critical Psychology, Counselling and Psychotherapy 31: 1-8. 
263 
